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ABSTRACT
Constructive-development and stage development theory, which posits that 
individuals move through different stages or action logics throughout life, has been the 
foundation for several models of human transformation. The literature on the leading 
stage theories indicates that research has focused on exploring stages and their behavioral 
correlates, but little work has been done on how individuals move between stages.
Stage theory has primarily been conceived o f as a linear and unidirectional 
transition from one stage to the next, which encompasses earlier stages, however 
emerging research has revealed that stage transition may be more fluid and bi-directional 
than originally thought and may involve fallback to earlier stages in certain circumstances. 
Further, fallback to an earlier stage o f meaning-making may prompt learning that can 
lead to growth.
The purpose of this study, which used grounded theory methodology, was to 
examine the phenomenon of fallback through twenty-seven interviews with six key 
thinkers in the field o f adult and leader development: Jennifer Garvey Berger, Susanne 
Cook-Greuter, Robert Kegan, David McCallum, Chuck Palus, and William Torbert. 
Several research questions guided this study, with the overall intention o f exploring 
fallback as situated within current developmental theory and learning how these key 
thinkers understand the fallback phenomenon. This research also examined the role that 
fallback may play in developmental growth, and how fallback might be studied in the 
future.
The findings are presented through the key thinkers’ own lenses, then through a 
cross-key-thinker analysis that suggests that fallback can indeed be understood through
the existing theory of stage development. Additional findings indicate that the most 
important criteria for defining fallback is the absence of options at the more complex 
level of development that one is capable -  be they in thought, feeling, behavior, or 
meaning-making -  and that fallback requires springing forward. This research 
demonstrates that fallback, under the right conditions has the potential to facilitate 
developmental growth, and that these conditions for growth to occur are most likely to be 
met by those in the post-conventional developmental stages. Finally, this exploration 
reveals the importance of having a theory for understanding fallback to both human and 
leadership development.
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Stage development theory has heretofore conceptualized human development as a 
forward-moving progression of meaning-making, one which has been likened to steps up 
a ladder. The theory accounts for the inclusion o f all stages o f development through 
which one has already progressed as part o f one’s overall meaning-making structure. 
However, stage development theory does not explicitly address the phenomenon of 
individuals making-meaning, not by choice, from a stage o f development that is less 
complex than the meaning-making capacity that one would expect based on an 
individual’s measured center-of-gravity stage -  a phenomenon that has been referred to 
as temporary regression (McCallum, 2008) or fallback  (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook- 
Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Torbert, 2004; Torbert, Livne-Tarandach, Herdman-Barker, 
Nicolaides, & McCallum, 2008).
Yet, the phenomenon of fallback in human development seems to be one that is 
universally experienced. In excluding the occurrence of unchosen earlier meaning- 
making than that which one is capable, the existing stage development theory denies the 
full lived experience of human beings. The research described herein explores the 
phenomenon of fallback in human development through the framework of constructive- 
development and stage development theories through explorations with six key thinkers 
in the fields of human development and leadership development. In so doing, this 
research 1) explicitly acknowledges the presence o f fallback, thereby making 
constructive-development theory more nuanced and accurate and 2) explores the
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paradoxically positive role fallback may play in both the lived experience o f 
developmental expression and in developmental theory.
Background
Constructive-development theory has provided the foundation for several models 
of human development, many o f which are based on stage development theory, which 
posits that individuals move through different developmental stages over the course o f 
their lives (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Kegan, 1982; Loevinger, 
1997; Torbert, 1991, 1994, 2004, 2010). A review o f literature on the leading stage 
theories concluded that most research has focused on exploring stages and their 
behavioral correlates, but little work has been done on how individuals move between 
stages (McCauley, Drath, Palus, Connor, & Baker, 2006).
Stage theory has primarily been conceived o f as a linear and unidirectional 
transition from one stage to the next, which encompasses all earlier stages (McCauley et 
al., 2006). The theory does allow for consciously accessing and choosing to act from a 
stage through which one has already transitioned. However, limited research has begun 
to show that developmental movement, while primarily forward-moving, does involve 
unconscious fallback to earlier developmental stages in certain circumstances, and this 
fallback to an earlier stage of meaning-making may prompt learning that can lead to 
developmental growth (McCallum, 2008). A more detailed explanation o f the theoretical 
framework of constructive-development theory and stage development follows in the 
next section.
Constructive-development theory and human development. Constructive- 
development theory proposes that context is paramount in the construction o f meaning
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(McCauley et al., 2006). Constructive as defined by Kuhnert and Lewis (1987) means 
that “humans create a subjective understanding of the world that shapes their experiences 
as opposed to their directly experiencing an objective ‘real’ world” (p. 650). The 
individual’s construction of meaning is influenced by both external and internal factors 
including one’s physical environment, one’s own actions, behaviors, and emotions, and 
one’s interaction with other individuals. One’s subjective construction o f meaning 
cannot be separated from the environment it is constructed within, nor can one’s human 
development.
Development is the expansion in people’s abilities to reflect on and understand 
their personal and interpersonal worlds made possible by increasing differentiation of 
one’s self from others and integration of the undifferentiated view into a complex and 
encompassing view (McCauley et al., 2006). As individuals transition from one stage to 
the next, the way in which they know the world broadens and leads to a qualitative 
transition in meaning-making and complexity (London & Maurer, 2004).
Through constructive-development, there is a transition from a focus on looking 
out for one’s self in the earliest stages to interpersonal connections and mutuality in the 
later stages. As an individual transitions to a more comprehensive stage, the prior stage 
is included, and one’s capacity to process more complex information and scenarios is 
enhanced (McCauley et al., 2006). The theory’s focus is on humans developing beyond 
their current capacity to make meaning of the world.
Several developmental theorists have articulated largely consistent, yet slightly 
nuanced approaches to the theory with divergence around nomenclature (stages, orders, 
action logics), the number and categories of developmental stages, and ways of
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describing the transition between developmental levels. Robert Kegan’s (1982) work 
expands upon the cognitive development theory o f Jean Piaget whose research focused 
largely on development through childhood. Susanne Cook-Greuter’s (Cook-Greuter, 
2000, 2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007) and William R. Torbert’s (Chandler & 
Torbert, 2003; Torbert, 1976, 1991, 1994, 2004; Torbert et al., 2008) research has 
primarily focused on the articulation of the post-conventional developmental stages.
O f all o f these developmental theorists whose primary focus has been on adult 
development, only Torbert has conducted empirical research focused on how a leader's 
developmental stage influences his or her ability to cultivate organizational 
transformation successfully, and how an organization's stage of development influences 
its ability to cultivate developmental transformation in its managers (Rooke & Torbert, 
1998, 2005; Torbert, 1991, 2004). Torbert (2004) refers to each stage o f development as 
an action logic and defines this term as “an overall strategy that so thoroughly informs 
our experience that we cannot see it” (p. 66). Throughout this document, stage and 
action logic are used interchangeably.
I have selected Torbert’s conceptual framework to explain constructive- 
development theory in greater detail given his research focus on the later stages of 
development and on the relationship between human development, leader development, 
and organizational development. This focus is helpful given my particular interest in the 
connections between human development and leadership development, and the research 
that indicates that it is at the post-conventional stages o f development that individuals are 
more capable of effectively exercising leadership (Rooke & Torbert, 1998, 2005; Torbert, 
1991, 2004). The primary action logics that order Torbert’s theory are detailed next.
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Action logics described. Torbert’s theory of human development consists o f 
eight primary developmental action logics that are categorized as either pre-conventional, 
conventional, or post-conventional (Torbert, 2004). The majority o f the population 
operates from a center-of-gravity action logic in the conventional category (Cook-Greuter, 
2004). One’s center-of-gravity is defined as “the most complex meaning making system, 
perspective, or mental model [that one has] mastered” (Cook-Greuter, 2004, p. 277). The 
conventional action logics are those through which individuals tend to progress earlier in 
life following their development from the pre-conventional Opportunist, through pre­
pubescence, the teenage years, and adulthood. These conventional or form al action 
logics are identified as Diplomat, Expert, and Achiever and are marked by an acceptance 
o f norms, structures, and relationships as given and impervious to an individual’s own 
influence (Torbert, 2004). Most individuals operating from a conventional 
developmental level interpret their experience through a lens o f taking existing 
conventions, norms, laws, and institutional structures for granted, rather than recognizing 
the possibility of acting in ways that can reconstruct such structures.
It is in the later, post-conventional or post-formal developmental stages that the 
simultaneous holding of facts, self-action, and self and other thoughts and feelings can be 
experienced (Torbert, 1994). The post-conventional action logics include the 
Individualist, Strategist, Alchemist, and Ironist. At these post-conventional action logics, 
individuals begin to recognize that pre-established structures are experienced differently 
by different individuals with varying ways o f making meaning, and that individuals not 
only shape the way they see conventions and structures, but can also directly influence 
these conventions and structures (Torbert, 2004).
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The action logics are not predicated on a person’s age, and there’s no guarantee 
that even through mature adulthood one will have transitioned through all o f the 
conventional action logics. In fact, very few individuals operate from the post- 
conventional action logics, making meaning of the world in a way that privileges their 
ability to influence it. Unlike development through pre-conventional and conventional 
action logics, which, at least in the case o f the earlier action logics, seems to take place 
fairly automatically, development to the post-conventional action logics requires a 
conscious effort to do so, facilitated by structures and environments that support this 
growth (Torbert, 2004; W.R. Torbert, personal communication, November 2, 2011).
Understanding the characteristics o f the stages of development contributes to an 
understanding of how fallback can be made sense o f within the existing theory. More in- 
depth descriptions of Torbert’s action logics, as well as the constructive-development 
theories o f Kegan and Cook-Greuter can be found in Chapter Two. Also important to 
framing fallback in developmental theory is understanding how developmental 
movement occurs. In the next section, I explore what is known in the existing stage 
development theory about developmental movement between each of these action logics.
Developmental movement. A review of literature on the leading stage theories 
of human development concluded that most research to-date has focused on exploring 
stages and their behavioral correlates, but little work has been done on how individuals 
move between stages (McCauley et al., 2006). W.R. Torbert (personal communication, 
November 2, 2011) explained why this may be: “The field as a whole is young...‘Adult 
development’ as a phrase is probably only 30 or 40 years old at the most.” In the 
theoretical research on developmental movement that has been conducted heretofore,
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stage theory has primarily been conceived o f as a linear and unidirectional transition from 
one stage to the next, which encompasses all earlier stages (McCauley et al., 2006). 
Certainly, the emerging research on the topic of transitioning from one stage to another is 
still limited, but research has revealed that stage transition may be more fluid and bi­
directional than originally thought (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; McCauley, et al., 
2006).
This fluidity in developmental movement has been captured in one recent 
empirical study. In this study, conducted during a group relations conference1,
McCallum (2008) identified the occurrence o f individuals operating from an action logic 
earlier than that which is their center-of-gravity action logic according to Cook-Greuter’s 
Integral Sentence Completion Test Maturity Assessment Profile (SCTi-MAP) 
developmental measure. The study’s findings suggested that all 18 participants, 
regardless o f the highest developmental action logic from which they were most regularly 
capable o f operating, experienced a phenomenon that McCallum (2008) referred to as 
temporary regression. This phenomenon in which one temporarily exhibits behavior that 
is noticeably different from his/her optimal developmental capacity, or center-of-gravity 
action logic, while under duress, has also been called fallback (Cook-Greuter, 2004; 
Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Torbert, 2004; Torbert et al., 2008).
While McCallum’s is the only known empirical study in the developmental field 
that has observed the phenomenon of fallback in individuals, many other developmental
1 Group relations theory provides a lens through which to examine the interaction of 
individuals, groups and organizations, and their mutual interdependence. Group relations 
conferences provide a real-time laboratory setting in which participants are empowered to 
take responsibility for their own learning while studying the influence o f unconscious 
activity on the group-as-a-whole (Getz, 2009; McCallum, 2008).
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theorists at least make mention in some form of the possibility of fallback to prior 
developmental action logics after individuals have moved on to subsequent 
developmental action logics (Cook-Greuter, 2000; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; 
McCallum, 2008; Torbert, 2004; Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008). Studies in the 
limited literature on fallback go on to suggest that this temporary falling out o f step with 
one’s center o f gravity meaning-making structure or action logic not only occurs, but also 
that this fallback, once it is recognized as such, may prompt learning that can support or 
lead to developmental growth (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; 
McCallum, 2008; McCauley, et al., 2006; Torbert, 2004).
Developmental movement may occur when a situation presents challenges that 
conflict with the way a person is accustomed to making sense of the world (Cook-Greuter, 
2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; McCauley, et al., 2006). This jarring dissonance 
also describes what happens when a person experiences fallback. One must often fall 
back in the face of challenge to what is familiar, in order to recognize that this familiar 
way of making meaning no longer supports the individual’s experience o f the world. 
Statement of the Problem
While these initial musings in the literature are helpful, a clear and universal 
definition of fallback has yet to be developed. The identification of fallback as an aspect 
of human development, and quite possibly an aspect that has paradoxically positive 
consequences for developmental growth, has largely been an ancillary bi-product of 
research focused on other topics, not the specific focus of study itself. Consequently, 
there is a need to conduct research intended to elucidate the phenomenon of fallback and 
its potential for transforming the developmental growth of individuals. Constructing an
9
understanding of how the fallback phenomenon fits in the existing theory o f human 
development is an important initial step.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose o f this study was to examine the phenomenon of fallback from the 
perspective of six key thinkers in the field of human development and leadership 
development, each representing a nuanced approach to constructive-development 
theory’s inner workings. Through interviews with the key thinkers in the field, I 
examined in some cases complimentary, in others contradicting theoretical conceptions. 
My goal was to develop a theory o f fallback that will add further explanatory power and 
accuracy to the existing theory of stage development while also uncovering the potential 
of fallback as an aid in the developmental transformation o f individuals. I also probed for 
a more deeply articulated and informed approach to conducting empirical research on 
fallback in the future.
This research was designed to understand how the fallback phenomenon might be 
explained within the existing constructive-development theory as well as through other 
theories by which the key thinkers have been influenced, to understand the space where 
theory and the lived experience of fallback meet, how the experience o f fallback when 
recognized as such might paradoxically lead to developmental growth, and how to 
deepen our understanding o f the fallback phenomenon through future research. I 
employed a qualitative research design using grounded theory as elaborated on by 
Charmaz (2006) and Bryant (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007) to answer the following research 
questions:
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1. How do we more deeply understand the fallback phenomenon as situated within 
current developmental theory?
2. How do key thinkers in the field o f adult development and leader development 
understand the fallback phenomenon within their own theoretical frame?
3. What role may fallback play in developmental growth?
4. How does each key thinker make sense of the stories that post-conventional- 
measured individuals tell about their fallback experiences?
5. How might the fallback phenomenon be researched with participants in the 
future?
In the next section, I detail the significance o f this research.
Significance of the Study
The broader implications of this research are apparent in the following four claims. 
First, while each individual’s meaning-making structure and experience of fallback is 
unique within the wider framework of his/her center-of-gravity action logic, the 
phenomenon of fallback appears to exist all along the developmental spectrum.
Cultivating a greater understanding of fallback, and understanding that fallback is an 
inevitable aspect of human development, no matter one’s developmental action logic, can 
help make the process—often marked by risk and ambiguity (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook- 
Greuter & Soulen, 2007; McCallum, 2008)— less frightening.
Second, identifying one’s primary fallback action logics and the circumstances 
which prompt the occurrence o f fallback, allows greater presence and awareness in the 
moment, enabling an individual to respond more effectively, and for fallback to be 
experienced as an opportunity for learning (Torbert, 2004). This learning may be a
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primary agent in developing the aptitude for more complex ways of making meaning o f 
the world, and may actually prompt human beings to transform to more complex 
developmental action logics.
Third, structured interventions have shown promising results in the developmental 
movement of an individual through post-conventional developmental stages (McCauley 
et al., 2006). This research may inform the design o f programs that can provide 
scaffolding and/or interventions that lead to quicker in-the-moment awareness o f fallback, 
leading to the capacity to regain one’s ability to make meaning at a more complex level, 
and offering the potential for learning to occur.
Finally, this research provides a contribution to the larger theory o f human 
development— specifically stage development theory—and leader development. 
Developmental movement to and through post-formal developmental action logics is 
largely unexplored. Yet, the ongoing study o f developmental action logics, leadership 
capacity, and the developmental movement that connects the two is integral to preparing 
leaders who are able to address the increasing complexities o f present and future 
communities of practice.
Definitions and Related Concepts
Throughout this dissertation, there are several key terms that will be used. Below, 
operationalized definitions are provided.
Action inquiry -  the practice o f simultaneously paying attention to a given 
situation, accomplishing prioritized tasks, and revising actions and tasks as 
necessary (Torbert, 2004).
Action logic -  an overall strategy that so thoroughly informs our
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experience that we cannot see it (Torbert, 2004).
Center-of-gravity (or “central tendency”) -  the most complex meaning- 
making system, perspective, or mental model one has mastered (Cook-Greuter & 
Soulen, 2007).
Domain -  1) The multiple intelligences of an individual including visual- 
spacial, musical, interpersonal, intrapersonal, bodily-kinesthetic, linguistic, 
logical-mathematical (Howard Gardner, 1993, as cited in Fischer & Rose, 1998); 
2) the “external-perspective term f ie ld ’ (Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & 
Krause, 1998, p. 252).
Highest sustained demonstrated score -  the developmental capacity that is 
measured on Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview (Berger, 2010, p. 255).
Order o f  development -  how one thinks and how one constructs reality 
(intangibles including feeling, thinking, and relating). Each order represents a 
different subject!object relationship: what is subject in one order becomes object 
in the next order (Bugenhagen, 2006).
Object -  separate from who one is (Kegan, 1982).
Stage -  the developmental structure, lens, perspective through which one 
understands and approaches one’s world.
State -  those aspects o f consciousness that are temporal, passing, 
experiential, and phenomenal.
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Subject -  part of who one is (Kegan, 1982).
Territories o f experience -  the realms of awareness, thought, action, and 




This review of the current literature explores the history of constructive- 
development theory in human development, with particular attention to stage 
development theory, the process o f developmental movement, and fallback in human 
development. The frameworks o f developmental theorists Robert Kegan, William R. 
Torbert, and Susanne Cook-Greuter are described in detail and provide the conceptual 
models against which the relationship between human development and leader 
development is explored.
The questions that guided this initial inquiry into the published literature include: 
What are the origins of constructive-development theory? What is known about the 
phenomenon of fallback in human development? What are the critiques to the existing 
constructive-development and stage development theories? What is the role o f human 
development in the exercise of leadership? It is to the subject o f human development and 
constructive-development theory, specifically, that I now turn. 
Constructive-Development Theory and Human Development
Constructive-development theory proposes that context is paramount in the 
construction of meaning (McCauley et al., 2006). Constructive as defined by Kuhnert 
and Lewis means that “humans create a subjective understanding of the world that shapes 
their experiences as opposed to their directly experiencing an objective ‘real’ world” 
(1987, p. 650). Development is the expansion in people’s abilities to reflect on and 
understand their personal and interpersonal worlds made possible by increasing 
differentiation of one’s self from others and integration of the undifferentiated view into a
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complex and encompassing view (McCauley et al., 2006). The theory’s focus is on 
humans developing beyond their current capacity to make meaning o f the world.
Abstracted from the fields o f biology (adaptation), psychology (ego), and 
philosophy (truth), the framework asserts both that the human experience is constructed 
within one’s environment, and that the environment is constructed by one’s experience 
(Kegan, 1982). “Constructive-developmental psychology reconceives the whole question 
of the relationship between the individual and the social by reminding us that the 
distinction is not absolute, that development is intrinsically about the continual settling 
and resettling of this very distinction” (Kegan, 1982, p. 115).
Constructive-development theory has provided the foundation for several models 
of human development, many that are based on stage development theory, which posits 
that individuals move through different developmental stages over the course o f their 
lives (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Kegan, 1982; Loevinger,
1997; McCauley et al., 2006; Torbert, 1991, 1994, 2004, 2010). As individuals transition 
from one stage to the next, the way in which they know the world broadens and leads to a 
qualitative evolution in meaning-making and complexity (London & Maurer, 2004; 
McCauley et al., 2006). Through stage development, there is a transition from personal 
goals in the earliest stages to interpersonal connections in the later stages. As an 
individual moves to a more comprehensive stage, the prior stage is included, and the 
capacity to process more complex information and scenarios is enhanced (McCauley et 
al., 2006).
Several developmental theorists have articulated similar, yet slightly nuanced 
approaches to the theory with divergence around nomenclature (orders, action logics,
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levels, stages) and ways of describing the transition between developmental stages. In 
this literature review, I focus primarily on the conceptual frameworks o f developmental 
theorists Robert Kegan, William R. Torbert, and Susanne Cook-Greuter with particular 
emphasis on their post-conventional levels o f development. I selected these 
developmental theorists, because they are three of the foremost, present-day thought 
leaders in constructive-development and stage development theories, and those who have 
most influenced my own thinking about human development and the phenomenon of 
fallback.
Kegan’s Orders of Development
Robert Kegan’s developmental framework outlines five orders through which 
individuals have the possibility to transform throughout their lives (see Table 1). The 
following assumptions apply to Kegan’s orders: the orders refer to how one thinks and 
how one constructs reality (intangibles including feeling, thinking, and relating). One’s 
approach to a situation is dependent upon one’s developmental order and the complexity 
o f the situation. Each order represents a different subject!object relationship: what is 
subject in one order becomes object in the next order (Bugenhagen, 2006).
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Table 1
Summary o f  Kegan’s Constructive-Development Subject-Object Transition
Order Subject Object
1: Impulsive Impulses, perceptions Reflexes (sensing, moving)
2: Imperial Needs, interests, wishes Impulses, perceptions
3: Interpersonal The interpersonal, mutuality^"*.S k  Needs, interests, wishes
4: Institutional Authorship, identity, psychic ^  
administration, ideology
s. The interpersonal, 
mutuality
5: Interindividual Interindividuality, 
interpenetrability of self 
systems
^  Authorship, identity, 
psychic administration, 
ideology
Note. Adapted from Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self: problem and process in human 
development, p. 86. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Subject, object, and the Subject-Object Interview. In 1988, Kegan created the 
Subject-Object Interview (SOI) to measure an individual’s complexity o f the mind or 
one’s “characteristic ways of understanding the world and organizing [one’s] experience” 
(Berger, 2010, p. 249). During an SOI, which generally lasts between sixty and ninety 
minutes, the interviewer asks questions to uncover the structure of a person’s meaning- 
making rather than the content. The interview is audio recorded and transcribed, and a 
trained scorer assesses what is subject and what is object for the interviewee and thereby 
measures the individual’s “highest sustained demonstrated score” (Berger, 2010, p. 255) 
or developmental order.
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A thorough explanation o f the subject/object relationship is integral to 
understanding Kegan’s developmental theory. An individual’s capacity to differentiate 
what is subject (part o f who one is) and what is object (separate from who one is) sets the 
tone for how the individual views a situation and the motivations that act upon that 
individual in any scenario. What is subject does not exist outside o f us (London & 
Maurer, 2004). It is an integrated aspect o f one’s self (Kegan, 1982). It is one’s 
subjectivity. As what is subject moves over to what is object in the process o f 
developmental movement, it becomes distinct, different, capable of being reflected upon 
object-ively. In other words, in the developmental transition between orders, one is able 
to separate and make meaning from what was once so closely held as part o f oneself, 
which now becomes an externalized object.
Subject/object relations is a study of one’s motion in the world (Kegan, 1982). As 
individuals transition from one order to the next through this movement o f subject to 
object, the way in which they know the world broadens and leads to a qualitative 
transition in meaning-making and complexity. This is so, because the transition from one 
order to the next is inclusive of and more complex than previous orders, resulting in an 
individual’s personality evolving qualitatively over time. This qualitative shift in 
meaning-making structure is marked by periods of stability and change (London & 
Maurer, 2004; McCauley et al., 2006), and according to Kegan, is the very process of 
“defending, surrendering, and reconstructing a center” (1982, p. 82). The process of 
developmental transition through the orders will be more thoroughly explored in the 
coming pages. First, I detail the characteristics o f Kegan’s developmental orders.
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Five orders of development. Kegan’s first order, Impulsive, is predominantly 
occupied by young children. Order one individuals are unable to understand a reality in 
which anything exists outside of their interaction with it. The “egocentrically embedded” 
(Kegan, 1982, p. 118) individual is ruled by one’s own impulses and perceptions. If  an 
object appears to be different, it must be as a result o f the object changing, not that the 
way one perceives that object has changed.
In the second, Imperial order, one has a “theory of impulse” which is ordered by 
one’s own needs, wishes, or interests (Kegan, 1982, p. 104). The Imperial individual can 
now experience the ambivalence o f two impulses at once, and can distinguish between 
one’s perception of an object changing, and the actual physical properties of an object 
having changed. In the second order, one is developing a sense of who I am (Kegan, 
1982), able to identify one’s own immediate needs and perceptions, but unable to 
appreciate the influence that one’s own personal goals and agendas have on one’s 
thoughts and feelings. Further, although the individual recognizes the existence o f others’ 
feelings, empathy is not possible at this stage. The second order individual identifies 
others as barriers to, or facilitators of, one getting what one wants. Children, teens, and 
some adults reside in this order (Bugenhagen, 2006).
Kegan’s third order, Interpersonal, is marked by a “fused commingling” of 
relationships (Kegan, 1982, p. 105). The Interpersonal individual is oriented to 
nurturance, affiliation, and organization of self according to the expectations of others. 
Once an individual has developed and transitioned to this order, one is able to recognize 
that one possesses a personal agenda and goals, but is unable to appreciate and reflect 
upon the influence that interpersonal connections have on one’s agenda and goals. While
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capable of distinguishing one’s own from others’ beliefs, the third order individual feels
responsible for others’ feelings (London & Maurer, 2004).
During emergence from the Interpersonal order, “the me-I-have-been starts to
look more like the expectations of other people, often one’s parents...” (Kegan, 1982, p.
205). The Interpersonal individual does not handle anger well, as it requires recognition
of one’s self as separate from another, a possibility that the individual has heretofore in
this order not been able to consider. Therefore, as one begins to emerge from the third
order, in lieu o f anger, feelings of disloyalty and selfishness are common. In the
Interpersonal balance, one is one’s relationships, and without the responsibility of
mutuality, one fears that one may cease to exist (Kegan, 1982).
It would follow, then, that as one transitions from the Interpersonal to the fourth
order Institutional, one often experiences intense feelings o f loss and loneliness.
... [It] phenomenologically amounts to, first, the relativizing o f what was taken for 
ultimate, a loss of the greatest proportion; and second, a period o f not-knowing, of 
delicate balance between what can feel, on the one hand, like being devoured in 
the boundarilessness of the old construction, and the selfishness, loneliness, or 
coldness o f being without ‘the interpersonal’ on the other. (Kegan, 1982, pp. 196- 
197)
The tools to handle this discord are present when an individual fully inhabits the 
Institutional order. In this balance one begins to possess “a sense o f self outside of 
connections to others” (London & Maurer, 2004, p. 234), which is gained through 
affiliation with societal and ideological institutions. In the Institutional balance, one sees 
one’s self as a self-governing and principled institution, yet possesses little insight into 
the limitations o f this self as a system. A fourth order individual possesses an 
internalized value system, which intertwines with one’s externalized commitment to
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relationship with others. Relationships exist, but they are relegated to their role in 
support of the self-system (Kegan, 1982).
The Institutional balance is ordered by perfectionism, certainty, self-esteem, 
successful self-maintenance and control, and independent accomplishment.
Dissatisfaction with goal achievement, achievement which was at one time the ultimate 
goal in the Institutional order, marks emergence from this order. There begins to be a 
self-conscious to be reflected on, and this is often experienced as a threat to self and a 
loss of agency characterized by “self-anger, self-shame, [and] fears about boundary loss” 
(Kegan, 1982, p. 223).
It is only when one reaches the fifth, or Interindividual order that one is able to 
cease monitoring the self as a system regulated by its affiliation to institutions and 
ideologies. One may hold concurrently an appreciation and questioning o f one’s own 
value system, and a desire to personally transform and to connect at an integral level with 
others. The Interindividual person assumes responsibility for one’s own transformation, 
seeking out feedback in a quest for authenticity. Contrastingly, in the Institutional 
balance, a critique of self would have been devastating. “Certainty” is the domain o f the 
Institutional order, while “tentativeness” is the hallmark of the Interindividual (Kegan, 
1982, p. 247). According to Kegan, individuals who operate in the fifth order are rare, 
and this order is not attainable before mid-life (as cited in London & Maurer, 2004).
In order five, one is able to understand the limits of one’s own system of 
principles, and is also capable o f understanding the nuances o f diverse opinions. The self 
is seen as “value-originating, system-generating, [and] history-making” (Kegan, 1982, p. 
104). Once in the Interindividual balance, performance is no longer “ultimate” (Kegan,
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1982, p. 105) and community is found beyond the affiliated organization. The 
Interindividual conceives community as one that all people, by virtue o f their humanity, 
have membership to. In the fifth order, one is able to both maintain one’s own distinct 
identity and recognize the distinct identity of others while also establishing a form o f self- 
and other-honoring intimacy and mutuality that is possible in none of the earlier, formal 
developmental orders (Kegan, 1982). The fifth order is Kegan’s first and only post- 
formal developmental stage, and it is to the explanation o f this classification of 
developmental orders that I now turn.
Kegan’s first four, or formal, developmental orders reveal a focus on intellect, 
thought, and reasoning. The meaning-making structures o f the formal orders are guided 
by a “dualistic... overarching ideology” (Kegan, 1982, pp. 229-230) in which sharp 
distinctions are drawn. Each formal order is marked by a tendency toward either over­
integration or over-differentiation, and the transition between the stages is a see-saw 
motion between the two extremes.
Contrastingly, at the post-formal Interindividual order, while form, structure, 
order and balance can be appreciated, they cease to be the ultimate context by which one 
defines the world (Kegan, 1982). In the post-formal order, the primary feature of reality 
is motion, process, and change— the movement through rather than within an 
environment. Systems are viewed in a larger context with a focus on the tension between 
them. The post-formal individual appreciates contradiction and recognizes the 
limitations o f intellectual solutions to moral problems.
In the Interindividual order, one recognizes one’s own connectedness with one’s 
community and the world at large (Kegan, 1982). To be sure, in the transition from
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formal to post-formal operations, there is a qualitatively different way o f being in the 
world; a way of knowing that we are all connected. No matter our developmental order, 
we are a perfect merging of opposites (over-integrated and over-differentiated), as 
individuals, and together with the rest of humanity (Kegan, 1982).
Kegan’s conceptions of formal and post-formal developmental orders form one of 
the early and most enduring frameworks for stage development theory. His 
developmental framework is built upon the work of Jean Piaget, whose research focused 
on the development of children within the formal stages of development. Kegan’s orders 
of development are based in constructive-development theory and explore the meaning 
individuals make.
In contrast, William R. Torbert’s and Susanne Cook-Greuter’s theory o f stage 
development is constructed on the logic that informs individuals’ actions as they navigate 
life, and is influenced by the ego development theory of Jane Loevinger (1997).
Torbert’s and Cook-Greuter’s developmental action logics are the subject o f the next 
section.
Torbert’s and Cook-Greuter’s Developmental Action Logics
Torbert, Cook-Greuter, and the Leadership Development Profile. Torbert 
sought a method for measuring the developmental capacity o f the students in his MBA 
program when he became Dean o f the Graduate School of Business at Boston College in 
the 1990s (Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008). He found Loevinger’s assessment o f ego 
development, the Washington University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT) (Walsh, 
1998), to be both psychometrically valid and demanding in determining how a person 
makes sense o f and acts in the world (Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008; Cook-Greuter &
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Soulen, 2007). He contracted with Cook-Greuter, a trained WUSCT scorer to assess the 
developmental stage of the students, thus beginning a collaboration that would span the 
next twenty years (Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008).
Torbert and Cook-Greuter collaborated extensively in the creation of the 
Leadership Development Framework and the associated developmental assessment, the 
Leadership Development Profile (LDP) which formed the basis for their theories and 
developmental measures. Torbert developed the Leadership Development Framework 
through a combination of synthesis o f existing theory and his own original research. 
Cook-Greuter expanded and refined Loevinger’s developmental measure to include more 
rigorous appraisal and definitions o f the post-formal stages o f  development and 
incorporate a focus on individuals in organizations (Cook-Greuter, 2004; McCauley et. al, 
2006), replacing Loevinger’s gender-focused sentence stems with work-related stems 
focused on teams, time, and power (Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008).
In the LDP, Loevinger’s “stage” was replaced by “action logic” in an effort to 
reflect the dynamic, multiple dimensions of a person’s experience, including reasoning 
and behavior (Torbert, 2004; Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008). Many of the names of 
the stages/action logics were changed, as well, in order to reduce the judgment Torbert 
felt was implied in Loevinger’s stage names and descriptions and to make them more 
descriptive, active, and better suited for feedback in organizational settings. For example, 
the “Conformist” stage was renamed “Diplomat,” and the “Self-aware” stage became the 
“Expert” action logic (Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008, p. 48). Instead o f referring to 
stages along the developmental continuum as lower and higher as had Loevinger, Torbert
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and Cook-Greuter referred to them as earlier and later action logics (Torbert & Herdman- 
Barker, 2008).
The Leadership Development Profile assesses the action logic which functions as 
an individual’s dominant way of making meaning (Rooke & Torbert, 2005) or an 
individual’s center-of-gravity action logic (Torbert & Herdman-Barker, 2008). The LDP, 
touted for the nuanced approach it provides to evaluating those at post-formal 
developmental action logics (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007), 
consists o f the beginning stems of 36 sentences which participants are asked to complete. 
Participant responses allow trained evaluators to construct images o f how participants 
frame their own actions and their world. Over the past 25 years, the LDP has been 
administered to thousands of professionals, primarily between the ages o f 25 and 55.
Torbert and Cook-Greuter eventually branched off to pursue their own particular 
interests in developmental theory. Cook-Greuter refined the original LDP into her own 
developmental measure, the Integral Sentence Completion Test Maturity Assessment 
Profile (SCTi-MAP), and now uses integral theorist Ken Wilber’s (2000) all-quadrant 
(AQAL) framework in her research and practice. Torbert continued to focus his theory 
and research on the post-conventional stages o f adult development and the implications 
of development for leadership and organizational success. The Global Leadership Profile 
(GLP) is the latest version of Torbert’s developmental leadership measure.
In an effort to maintain simplicity in the midst of an already complex theory, and 
given the similarities of Cook-Greuter’s and Torbert’s theoretical underpinnings, the 
following descriptions of Cook-Greuter’s and Torbert’s developmental action logics 
focus primarily on Torbert’s framework.
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Developmental action logics. Torbert’s theory o f human development consists 
of eight primary developmental action logics, which are defined as an overall strategy 
that so thoroughly informs our experience that we cannot see it (Torbert, 2004). These 
are categorized as either pre-conventional, conventional, or post-conventional (Torbert,
2004). The Opportunist falls in the pre-conventional category, because it makes its 
appearance prior to the influence o f conventions on the developing individual. Most 
individuals who make meaning from the Opportunist action logic are between the ages of 
six and twelve, though some adults can also be found at this stage (Torbert, 2004). The 
Opportunist’s focus is on mastering external reality, which may include exploiting other 
human beings to suit one’s own needs (Torbert, 2004; W.R. Torbert, personal 
communication, November 2, 2011). The Opportunist exercises power unilaterally, and 
this exercise is often marked by manipulation with little regard for the long-term 
repercussions o f one’s actions, particularly on relationships (Torbert 1991, 2004). 
Opportunists often see themselves as victims, and consequently, avoid taking 
responsibility for their actions and instead place blame on others (Torbert, 2004; W.R. 
Torbert, personal communication, November 2, 2011).
Conventional action logics. The conventional action logics are those through 
which individuals progress earlier in life through pre-pubescence, the teenage years, and 
adulthood following development from the pre-conventional Opportunist. The 
conventional action logics are identified as Diplomat, Expert, and Achiever and are 
marked by an acceptance of norms, structures, and relationships as given and impervious 
to an individual’s influence (Torbert, 2004). The majority o f the population operates 
from a center-of-gravity action logic in the conventional category (Cook-Greuter, 2004).
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The Diplomat, having emerged from the Opportunist’s self-focus, recognizes that 
others have their own point of view and conforms behavior to suit the expectations and 
preferences o f others (Torbert, 2004; W.R. Torbert, personal communication, November 
11, 2011). Those at the Diplomat action logic realize they can control the external world 
through their own behavior and through the coordination o f viewpoints, but are unable to 
hold separately the conflicting needs o f self and other, and often have trouble making 
decisions on their own. Diplomats often perceive themselves as victims, and receiving 
negative feedback becomes translated as a loss o f status (Torbert, 1991, 2004).
Diplomats’ aversion to feedback serves to reinforce this action logic when held during 
adulthood, though most individuals transition through the Diplomat action logic during 
their early teen years (Torbert, 2004).
From the Diplomat emerges the Expert action logic, which is able to prioritize 
claims by others within one’s own cognitive system. This action logic’s focus is on 
cognitive awareness and display o f the “intellectual symbols o f excellence and 
consistency” (Torbert, 1991, p. 45). The Expert values expertise, though often only in 
one’s own chosen field (McCauley et al., 2006), and rarely seeks or appreciates feedback 
unless it comes from “acknowledged masters of the craft” (Torbert, 2004, p. 80). The 
Expert seeks to stand out from others, is competitive, and is critical o f self based on one’s 
own standards o f perfection (Torbert, 2004).
Torbert’s final conventional action logic, the Achiever, works to incorporate the 
meaning-making tools from the three prior action logics -  Opportunist, Diplomat and 
Expert -  but with a different end goal. Rather than trying to personally advance, to 
maintain organizational norms, or to find the answer solely in one’s chosen field, the
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Achiever attempts to influence the entire system’s effectiveness through coordination of 
the external, behavioral, and strategic. However, the Achiever will not dare to do so 
through innovation, instead focusing on implementing a current strategy in an effort to 
influence (Torbert, 1991).
The Achiever’s main focus is goal achievement within the existing system 
through involvement with new and different projects. Success is measured by outcome, 
not process (McCauley et al., 2006; Torbert, 2004; W.R. Torbert, personal 
communication, November 2, 2011), though the Achiever values mutuality over 
hierarchy (Torbert, 2004). Unlike the Expert, the Achiever welcomes feedback, and 
looks for opportunities to improve, but is only able to internalize this feedback if it fits 
within one’s self-chosen cognitive and ethical framework (Torbert, 2004).
Most individuals operating from a conventional developmental action logic 
interpret their experience through a lens o f being influenced by the world they interact 
within; rather than influencing the world and their experience of it through their own 
intentional interactions. It is in the later, post-conventional developmental stages that the 
simultaneous holding of facts, self-action, and self and other thoughts and feelings can be 
experienced (Torbert, 1994).
As individuals advance through the post-conventional developmental stages, they 
begin to link theory, principles, and practice through awareness, thought, action and 
effect (McCauley et al., 2006). This interplay o f awareness, thought, action, and effect, 
or the territories o f  experience (Torbert, 1994; Torbert et al., 2008), are integral concepts 
in Torbert’s work, particularly within his post-conventional action logics. Each o f the
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post-conventional action logics will be described in detail in the coming pages, but I first 
describe Torbert’s four territories o f experience.
Territories o f  Experience. Torbert, et al. (2008) described the four territories o f 
experience to which all individuals have access. The first territory o f experience is the 
outside world, or the facts and stimuli that are external. One’s own behavior marks the 
second territory. The third territory encompasses an individual’s thoughts and behaviors 
and those o f others, which guide our actions. The fourth and ultimate territory is known 
as transcognitive awareness, or the ability to be aware of all o f the territories at once 
(Torbert et al., 2008).
While individuals are able to explore each o f these territories separately, their 
capacity to make meaning with more than one territory at a time is influenced by their 
stage of human development. For example, the Opportunist only has access to the 
experience o f the outside world. Yet, the Diplomat can make sense o f one’s own 
experience through reflection on the outside world and one’s own behavior, and is able to 
regulate the former to influence the latter. The Expert is able to access both the prior two 
territories and one’s own thoughts and behaviors in a quest for perfection and efficiency 
(Torbert, 2004). While not noted explicitly in Torbert’s description o f stages and 
territories o f experience, I would argue that the Achiever, according to the characteristics 
o f this action logic, has access to the first two territories as well as the full spectrum of 
territory three which includes not only one’s own thoughts and behaviors, as accessed by 
the Expert, but also the thoughts and behaviors o f others. It is in the later, post- 
conventional developmental stages that territory four -  the simultaneous holding of facts, 
self-action, and self and other thoughts and feelings -  can be experienced (Torbert, 1994).
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The post-conventional developmental action logics have been the focus o f Torbert’s most 
recent work on human development and developmental movement and are described in 
greater detail next (Chandler & Torbert, 2003; Merron, Fisher, & Torbert, 1987; Rooke & 
Torbert, 1998, 2005; Torbert, 1991, 1994; Torbert et al., 2008).
Post-conventional action logics. The post-conventional action logics include the 
Individualist, Strategist, Alchemist, and Ironist. At these post-conventional action logics, 
individuals begin to recognize that reality is not pre-established, that it is experienced 
differently by each individual according to one’s unique way of making meaning, and 
that individuals not only shape the way they see reality, but can also influence the 
structures and conventions that contribute to one’s reality (Torbert, 2004).
Also referred to as inter-independent (McCauley et al., 2006), the four post- 
conventional developmental action logics are characterized by an individual 
understanding o f one’s power to determine who he or she is and who he or she is 
becoming. Inter-independent individuals appreciate the usefulness o f conflict and display 
a willingness to question and revise their own goals and principles. Individuals in the 
post-conventional action logics are more aware of incongruities in self (Torbert & 
Herdman-Barker, 2008). Mutuality is the goal, and negotiation is used to discover 
commonalities.
Postconventionals are more likely to (a) reframe presenting problems and 
constraints; (b) recognize diverse frames or action-logics and to deliberately seek 
to create shared vision; (c) use a collaborative inquiry process in implementing 
solutions; and, (d) spot incongruities among their own territories o f experience, 
such as between what they advocate and what they actually do. (Torbert & 
Herdman-Barker, 2008, p. 51)
The Individualist is Torbert’s first post-conventional action logic, and is the first 
of the developmental action logics at which moment-to-moment awareness is beginning
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to be experienced (W.R. Torbert, personal communication, November 2, 2011). The
Individualist is aware of conflicting emotions which often result from being . .in part
engaged in a journey that reevaluates all prior life experiences and action logics” (Torbert,
2004, p. 102). The Individualist’s newfound ability to deconstruct the assumed frames
which regulated meaning-making in the conventional action logics, combined with one’s
barely burgeoning ability to apply post-relativistic principles in one’s current making o f
meaning can result in an inability to make decisions.
The Individualist is a bridge between two worlds. One is the preconstituted, 
relatively stable and hierarchical understanding we grow into as children, as we 
learn how to function as members of a preconstituted culture. The other is the 
emergent, relatively fluid and mutual understandings that highlight the power of 
responsible adults to lead their children, their subordinates, and their peers in 
transforming change. (Torbert, 2004, p. 102)
The Individualist seeks out different perspectives, and assigns less judgment to 
these and to those who hold them than did the Achiever. Awareness o f one’s own 
shadow side -  those aspects o f self which humans seek to deny and often project onto 
others -  comes to the surface for the first time (Torbert, 2004).
The Strategist is Torbert’s second post-conventional developmental action logic, 
and the first stage at which a person has momentary access to a comprehension o f self 
and environment as mutually intertwined (Torbert, 1994). Strategists appreciate that each 
person views the world from a unique frame (as do Individualists) (Rooke & Torbert,
1998; Torbert, 2004), yet they are also able to honor the evolving nature o f individuals 
(Torbert, 2004). The Strategist is capable of creating a shared vision across different 
action logics, while also being open to having one’s own perspective changed (Torbert,
2004), allowing Strategists to serve as effective agents of change (Rooke & Torbert,
2005). Governed by principles that they choose themselves, not mles assigned by others,
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Strategists value finding the best solution over imposing their own (Torbert, 1994), and 
are willing to expose and discuss personal and organizational constraints and 
shortcomings in order to transform them (Rooke & Torbert, 2005). Authenticity is a 
hallmark of the Strategist action logic. Strategists are both goal- and process-oriented 
(Rooke & Torbert, 1998), motivated to work towards organizational and even global 
change (Rooke & Torbert, 2005), and are committed to the ongoing development o f both 
self and others (Torbert, 2004).
Strategists are intrigued by their simultaneous need to be recognized as 
individuals while also being in-relationship with others (Rooke & Torbert, 1998; Torbert, 
1994). Precisely because Strategists are so effective at leading, often in transformational 
ways, their perspective can paradoxically become over-powering, blocking the creation 
of shared understanding and solutions that initially led to the Strategist’s success. 
Strategists may become enamored with their own theory, forgetting that the contributions 
of many led to the theory’s creation, and that each moment and situation presents new 
opportunities for evaluation, interpretation, and theory-development (Torbert, 1991).
In the third post-conventional developmental action logic known as the Alchemist 
(also referred to as Magician and Clown), persons consistently operate from all four 
territories o f experience at once, allowing others’ perspectives to be held in equal regard 
to their own, recognizing the interconnected roles of self, others, and organization and the 
influence generated by each on the other (Torbert, 1994). The self-aware Alchemist is 
able to observe one’s inner process concurrently alongside the ongoing transaction 
process with the outer world and other people (W.R. Torbert, personal communication, 
November 11, 2011). More awareness leads to more noticing o f incongruities (Torbert &
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Herdman-Barker, 2008), and the Alchemist, recognizing that there is a constant shift in 
developmental state, seeks to influence one’s own action logic in the moment (W.R. 
Torbert, personal communication, November 2, 2011).
Alchemists are capable o f holding multiple and conflicting perspectives in time 
and space, and recognize important moments as they occur (Rooke & Torbert, 1998,
2005). The Alchemist’s principles are self-created and inform their purpose and action 
(Rooke & Torbert, 2005). Flexibility in their ability to reinvent themselves and their 
organizations differentiates Alchemists from Strategists (Rooke & Torbert, 2005).
Further, unlike Strategists, Alchemists can claim their own shadow side, resist projecting 
it on others, and instead, use their charisma to support the development o f others (Torbert, 
1994).
Similarly, Ironists, those at the fourth post-conventional developmental action 
logic, are able and inspired to use themselves and their mastery of the four territories of 
experience as instruments to advance the learning and development o f others and the 
growth of the system as a whole. Often, Ironists take up their roles in a manner that is 
contrary to their natural inclinations, which allows them access to a different kind of 
experience. This foreign perspective allows the Ironist to come into contact with a 
different way of knowing and understanding, which expands the possibility o f mutuality. 
Further, Ironists, in taking up their roles in this way, become aware o f characteristics of 
the system that may otherwise have gone unnoticed (Torbert, 1994).
At these two final action logics, Alchemist and Ironist, transformation of self and 
organization comes easily as does a consistent presence in the fourth territory of 
experience. Torbert points out the rarity o f this level o f development, noting in one o f his
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earlier studies of managers the absence of a single participant operating from either the 
Alchemist or Ironist action logics (Torbert, 1991). In fact, the very names given these 
latest stage action logics are a nod to their elusive existence (Torbert, 1991).
Table 2 (below and also in Appendix A) provides a brief description o f Torbert’s 
main action logics (listed sequentially from earliest to latest), and the corresponding 
percentage of the population by which they are represented based on empirical studies 
conducted using developmental assessment instruments (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook- 
Greuter & Soulen, 2007).
The action logics are not predicated on a person’s age, and there’s no guarantee 
that even through mature adulthood one will have transitioned through all o f the 
conventional action logics. Very few individuals operate from the post-conventional 
action logics, making meaning of the world in a way that privileges their ability to 
influence it. Unlike development through pre-conventional and conventional action 
logics, which, at least in the case o f the earlier action logics, seems to take place fairly 
automatically, development to the post-conventional action logics requires a conscious 
effort to do so, facilitated by structures and environments that support this development 
(W.R. Torbert, personal communication, November 2, 2011).
35
Table 2
Brief overview o f  each o f  Torbert’s eight main action logics
Action logic (the primary stage 
or level from which one makes 
meaning of their world)
Main focus (of an individual’s 
interaction with the world)
Percentage 
o f adult 
population 
(n=4,510)
1 - Opportunist -  needs rule 
impulses
Own immediate needs, 
opportunities, self-protection
4.3
2 - Diplomat -  norms mle 
needs
Socially expected behavior, 
approval
11.3
3 - Expert -  craft logic rules 
norms
Expertise, procedure and 
efficiency
36.5
4 - Achiever -  system 
effectiveness rules craft logic
Delivery of results, effectiveness, 
goals, success within system
29.7
5 - Individualist -  relativism 
rules single system logic
Self in relationship to system; 
interaction with system
11.3
6 - Strategist -  most valuable 
principles mle relativism
Linking theory and principles 
with practice, dynamic systems 
interactions
4.9
7 - Alchemist 
(Magician/Clown) -  deep 
processes and intersystemic 
evolution mle principles
Interplay of awareness, thought, 
action, and effects; transforming 
self and others
2.0
8 -  Ironist -  intersystemic 
development mles process 
(Torbert, 1994)
Generating ambiguity (Torbert & 
Herdman-Barker, 2008); 
transforming others through own 
role transformation (Torbert, 
1994)
?
Note. Adapted from Cook-Greuter, S. R. (2004). Making the case for a developmental 
perspective. [Technical paper]. Industrial and Commercial Training, 36(7), p. 279; 
and Cook-Greuter, S. R., & Soulen, J. (2007). The Developmental Perspective in 
Integral Counseling. Counseling & Values, 51(3), p. 188.
The strength of Torbert’s theory of stage development and action logics is that it 
has evolved over the years. However, this evolution, specifically of action logics, may 
leave the Torbert enthusiast a little perplexed. There are numerous changes in the action 
logic nomenclature throughout Torbert’s publications, and in some cases, the outright
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omission of certain action logics altogether. Even following a chronological path does 
not provide a complete picture of the action logic evolution. Finally, the Ironist action 
logic has not been proven to exist, leaving one to wonder if it is merely a myth.
Torbert’s developmental action logics, particularly those in the conventional 
category, bear close resemblance to Kegan’s developmental orders, yet are classified 
differently within the conventional/formal, post-conventionaL/post-formal realm. They 
can be viewed comparatively in Table 3.
A review of literature on the leading stage theories concluded that most research 
has focused on exploring stages and their behavioral correlates, but little work has been 
undertaken to reveal how individuals move between stages (McCauley et al., 2006). It is 
to the process o f developmental movement that I turn next.
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The tenets o f stage development theory indicate that developmental movement is 
a linear and unidirectional transition from one stage to the next sequential stage, each 
stage increasing in complexity. As each stage is transitioned through, the stages through 
which one has already traversed are encompassed and are capable of being reflected on 
from the later order meaning-making structure (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; McCauley 
et al., 2006). While those at later developmental stages can understand individuals at 
earlier stages, the reverse is not true (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007).
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Developmental growth happens when one turns away from the self that is known,
because that self is no longer functional in avoiding displeasure (Kegan, 1982). In other
words, developmental movement is precipitated when one’s current meaning-making is
no longer sufficient to construct the increasing complexity of one’s environment
(McCauley et al., 2006). Kegan notes,
Every balance’s irritability is simultaneously testimony to its capacity to grow and 
its propensity to preserve itself. Every new balance represents a capacity to listen 
to what before one could only hear irritably, and the capacity to hear irritably 
what before one could not hear at all. (1982, p. 105)
In the process of development, one is “defending, surrendering, and
reconstructing a center” (p. 82), as one emerges from embeddedness in one stage, thereby
making object what was before subject (Kegan, 1982). Kegan describes the process as
one o f “recoverable loss” (1982, p. 129). What we separate from in one developmental
stage, we find anew in the next (Kegan, 1982). Once one achieves a higher action logic,
the needs characteristic of the earlier action logics have a different pull, and one’s
response to these needs will be different (W.R. Torbert, personal communication,
November 11, 2011).
Developmental movement occurs when a person experiences existential
awareness, or is present in multiple territories of experience (Torbert, 1994). Existential
awareness can be defined as positive, negative, or reconciling (Torbert, 1994). Positive
awareness results when individuals are aware that their intentions at all levels are in
alignment, for example, “saying what one means and doing what one says” (Torbert,
1994, p. 184). Negative awareness occurs when there is a disconnection across territories
(Torbert, 1994), when behavior hasn’t yet caught up to thought and feeling (Kegan, 1982;
W.R. Torbert, personal communication, October 14, 2011). Kegan, describes this as
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“meeting up with experience in the world that cannot be made sense o f according to my 
present way o f organizing reality” (1982, pp. 169-170). Reconciling moments take place 
during a “crisis of meaning” (Kegan, 1982, p. 240), when what worked or made sense 
before does no longer, the contemplation of which leads to a more inclusive 
understanding of multiple territories (McCauley et al., 2006; Torbert, 1994).
Developmental movement can be triggered through both challenges (Kegan,
1982; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; W.R. Torbert, personal communication, October 14, 
2011) and opportunities, including personal changes, external events and changes in 
environment, and planned and structured developmental interventions (Rooke & Torbert, 
2005; McCauley et al., 2006; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007). Personal changes such as 
becoming a parent, developing new relationships, and seeking out spiritual practice and 
forms o f self-expression provide the opportunity to examine existing patterns and 
assumptions and to experiment with new ways of acting (Rooke & Torbert, 2005). 
External events, such as a promotion, or changes to a business environment or tasks can 
prompt development of different skills, and the necessity to view situations from a 
different perspective. Structured interventions have shown promising results in the 
developmental movement of an individual through post-formal developmental stages 
(McCauley et al., 2006). In fact, Cook-Greuter and Soulen (2007) claim that the complex 
world requires individuals to develop to post-conventional action logics.
While many organizational management and leadership programs focus on 
development through goal achievement, developmental movement through action logics 
or orders is qualitatively different. Torbert notes that it entails making vulnerable current 
ways o f knowing, allowing space for the unknown to enter, and re-evaluating the very
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structures of reality as they are currently viewed (Torbert, 1991). Kegan describes 
developmental transition as “the motion o f life” (1982, p. 123), which entails “loss and 
recovery, separation and attachment, anxiety and play, depression and transformation, 
[and] disintegration and coherence” (1982, p. 44). Even when individuals are dissatisfied 
with their current worldview, experiencing the discomforting ambiguity o f a different 
way o f understanding creates frustrations that may prevent change (Torbert, 1991).
Similarly, Torbert points out that developmental movement between action logics 
at the post-conventional level is qualitatively different from that of earlier action logics. 
The post-conventional action logic individual is no longer looking to transform self 
within an organization, but now seeks communities o f collaborative inquiry through 
which to transform society (Rooke & Torbert, 2005). While individuals operating from 
conventional action logics seek mentors, post-conventional action-logic individuals seek 
the development of existing relationships to challenge their assumptions, their practices, 
and their purpose. A person’s attraction to those at the next highest action logic is often 
an indication of an individual’s readiness to transform to the next action logic (Rooke & 
Torbert, 2005). Cook-Greuter and Soulen (2007) similarly point to self-reflection, action, 
inquiry, dialogue, and surrounding oneself with those further along the developmental 
spectrum as prompts for human development.
While the stage development theorists highlighted to this point focus on 
sequentially-forward movement along the stair-steps o f development as measured by 
assessment of one’s espoused behavior, feeling, thinking, and overall meaning-making, 
other theorists provide a critical lens to this approach. In the next section, two critiques 
of stage development theory are offered.
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Critiques of Stage Development Theory
Stage development theory posits that development takes place through sequential, 
forward movement o f one’s entire meaning-making system through stages o f increasing 
complexity. However, some theorists claim that stage development theory is far too 
simplistic to represent the true complexity o f human development.
Dynamic Skills Framework. Fischer and Rose (1998) argue that the stair-step 
ladder approach of stage development is a gross oversimplication o f what happens during 
development. Instead, they posit that cognitive capacity develops separately across 
different domains and levels (Fischer & Rose, 1998). They reference the concept of 
domains as used in Howard Gardner’s (1993, as cited in Fischer & Rose, 1998) 
framework of multiple intelligences (e.g., visual-spacial, musical, interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, bodily-kinesthetic, linguistic, logical-mathematical). They define 
developmental level as “each round o f the growth cycle” (Fischer & Rose, 1998, p. 56), 
and note that one’s optimal level o f development is the most complex skill or 
understanding one can produce. However, Fischer and Rose posit that one’s optimal 
level of development is generally only produced in highly supportive environments, 
which they suggest are rare in everyday life. They claim that lower level functioning 
takes place in most normal and frequently present environments, therefore individuals 
need to learn how to operate effectively in the normal environments that do not support 
optimal developmental functioning (Fischer & Rose, 1998).
Based on research in cognitive neuroscience, Fischer and Rose suggest that there 
is a relationship between the development of the brain, specifically the cerebral cortex, 
and thinking and learning (1998). Their research indicates that there are multiple growth
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cycles of both the brain and mind that occur in humans between zero and 30 years of age 
(Fischer & Rose, 1998). According to Fischer and Rose’s “dynamic skills framework” 
(1998, p. 56), development is flexible, and variable, and marked by complexity and chaos 
similar to that found in mathematical theory. Fischer and Rose claim that individuals 
experience different levels of developmental growth independently but in parallel along 
different domains (1998). There is no sudden transformation in development. 
Development takes time, though optimal skills do show sudden spurts.
Fischer and Rose posit that the repetition of growth cycles throughout the first 
three decades o f one’s life provides a new capacity for learning and thinking that may 
have been missed in earlier cycles (1998). They suggest that the repeated cycles of 
growth explain the human capacity for plasticity of earlier psychological and 
neurological trauma, particularly when later cycles take place in a more supportive 
environment (Fischer & Rose, 1998). This has interesting implications not only for one’s 
later capacity to develop generally in those domains which were not fully developed 
earlier, but specifically for how one may grow through earlier periods o f trauma that may 
have caused stunting of development in certain domains. While this seems great news 
for the capacity of individuals to develop to the age of 30, Fischer and Rose do not 
indicate how development takes place once the occurrence o f these multiple cycles has 
ceased.
General Model of Hierarchical Complexity. While Fischer and Rose (2008) 
through their Dynamic Skills Framework argue that stage theory is too simplistic to 
describe the chaotic nature of development that occurs at different levels which vary 
across different domains, the General Model o f Hierarchical Complexity (GMHC)
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(Commons et al., 1998) offers a different critique o f stage development theory.
Commons et al. critique stage development theory’s focus on behavior-focused linkages 
to developmental sequence as empirical evidence o f stages, claiming to have proven 
stage development theory through the analytic lens of their GMHC (Commons et al., 
1998).
The authors (Commons et al., 1998) acknowledge the existence o f developmental
stages, posit that stages are inclusive o f the lower stages through which they have
transformed, and contrary to Fischer and Rose, claim that developmental stages are
constant across domains (which Commons et al. define as the “external-perspective term
f ie ld ” p. 252). However, Commons et al. takes issue with stage development theory’s
use of behavioral “evidence” to identify one’s stage of development. In this article,
“stage” is based on the hierarchical complexity o f a task and one’s performance based on
that task (Commons et al., 1998). The authors explain,
With tasks as the fundamental elements to be measured, task analysis and the 
sequential ordering of tasks are alone sufficient to form a “ stage”  sequence.
From the order of hierarchical complexity o f tasks, then, it is possible to derive an 
analytic measure o f stage. (Commons et al., 1998, p. 241)
The GMHC claims to provide an objective measure o f an individual’s
developmental stage by determining if the subject successfully completes this task that
has been associated with this level o f complexity. The GMHC measures only from the
outside in based on performance, not one’s subjective experience, capacity, or
competence (Commons et al., 1998).
Further, the authors (Commons et al., 1998) criticize the seemingly abrupt
occurrence of a new stage and sudden disappearance of a former stage as indicated by
current stage development measures. They identify challenges with the Subject-Object
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Interview specifically, noting that no task has been identified in the assessment of the 
stage. Instead, the task is inferred by the researcher (Commons et al., 1998).
The authors seem to argue that in the absence o f a formally defined task that an 
individual must complete, it is difficult to measure if  the individual has met the task 
requirements of that stage. In contrast to the stage theories developed by Kegan, Cook- 
Greuter, and Torbert, the GMHC framework of stage development privileges action over 
meaning-making and the way one shows up rather than the capacity one has to do so.
While the prevailing literature on stage development theory, including that of 
Commons et al. (1998), posits that development through the stages is largely forward, 
other theorists such as Fischer and Rose (2008) indicate that development is much more 
chaotic and random. Even within the traditional Kegan, Torbert, Cook-Greuter camp of 
stage development some developmental theorists allude to the possibility of 
developmental movement that is more fluid and bi-directional. What is currently 
accounted for in the literature on fallback in human development is detailed next.
Fallback in Human Development
As noted before, one o f the tenets of constructive-development theory is that 
development unfolds through a specific sequence with each next stage transcending and 
incorporating the previous stage. McCauley et al. in their review o f the literature on 
constructive-development theory specifically note, “In general, people do not regress; 
once an order of development has been constructed, the previous order looses its 
organizing function, but remains as a perspective that can now be reflected upon (2006, p. 
636).” Similarly, Cook-Greuter and Soulen write, “Once a stage has been traversed, it 
remains a part of the individual’s response repertoire, even when more complex, later
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stages are adopted (2007, p. 184). Additionally, Torbert (2004) points out that as 
individuals progress to later action logics, they have more tools available to make choices 
about which action logic to use given a specific circumstance. It seems clear that one has 
the ability to choose to use an earlier action logic than one’s highest measured action 
logic. However, one empirical study set in the midst of a group relations conference 
found that an involuntary acting from an earlier stage is also possible.
McCallum’s Fallback Finding. In his 2008 dissertation research, McCallum 
found that all 18 of his participants, regardless of their center-of-gravity action logic (as 
measured through Cook-Greuter’s SCTi-MAP) experienced “temporary regression” or 
“fall-back.” McCallum defined fallback as “ .. .a temporary regression o f undetermined 
duration that is catalyzed by experiences of anxiety and distress such that individuals 
behave with a logic of action that is markedly less complex and adaptive than their 
developmental capacity suggests is possible” (2008, p. 135). He claimed, “ .. .with regard 
to fall-back, a participant’s developmental maturity as assessed by the SCTi[-MAP] may 
indicate one’s meaning-making center of gravity, but it does not preclude temporary 
regression into a way of sense-making and/or acting consistent with earlier action logics” 
(McCallum, 2008, p. 255).
McCallum suggested that individuals’ developmental capacity is significantly 
influenced by context (2008). He identified anxiety, distress, and confrontation as 
catalysts for fallback. His participants’ experiences of fallback included disorientation, 
confusion, rage, excessive self-criticism, aggression, accommodation, conflict-aversion, 
and reversion to childhood patterns.
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McCallum noted that participants also experienced temporary depression caused 
by rejection, disappointment, marginalization, hostility, criticism, loneliness, and loss of 
agency (2008). McCallum found that those in later action logics experienced less 
diversity in the action logics they fell back to than did those at earlier action logics.
The participants caught themselves in fallback by noticing their own 
inauthenticity, that they were acting out o f character, and that they had forgotten their 
normal tools. Perhaps not surprisingly based on what we know about the differing 
developmental characteristics o f various stages, the participants in McCallum’s study 
noticed and recovered from fallback at different paces and in different ways. The Experts 
needed time to notice their regression and self-correct. Likewise, those measured as 
Achievers in McCallum’s study were only able to see fallback and learn from it after the 
fact. However, those measured as Strategist or Alchemist were aware o f their “shadow” 
(McCallum, 1998, p. 144) even as they were experiencing it. McCallum found that 
though it may seem that those at later stages fell back less frequently, given their faster 
noticing of falling back the later stage individuals were able to recover from it more 
quickly. McCallum noted that though the time to notice their fallback differed, 
participants at all action logics had the capacity to take responsibility for their role and 
took comfort in this accountability. In McCallum’s research, fallback had the capacity to 
lead to learning (2008).
In contrast to fallback, McCallum identified the use o f  “coping mechanisms” by 
his participants. He defined coping mechanisms as “ .. .behaviors that are largely self- 
protective and that helped participants manage their anxiety more than they assisted in 
leading or learning in the moment” (2008, p. 153). He identified many o f the same
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behaviors exhibited by those in fallback as those employed through coping mechanisms, 
however he noted that coping led to “missed opportunities” that actually prohibited 
learning as long as they trumped re-engagement and awareness (McCallum, 2008, p. 152).
McCallum pointed to the importance o f his finding o f fallback in individuals 
noting that it helps raise awareness o f situations that trigger fallback, suggesting that 
awareness will help individuals develop the capacity to self-support through periods o f 
duress and resist regression. He recommended: paying closer attention to the dynamic 
relationship between developmental capacity and context and conditions; interventions 
that make fallback more explicit in the moment for the learning of self and others; data 
gathering on regression that includes more than just self-report; and specifically, the 
creation o f developmental assessments that help track patterns of regression.
Fallback in constructive-development literature. While McCallum’s is the 
first and only empirical study to my knowledge that identifies fallback in human 
development, there has been feint mention o f the phenomenon (if not by name) by the 
stage development theorists dating back to Kegan’s The Evolving Self (1982). Kegan 
notes, “Human being is the composing o f meaning, including, o f course, the occasional 
inability to compose meaning, which we often experience as the loss o f our own 
composure (p. 11).” In fact, the see-saw motion back-and-forth between the stage one is 
aspiring to, and that which one is leaving behind in the process of developmental 
transition is well-documented (Kegan, 1982). Kegan describes the process as one of 
“loss and recovery, separation and attachment, anxiety and play, depression and 
transformation, disintegration and coherence” (1982, p. 44). However, fallback outside 
its occurrence in developmental transition is not something Kegan has acknowledged in
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his writing. Instead, he has posited that one may revisit old issues but does so at a whole
new level o f complexity with the full use o f the tools one has from one’s highest
developmental capacity (Kegan, 1982).
In contrast, both Torbert and Cook-Greuter have acknowledged fallback in their
writing. Torbert wrote,
In addition to our primary action-logic, we each tend to have one particular 
secondary or fallback action-logic to which we retreat when we are under 
duress—when we feel insecure, ill, angry, or exhausted or when visiting our 
parents in our childhood home. This fallback position is well worth knowing and 
remembering at the moment o f action in order to avert ineffectiveness and bad 
feeling. (2004, p. 68)
Cook-Greuter and Soulen (2007) also identify regression in human development
that is caused by life circumstances, environment, stress, or illness. They write, “Under
pressure and rapid change conditions, people often resort to behavior patterns from
earlier stages (p. 185).” However, in contrast to McCallum’s (2008) claim that those at
later action logics fall back as frequently as those at earlier action logics, Cook-Greuter
and Soulen (2007) suggest that those at later action logics have a greater ability to hold
steady in the face of ambiguity and pressure and to not fallback.
Following McCallum’s research, and perhaps based on it, the fluidity o f
developmental movement has been more widely acknowledged in the literature. In a
conference paper presented during a session at the 2008 Integral Theory in Action
Conference, Torbert et al. state,
While development is often understood as a process o f moving from one stable 
action-logic to the next more open action-logic that transcends and includes the 
earlier action-logics, recent research indicates that development is actually a more 
fluid phenomenon, with more likelihood of falling back to earlier action-logics in 
action than has previously been imagined. Although theoretically the 
postconventional action-logics give persons or teams increasing capacity to 
influence their environment, in fact it appears that developmental capacity seems
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to fluctuate to some degree based on the context in which a person is situated and 
on the contingencies that they are facing in the moment, (p.21)
Certainly, the emerging research on the topic of transitioning from one stage to
another is still limited, but recent research has revealed that stage transition may be more
fluid and bi-directional than originally thought (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007;
McCauley, et al., 2006). Further, the learning that may be generated as a result of
fallback could have potential for prompting developmental growth and may have broader
implications for individuals in organizations (McCallum, 2008). One o f  the prevailing
themes of a review o f literature on constructive development is how current stages of
development predict leadership behavior (McCauley et al., 2006). It is to this
relationship between human development and leader development that I now turn.
The Relationship between Human Development and Leader Development
Organizations as systems face the same challenges as any other system
(community, family, marriage), and must ask the question “to which is it more committed
-  the present evolutionary state o f its constituents, or the bigger picture o f the person as
the process of evolution itself?” (Kegan, 1982, p. 248). Workplaces that face this
decision and choose commitment to the present evolutionary state often lose the valuable
human capital that strives for ongoing development. This development and striving for
such is the best source of information and resources for the organization’s continued
growth and for the leadership that is integral for success and change in the world today
(Kegan, 1982). Human development cannot be divorced from leader development if
leadership at its highest aspirations is to be exercised.
According to the characteristics o f the stages or orders o f development, one’s
capacity to understand, empathize with, and aid in the growth of others is directly tied to
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one’s own human development. One’s developmental stage has an impact on one’s own 
motivations and the methods one uses to motivate others through one’s understanding of 
and ability to relate to another’s developmental stage. Analyzing Kegan’s developmental 
orders through the lens o f leadership will make this relationship explicit.
Kegan’s developmental orders through the lens of leadership. As the reader 
may recall, Kegan’s second or Imperial order, where one sees that one’s own way is the 
best, and perhaps even the only way, defines a relationship to others that revolves around 
the leader getting what s/he wants. As long as the leader is able to offer the follower 
something the follower wants or needs, the relationship will remain functional. When 
this need satisfaction breaks down, the leader is unable to access other leadership tools, as 
s/he is incapable of comprehending motivations and communicating a vision other than 
her/his own.
Once individuals develop and transition to the third, Interpersonal, order, they are 
able to recognize that they possess a personal agenda and goals, but are unable to 
appreciate and reflect upon the influence o f interpersonal connections. That which is 
subject to an individual, the thing that the individual cannot see -  in this case, 
interpersonal connections -  inhibits one’s development. In other words, in the 
Interpersonal order, while one may understand that s/he is acting to accomplish one’s 
own goals, s/he does not realize that s/he is equally motivated by interpersonal 
connections. However, these interests play a role as s/he attempts to exercise leadership 
through emphasis on the shared values o f the leader and follower and a concurrent 
striving to actualize the needs o f both parties.
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Interpersonal individuals are often team players with a shared professional 
identity. While they are able to internalize diverse perspectives, they have not yet 
achieved a sense of self-ownership. Instead, they are willing to sacrifice their individual 
and the organization’s goals and growth for the appeasement of others (London &
Maurer, 2004). Interpersonal individuals, through their ability to recognize the 
perspectives of others, may exercise interpersonal influence only as long as the 
continuum of diversity between their and others’ perspectives is not vast. In this order, 
too much dissent has the capacity to result in leaders giving up their attempt at leadership 
in favor o f harmony with others. Leadership can be painful for both leader and follower, 
and is often lonely.
Self-ownership and self-motivation are the hallmarks o f the fourth order, 
Institutional balance. Perhaps because fourth order individuals are autonomous and self­
driven, they find difficult “motivating others around a vision, working with those who are 
not self-empowering, being honest and sensitive, and working collaboratively. They are 
self-empowered but not yet able to think of themselves objectively” (London & Maurer, 
2004, pp. 234-235). Personal goal achievement and perfection are the focus for the 
Institutional individual, and one’s embeddedness in one’s own autonomy is a weakness 
(Kegan, 1982), particularly when it comes to the exercise o f leadership.
Individuals in the fifth, Interindependent, order operate from an integral 
perspective, and therefore are adept at finding common ground and mediating conflicts 
(Kegan, 1982). The Interindividual balance recognizes the integration of the many 
narratives that contribute to a system through the shared construction o f reality. Similarly, 
in the exercise of leadership, the collective ownership of advancing the system and its
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individuals resides in the group itself and results from the sense made by the group o f its 
divergent perspectives (Ospina & Sorenson, 2006).
As I have alluded through the exploration o f Kegan’s orders o f development 
through a lens o f leadership, at the later stages of human development, one has evolved 
the capacity to distinguish subject from object and therefore has the capacity to 
understand the motivations o f those at the same and earlier development levels. This 
understanding o f others’ frames of meaning-making allows leaders to customize their 
approach to the potential follower using language and motivations that both can 
understand. Yet, this conclusion is based on mere speculation, since in the reviewed 
literature, I was unable to locate any empirical research conducted by Kegan linking 
human development to leader development. In fact, in another review o f literature 
(McCauley et al., 2006) in which both Kegan and Torbert were included, it is noted that 
only Torbert empirically explored how developmental movement changes the way 
individuals approach leadership and management (Rooke & Torbert, 1998, 2005; Torbert, 
1991). A review of the empirical studies that have examined the relationship between 
human development and leadership is the subject o f the next section.
Torbert’s empirical studies of the relationship between human development 
and leadership. Torbert’s empirical studies o f the relationship between human 
development and leadership were primarily conducted prior to the evolution o f the LDP 
into what is now the Global Leadership Profile. In a meta-analysis o f the quarter century 
of LDP results, developmental action logic was positively correlated with leadership 
capacity. Action logic predicted levels of organizational and individual performance. 
Those measured at the post-conventional action logics (Individualists, Strategists and
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Alchemists), demonstrated consistent capacity to lead organizational transformations 
(Rooke & Torbert, 2005).
In a study of ophthalmologists of differing developmental action logics, the 
business practices o f participants measured at the Strategist action logic far outperformed 
the practices of participants measured at two conventional stages: Achiever and 
Technician (now referred to as Expert) (Torbert, 1991). Gross annual business revenue 
of the medical practices run by Strategists was three times greater than that o f participants 
at the conventional stages (Torbert, 1991).
In this study, qualitative responses to interview questions revealed a distinct 
difference in the manner in which the ophthalmologists at the three action logics (Expert, 
Achiever, and Strategist) made meaning of their broader environment. The Strategist 
ophthalmologists’ worldview incorporated a focus on technical expertise and 
relationships which was similarly noted by individuals at the two conventional action 
logics, but also included a capacity to identify market niches and form strategic business 
partnerships. This finding lends support to the assertion that individuals at the Strategist 
action logic, given their business results, are often promoted (Torbert, 1991). However, 
this hypothesis does prompt a question along the chicken and egg line. Are Strategists 
promoted to leadership positions because o f their capacity to navigate complex 
organizational environments, or do complex organizational environments prompt the 
development o f Strategist capacities (Torbert, 1991)?
Another study conducted by Torbert explored the relationship between ten CEOs 
and the success o f their respective organizations. Five CEOs were measured at the 
Strategist action-logic and five at pre-Strategist action logics. The organizations o f all
54
five Strategist CEOs transformed positively, while only two o f the five organizations led 
by pre-Strategist CEOs transformed positively. Two o f the other three pre-Strategist 
CEO-led organizations did not transform positively, and one regressed. In all ten cases, 
researchers at the Strategist or Alchemist action logic served as consultants to each CEO.
These findings indicate that leaders’ developmental action logic and that o f their 
closest advisors accounts for 59% of the variance in the positive transformation of their 
organizations (rho=.651, one-tailed p<.01) (Torbert, 2010). Further, CEOs at the 
Strategist action logic specifically have a strong likelihood o f influencing positive 
transformation in their organizations (Rooke & Torbert, 1998).
The five CEOs who measured at the Strategist action-logic on the LDP were 
associated with organizations that positively transformed as measured by organizational 
growth and profitability, customer and employee satisfaction, reputational measures, 
archival data, and “thick descriptions.” The authors suggest that Strategist action-logic 
CEOs whose exercise of leadership is marked by mutual (not unilateral) power, and who 
are self-reflective practitioners who inquire about and adjust their own actions to increase 
effectiveness and encourage the same in others, are more effective at positively 
transforming the organizations they lead (Torbert, 2010).
Two o f the five CEOs who measured at conventional action logics (one Expert 
and one Achiever), and whose consultant measured at the Alchemist post-conventional 
action logic were associated with organizations that also experienced positive 
transformation. In these two instances, the CEO either treated the Strategist 
consultant/researcher as a close confidant or shared leadership influence with the senior 
management team and consultant. The researchers do not hypothesize about whether
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there was developmental movement o f these CEOs, and did not note if developmental 
action logic was assessed at the end of the study period in addition to at its beginning.
The inclusion of this data could have important implications for the understanding of how 
close interaction with individuals at later developmental action logics might influence the 
developmental movement of individuals at earlier action logics.
Two more of the organizations led by conventional action logic CEOs (Achiever) 
with Strategist-measured consultants did not transform at all. And, the organization led 
by a Diplomat-measured CEO paired with an Alchemist consultant actually regressed on 
the organizational action logic continuum. In these three cases of organizations that did 
not transform positively even with consultant interventions, the pre-Strategist CEOs 
distanced themselves from the post-conventional consultants/researchers and their 
broader leadership team (Rooke & Torbert, 1998).
The authors suggest that the lack of positive organizational transformation in 
these organizations may have been the result o f consultants’ interventions that were not 
well-matched to the CEOs’ action logics. Specifically, the interventions utilized may 
have caused too much risk and anxiety for the earlier stage CEOs, while the same 
intervention with the Strategist CEOs would have a positive effect coming from an 
individual with a similar frame for viewing the world (Rooke & Torbert, 1998). This is 
an interesting suggestion given that those at post-conventional action logics should be 
able to more effectively provide feedback in a way that can be understood, even by those 
at earlier action logics according to Cook-Greuter and Soulen (2007).
The measurement of organizational action logic held strong inter-rater reliability 
(1.0 reliability on if organizations transformed, and .9 reliability in agreement on the
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number of transformations in each organization). However, the researchers do not 
reference any inter-rater reliability testing on the exact assessment o f starting and ending 
organizational action logics. For instance, the raters may have agreed that there were 
three levels of positive organizational transformation, but it is not noted if they agreed on 
which organizational action logic the organizations were measured at in the beginning 
and to which they transformed.
The lack of a common definition of both “organizational transformation” and 
“leadership” is a shortcoming o f Torbert’s research connecting developmental stage to 
organizational transformation and leadership. Without an equally well-validated and 
descriptive instrument for measuring both organizational transformation and leadership, 
together and separately, the relationship between developmental stages and these two 
concepts is unable to be linked without critique.
Despite the limitations o f these particular studies, research suggests that human 
development is critical to leader development (Getz, 2009; Martynowych, 2006; Merron 
et al., 1987; Rooke & Torbert, 1998, 2005; Spence, 2005; Torbert, 1991, 1994). It is 
clear that those at earlier stages o f development are only able to approach leadership from 
certain perspectives given that they have access to only the meaning-making perspectives 
that they themselves have transitioned through (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007). Those at 
later stages are privy to a broad repertoire of leadership approaches, which include those 
at both the higher and lower ends o f the leader/follower exchange spectrum by virtue of 
themselves having transitioned through a greater number o f stages o f meaning-making, 
which are inclusive of the earlier stages (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007). Therefore, in
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order to develop a leader, one must first focus on how to support the development of the 
human.
An understanding of what prompts human development at the post-conventional 
action logics is integral to the development o f leaders who operate from a framework in 
which diverse perspectives are sought and explored for their ability to transform mental 
models, existing structures and practices are examined against principles, transforming 
power originates not from an individual but from the collective awareness o f the group, 
personal development is linked to development and understanding of communities of 
practice, and mutuality is the goal. As organizations confront increasingly complex 
challenges, it is important to understand developmental movement, what catalyzes it, and 
how it can be channeled in the development o f leadership capacity. Action inquiry as a 
tool for prompting developmental movement through post-formal developmental stages 
is explored next.
Action inquiry as a structure to support developmental growth. Action 
inquiry is the practice of simultaneously paying attention to a given situation, 
accomplishing prioritized tasks, and revising actions and tasks as necessary. Torbert 
developed the practice of action inquiry as a tool to catalyze developmental movement 
(McCauley et al., 2006). In fact, action inquiry and Vedic/Transcendental Meditation are 
the only two educational interventions that have empirically been shown to facilitate 
developmental transformation beyond formal operations (Torbert, 1994).
Formal educational settings that offer lengthened exposure (one to two years) or 
that are intense and repeated were identified as effective settings for action inquiry 
prompting developmental movement (Rooke & Torbert, 2005). These settings, which are
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designed to encourage in-the-moment awareness and to produce dissonance in order to 
allow participants both reason and opportunity to challenge their current meaning-making 
frames (Rooke & Torbert, 2005), include Bath University’s two-year master’s degree 
program, the University o f San Diego’s leadership program’s group relations courses, 
and Boston College’s master’s o f business administration (MBA) program.
The concurrent responsibilities of action inquiry are described as first-person, 
second-person, and third-person practice (Chandler & Torbert, 2003). In first-person 
practice, the individual is part of and an active contributor to the situation, able to 
determine what is most helpful in advancing the work of self and others. In second- 
person practice, an understanding o f the environment is gained through seeking out 
others’ views and sharing one’s own perspective on the identification o f patterns, 
perceptions, influence, and growth. Third-person practice takes place through attention 
to both one’s own actions and external information that contributes to an understanding 
o f the situation. In the practice of action inquiry, while actively working in real time on a 
project with others, one is challenged to access all levels of experience -  the situation, 
one’s own behaviors, and how self and others’ thoughts and behaviors influence action. 
First-, second-, and third-person practice provides the transcognitive awareness that is 
present in the fourth territory of experience (Chandler & Torbert, 2003).
Torbert has identified similarities between action logics of individuals and those 
of organizations (Rooke & Torbert, 1998), and the post-conventional organizational 
settings may provide the kinds of structures that have been shown to facilitate 
developmental growth in individuals (W.R. Torbert, personal communication, November 
2 & 11,2011). The Strategist individual’s organizational counterpart is referred to as
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collaborative inquiry. Its characteristics include open discussions to reveal differences, 
directly addressing potential conflicts, and a commitment to collectively creating the 
strategies and structures o f the organization rather than accepting those that currently 
exist (Rooke & Torbert, 1998).
These characteristics are similar to those of the group relations theory-in-practice 
courses at the University o f San Diego in which the class is used as a laboratory to 
explore issues of authority, leadership, and organizational change. Participants are 
empowered to take responsibility for their own learning while studying the influence o f 
unconscious activity on the group-as-a-whole (Getz, 2009; McCallum, 2008). The 
unconventional pedagogical approach used provides an environment for exploration of 
self in relation to others and to the embedded contexts of systems. In this environment, 
discomfort and ambiguity are ever-present and are intended to be made explicit, thereby 
providing a rich environment in which to practice developmental interventions and 
conduct research focused on human development’s links to leader development.
A five-year longitudinal self-study of a University of San Diego faculty member’s 
experience in teaching leadership to undergraduate students offers scaffolding to the 
concept o f action inquiry (Getz, 2009). Five group relations, case-in-point, experiential 
learning courses provided a setting in which to engage learners, both students and faculty, 
in the three levels of analysis: introspection; interactions with others, group or any sub­
system within the whole; and the larger organization (Getz, 2009). The learners were 
charged with practicing action inquiry as a disciplined way of becoming aware o f what’s 
happening in the moment and taking action based on this knowledge in keeping with the 
group’s purpose.
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While action inquiry was used as a tool to teach leadership to the students rather 
than to teach the students about leadership, the professor/researcher discovered a broader 
use for action inquiry in the development o f self. Specific benefits o f action research 
noted by the researcher include improved ability to make thoughtful decisions, assistance 
for those aspiring to leadership to gain confidence, and increased capacity to “hold steady” 
through conflict (Getz, 2009). Personal reflection as a necessary tool for development 
was also identified in this study (Getz, 2009).
Respect for the individual, organizational effectiveness, and an encouragement o f 
innovation characterize liberating disciplines, the Ironist’s organizational counterpart. 
These environments provide supports that are accessible to all members at each stage of 
development and encourage developmental transformation (Torbert, 1987). Liberating 
disciplines are marked by an open structure in which all participants can exercise 
leadership, a commitment to correcting inconsistencies, and an ongoing cycle o f action 
and inquiry (Rooke & Torbert, 1998), which closely matches Boston College’s master’s 
in business administration program design.
The Wallace E. Carroll School o f Management at Boston College designed its 
MBA program to include specific elements encouraging post-formal development 
through action inquiry (Torbert, 1994). The program highlighted each participant’s 
potential for critical thought, and did not require adherence to one theory. On the job 
training in giving, receiving, and responding to feedback was provided to participants on 
all four levels of experience. Additionally, feedback was encouraged as close to the 
experience as possible. Findings indicate that those measured at later action logics 
sought out opportunities for developmental growth. For example, students who
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volunteered to explore the action inquiry approach through consulting roles and ongoing 
practice experienced development to later action logics (Torbert, 1994).
In action inquiry, researchers are participants and participants are researchers. If 
empirical research instruments are used, they are developed with or agreed upon by the 
participants (Torbert, 1994). The goal is to create communities of inquiry to address 
issues o f concern and in pursuit of the development o f individuals in communities of 
social practice (Chandler & Torbert, 2003; Torbert, 1994). In action inquiry, as in the 
post-formal developmental action logics, the purpose is to become aware o f incongruities 
that exist, simultaneously observe the four territories o f experience, and bring 
authenticity to the practice in a quest for integrity, mutuality, and transforming power 
(Chandler & Torbert, 2003).
Torbert’s work with its efforts to explore the connections between human 
development, developmental movement, and leadership capacity, has wide-scale 
implications for both theory and practice. A theoretical understanding of how humans 
make meaning and how their meaning-making structures inform their ability to practice 
leadership, not only as individuals, but also in concert with society, should be a key 
component of leadership studies. The practical value o f this knowledge lies in the 
potential for research to uncover the catalysts for developmental movement. Action 
inquiry, with its focus on communities of practice, timely action and reflection, and 
transformation of all participants is key in providing an actionable, real-world tool for 
developing individuals to their highest selves in pursuit of leadership, organizational, and 
societal transformation.
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These examples illustrate how the relationship between human development and 
leadership development has been explored to-date, and how research might be undertaken 
in the future. Additionally, fascinating research is currently being undertaken to 
understand how the structure o f the brain may influence the structure o f the mind, and the 
implications of this connection to the exercise o f leadership. In the next section, one 
particular strand o f brain/mind/leadership research is described.
Connecting the structure of the brain with structure of the mind and 
implications for leadership. Research in the developmental field is turning more 
frequently to an exploration of the linkages between the physical organ of the brain and 
the mind (Fischer & Rose, 1998; Rock & Schwartz, 2007; Rock, 2008). Emerging 
research focuses on the integration of psychology (the study o f the human mind and 
behavior, which forms the basis for constructive-development theory) and neuroscience 
(the study o f the anatomy and physiology of the brain) (Rock & Schwartz, 2007).
According to research in the field of social neuroscience, much o f social behavior 
is driven by the organizing principle o f reducing threat and maximizing reward. Several 
domains o f social experience draw on the same brain networks as those used in survival 
situations (Rock, 2008). David Rock (2008) in his SCARF Model has identified five 
domains o f human experience that motivate threat and reward responses in the brain: (a) 
Status -  how one is perceived by others, (b) Certainty -  ability to predict the future, (c) 
Autonomy -  sense o f control and o f having choices, (d) Relatedness -  sense o f safety 
with others, and (e) Fairness -  “perception o f fair exchanges between people” (p. 1).
These social triggers are first processed through the amygdala, part o f the limbic 
system in the brain. The amygdala plays a role in categorizing stimuli to the brain as
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“approach” (good) or “avoid” (bad) stimuli (Rock & Schwartz, 2007). In a reflexive
reaction, the limbic system and amygdala respond before conscious processing is able to
occur. Threat (avoid stimuli) perceived as such by the amygdala results in reduced
functioning of the prefrontal cortex where the cognitive mind his housed and where linear
conscious processing takes place. Under threat, the basal ganglia, the part o f the brain
located near the core “where neural circuits of long-standing habit are formed and held”
(Rock & Schwartz 2007, p.l 1), are activated. As a result, the brain adopts less nuanced
responses, retreating to what’s safe and “shrinking from opportunities, as they are
perceived to be more dangerous” (Rock, 2008, p. 3).
The basal ganglia can function exceedingly well without conscious thought in any 
routine activity. In contrast, working memory fatigues easily and can hold only a 
limited amount o f information “on line” at any one time. Therefore, any activity 
conducted repetitively (to the point of becoming a habit) will tend to get pushed 
down to the basal ganglia, the habit-center part of the brain. This frees up the 
processing resources o f the prefrontal cortex. (Rock & Schwartz, 2007, p .l 1)
Understanding the interaction between the brain and the cognitive mind has
significant implications for a more nuanced understanding o f how individuals are able to
make meaning and the circumstances in which their most complex meaning-making may
be beyond their physiological reach. It would seem that one’s well-established meaning-
making becomes engrained in the habitually-oriented basal ganglia. In general, but
particularly under threat situations (such as those related to status, certainty, autonomy,
relatedness, and fairness), when the necessary energy for the prefrontal cortex where the
conscious mind resides is redirected to the amygdala, the basal ganglia, or that which is
well known, steps in. This may be the physiological explanation for what happens in
fallback when one unconsciously makes meaning from a less complex stage of
development than one would otherwise be capable.
64
Rock and Schwartz identify specific recommendations for leaders in 
organizations, noting that threats to the five SCARF areas reduce capacity to collaborate 
and persuade, limit empathy and feelings o f  connectedness, and cause individuals to 
become emotional, to act more impulsively and to resist change (2007; 2008). Rock 
posits that the value of knowing the social drivers that motivate threat is that one is able 
to avoid them in self and avoid generating them in others. He also points to the 
importance of naming and reframing these triggers and the impact they may have (Rock, 
2008). He emphasizes focusing on the positive, thereby allowing individuals to create 
their own mental models o f what the positive vision looks like, and to create their own 
solutions.
Rock and Schwartz suggest that awareness is critical to successfully changing the 
structure of the brain (2007), and note that “people’s expectations have a significant 
impact on what they perceive” (p. 11). Regular focus and attention on a particular thing 
engrains patterns in the brain around that thing and new neuropathways can be formed. 
Rock and Schwartz also point to the importance o f increased attention in moments of 
insight.
The findings suggest that at a moment of insight, a complex set of new 
connections is being created. These connections have the potential to enhance our 
mental resources and overcome the brain’s resistance to change. But to achieve 
this result, in the brain’s limited working memory, we need to make a deliberate 
effort to hardwire an insight by paying it repeated attention. (2007, p. 15)
Many of Rock’s and Schwartz’s recommendations including those related to the
power of naming and positive focus; the importance o f knowing, accepting and reducing,
when possible, the circumstances that trigger threat responses in the brain; and holding
steady during moments o f insight have relevance to the phenomenon o f fallback in
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development. First, the science of the interaction between the brain and the mind 
suggests that mental maps play a central role in human experience. This emphasizes the 
importance o f not only naming fallback, but also exploring the positive role it may play 
in development. Second, by naming fallback and identifying its triggers, one is able to 
attempt to avoid them in self and create circumstances and environments in which they 
may be avoided by others. Yet, also accepting the inevitability of the fallback and 
recognizing that it has the capacity to be in the service o f learning allows the creation o f 
safe spaces in organizations and on teams for people to be vulnerable and bring their full 
self. The experience of fallback may prompt moments of insight. Rock’s SCARF model 
emphasizes the importance o f staying present in these moments of learning rather than 
withdrawing from the situation and allowing the established patterns o f the basal ganglia 
to take over.
The relationship between the structure of the brain and the mind and the 
subsequent implications for the exercise o f leadership provides a different lens through 
which to view human development and leadership. Future research specifically focused 
on the linkage between human development and leadership should attempt to address 
limitations that exist in this field o f study, which are next described.
Limitations of research on human development and its relationship to 
leadership. The ongoing study of post-conventional developmental action logics, 
leadership capacity, and the developmental movement that connects the two is integral to 
preparing leaders who are able to address the increasing complexities o f present and 
future communities of practice. However, research in this subject area is challenging. 
Assessing developmental action logic is time-consuming, the instruments expensive, and
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the data complex, requiring manageable, and therefore, small samples (McCauley, et al., 
2006). Given the somewhat nascent explorations o f the connections between the fields of 
human development and leader development, research designs have also been limited. 
Existing research in this area has largely focused on a limited range of developmental 
levels, and primarily those at the conventional action logics from which the majority o f 
the population makes meaning (McCauley et al., 2006), yet not those at which individuals 
have been shown to have the highest capacity to exercise leadership.
Further, the majority of studies on development, leadership, and developmental 
movement specifically, have been of brief duration. Torbert’s hypothesis that individuals 
can develop through action logics and that this development supports leadership has been 
supported in a handful of research projects (Rooke & Torbert, 2005). However, 
developmental movement takes time. Only three examples from the research exist of 
individuals transforming twice in less than four years (Rooke & Torbert, 2005). 
Longitudinal studies should be the focus of future research in this area to allow for a 
comprehensive understanding of how individuals develop over time and how this 
movement influences their leadership capacity.
Another limitation of this area of research is its lack o f generalizability (Chandler 
& Torbert, 2003). Action logics are distinguished by consistent characteristics, however 
the essence o f the action logic of individuals is their distinctiveness based on each 
individual’s unique worldview. This worldview is constructed through one’s particular 
interaction with and influence upon one’s environment, and conversely, one’s 
environment’s interaction with and influence upon the individual (Kegan, 1982; Cook-
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Greuter & Soulen, 2007). One’s unique experience o f the world cannot be oversimplified 
by application to the masses.
In the next chapter, I describe the methodological approach I undertook in 
exploring one particular aspect of one’s experience of the world, an aspect that has 





The Purpose of the Study & Research Questions
The purpose o f this study was to examine the phenomenon o f fallback through 
interviews with six key thinkers in the field o f developmental theory, each representing a 
nuanced approach to the theory’s inner workings. Five research questions guided this 
study:
1. How do we more deeply understand the fallback phenomenon as situated within 
current developmental theory?
2. How do key thinkers in the field of adult development and leader development 
understand the fallback phenomenon within their own theoretical frame?
3. What role may fallback play in developmental growth?
4. How does each key thinker make sense o f the stories that post-conventional-measured 
individuals tell about their fallback experiences?
5. How might the fallback phenomenon be researched with participants in the future?
I employed a qualitative research design using grounded theory methodology. This 
approach to research methodology is detailed in the next section.
Research Design: Grounded Theory Method
The grounded theory method is based on the claim that “theory emerges from the 
data” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 32). Analysis is conducted throughout the research 
process, thereby allowing the analysis of the data to inform the data collection process. 
The method advocates looking anew at concepts and categories through an ongoing 
process of “coding for actions and theory construction, successive comparative analyses,
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inductive-abductive logic, memo-writing, theoretical sampling, and theoretical 
integration” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 51).
The grounded theory method was perfect for the research I undertook: collecting 
data, allowing the theory to emerge by understanding each key thinker’s perspective of 
the fallback phenomenon, noting the similarities and differences between key thinkers, all 
in order to better elucidate the phenomenon of fallback. Charmaz wrote, “through 
comparing other scholars’ evidence and ideas with your grounded theory, you may show 
where and how their ideas illuminate your theoretical categories and how your theory 
extends, transcends, or challenges dominant ideas in your field” (2006, p. 165). More 
detail about how the grounded theory method was utilized in data collection and analysis 
is included in the sections that follow.
Research Participants
Identification and selection. I conducted a series o f interviews with six “key 
thinkers” in the field of adult development and leader development. For the purposes o f 
this study, a key thinker is defined as one who has done extensive thinking around models 
of developmental theory that one or several o f the originators o f the theory created. 
Another distinguishing factor for key thinker classification was that they have also 
integrated these models into their own research and application in the adult development 
and leadership development fields. As a result, they were able to draw upon the 
experience of individuals positioned all along the developmental continuum through their 
own extensive empirical research and practice in the field. In addition, the key thinkers 
had access to their own experiences as humans who have themselves traversed the 
developmental spectrum.
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The basic tenets of stage development theory are a common thread that all o f the 
selected key thinkers share. These essential principles posit that individuals move 
sequentially through stages of development throughout their lives; that individuals have 
access to the meaning-making structures o f the stages through which they have already 
developed; and that there is a qualitative difference in the way in which individuals make 
meaning between the conventional stages o f development and the post-conventional 
stages.
However, each key thinker represented a slightly nuanced approach to stage 
development theory. To this end, maximum variation sampling (Patton, 2002) among the 
key thinkers within stage development theory was employed in an effort to represent and 
subsequently analyze patterns and anomalies that emerged as a result o f their differing 
points of view. In this case, this meant choosing key thinkers whose primary conceptual 
frameworks diverge in the nomenclature and narrative used to describe the theory, stages, 
and/or the process of developmental transition, and whose research may be primarily 
focused on varying stages along the developmental spectmm. The use o f purposeful 
sampling (Patton, 2002) enabled me to access a diversity o f thought, experience, and 
perspective on developmental movement between the stages.
Snowball sampling, a strategy that uses others to identify potential participants 
who meet a certain criteria (Glesne, 2006)— in this case, classification as a key thinker 
following the definition outlined above—was utilized. William R. Torbert, with whom I 
had an existing relationship, agreed to both participate as one o f the key thinkers and to 
facilitate identification of and introduction to the additional participants. I also utilized 
my own network of faculty and colleagues in the field of leadership and human
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development to identify and recruit potential key thinkers. Torbert sent an introductory 
email to Chuck Palus, Robert Kegan, and Jennifer Garvey Berger to which I followed up 
directly by email with an invitation to participate. I invited Susanne Cook-Greuter to 
participate directly, with no prior introduction. Theresa Monroe, one o f  my committee 
members, mentioned my research in a phone call with David McCallum, prompting him 
to offer his participation via Facebook message. Ah, the evolving technology of research 
participant recruitment.
Through these resources and outreach, I was able to secure all three o f the living 
originators of constructive-development theory as participants: Robert Kegan, William R. 
Torbert, and Susanne Cook-Greuter. In addition, David McCallum, Jennifer Garvey 
Berger, and Chuck Palus represent the next generation of scholar-practitioners in the 
fields o f human and leadership development through not only their own research, but 
their extensive integration of Kegan’s, Torbert’s, and Cook-Greuter’s frameworks in their 
practice outside of academia. In the next section, I provide additional background on the 
key thinkers and identify the conceptual and relational ties that connect them.
Meet the key thinkers.
Susanne Cook-Greuter, Ed.D. Susanne Cook-Greuter is an independent scholar 
who coaches individuals in personal and professional resilience, self-acceptance, and 
consults to various organizations and projects in researching and applying developmental 
thinking. Cook-Greuter earned her doctorate from Harvard University where she worked 
closely with Robert Kegan. Her thesis, Postautonomous Ego Development (1999), is 
recognized as a landmark study in the characteristics and assessment o f highly developed 
and influential individuals and leaders. Cook-Greuter and Torbert collaborated for years
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on the development of the Leadership Development Profile (LDP), an instrument that 
assesses the core human process of making meaning, before Cook-Greuter later 
independently developed the Integral Sentence Completion Test Maturity Assessment 
Profile (SCTi-MAP). She is an internationally known authority on adult development.
Jennifer Garvey Berger, Ed.D. Jennifer Garvey Berger earned her doctorate 
from Harvard University where Robert Kegan served as her dissertation chair. She’s a 
trained interviewer and scorer for Kegan’s developmental assessment instrument, the 
Subject-Object Interview (SOI), and has adapted this research instrument into her own 
Growth Edge Interview which she uses in her consultation practice to help her clients 
identify the growing edge in their human and leadership development. Before launching 
her own consulting organization, Berger was an associate professor at George Mason 
University in Virginia, and continues to teach and offer workshops at academic 
institutions including the Kennedy School o f Government at Harvard University, 
Georgetown University, the University of Sydney, and Oxford Brookes University. 
Berger is the author of Changing on the Job: Developing Leaders fo r  a Complex World 
(2012) as well as numerous articles and books on leadership, coaching, adult 
development, and individual and organizational change.
Robert Kegan, Ph.D. Robert Kegan earned his doctorate from Harvard 
University and is a psychologist who teaches, researches, writes, and consults about adult 
development, adult learning, and professional development. His work explores the 
possibility and necessity o f ongoing psychological transformation in adulthood; the fit 
between adult capacities and the hidden demands o f modem life; and the evolution o f 
consciousness in adulthood and its implications for supporting adult learning,
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professional development, and adult education. In addition to his faculty appointment at 
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, Kegan serves as educational chair o f the 
Institute for Management and Leadership in Education; as co-director o f a joint program 
with the Harvard Medical School to bring principles o f adult learning to the reform of 
medical education; and as co-director of the Change Leadership Group, a program for the 
training of change leadership coaches for school and district leaders. In collaboration 
with Lisa Lahey (change management consultant, author, and Harvard Graduate School 
o f Education faculty member), Kegan conducted the original research on the 
development of adult mindsets and later discovered the hidden mechanism which 
prevents people from making the changes that are most important to them. He developed 
the Subject-Object Interview, an instrument that is aimed at understanding and assessing 
the developmental complexity of an individual's way o f making meaning. His research 
and publications on the development of mental capacities in adulthood (The Evolving Self, 
In Over Our Heads) have had an international influence in many fields including 
management, leadership studies, and organizational learning. Kegan served as 
dissertation chair for two other key thinkers in this study: Susanne Cook-Greuter and 
Jennifer Garvey Berger.
David McCallum, S.J., EtLD. Fr. David McCallum, S.J. is a Jesuit priest and 
educator. In 2008, McCallum completed his doctorate in Adult Learning and Leadership 
at Columbia University, Teachers College on the implications of adult developmental 
maturation for leadership capacity. His dissertation research, Exploring the Implications 
o f a Hidden Diversity in Group Relations Conference Learning: A Developmental 
Perspective (2008), generated the only empirical evidence o f fallback in human
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development o f which I am aware. Susanne Cook-Greuter participated in and provided 
guidance to McCallum during the group relations conference in which his study was set. 
McCallum uses Torbert’s Developmental Action Inquiry as the principle conceptual 
framework in his research, study, and consultation work. He presents workshops and 
retreats, consults to organizational change processes, and facilitates leadership 
development. McCallum serves as special assistant to the president o f Le Moyne College 
in Syracuse, N.Y.; Director o f Mission & Identity, responsible for aligning the institution 
with its Jesuit, Catholic mission; as well as Interim Dean o f the Madden School of 
Business where he also teaches leadership.
Chuck Palus, Ph.D. Charles (Chuck) Palus is Manager of the Connected 
Leadership Project at the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, NC. As a 
research scientist, his focus is on how leadership is created and maintained among people 
working together on complex challenges. Palus earned a doctorate from Boston College 
for his research in adult development where he also taught in the business school and 
psychology department. He is lead researcher and co-designer of “Leading Creatively,” a 
five-day experiential program for developing creative leadership, and “Facing and 
Solving Complex Challenges,” a custom program for developing connected leadership. 
His publications include “Making Common Sense: Leadership as Meaning-making in a 
Community of Practice” and “The Leader's Edge: Six Creative Competencies for 
Exploring Complex Challenges.”
William R. Torbert, Ph.D. William R. Torbert is co-founder o f Action Inquiry 
Associates, which provides organizational transformation consulting services, leadership 
development workshops, and the Global Leadership Profile (GLP) instrument for
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assessing individuals’ characteristic leadership style for acting and inquiring. Torbert 
received his Ph.D. in Individual and Organizational Behavior from Yale before launching 
his career in academia. He taught leadership at Southern Methodist University, the 
Harvard Graduate School o f Education, and then, from 1978-2008 at the Carroll Graduate 
School o f Management at Boston College (BC), where he also served as Graduate Dean 
(the BC MBA program’s ranking rising from below the top 100 to #25 during his tenure) 
and later served as Director of the Organizational Transformation Doctoral Program. 
Torbert is the author of several books and articles including “Seven Transformations o f 
Leadership,” Action Inquiry: The Secret o f  Timely and Transforming Leadership, and The 
Power o f  Balance: Transforming S e lf Society, and Scientific Inquiry.
Data Collection M ethods
Interviews, Interviews served as the primary method for data collection with the 
key thinkers. I conducted six interviews between October 14th and December 5th, 2011 
with Torbert for previous research I undertook exploring the fallback phenomenon with 
one key thinker, and one final interview on March 4th, 2013. Data collection with the 
other five key thinkers began in August 2012 and ended in January 2013. The number of 
interview sessions with each key thinker ranged from one in one case, to seven in three of 
the others. All 27 interviews combined totaled approximately 32 hours: Palus, seven 
interviews totaling over seven hours; McCallum, seven interviews totaling over seven 
hours; Torbert, seven interviews totaling over eight hours; Berger, three interviews 
totaling just over four hours; Cook-Greuter, three interviews totaling three-and-a-half 
hours; and Kegan, one interview, just under one hour. Most o f the interviews were
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conducted via online video chat, but occasionally phone conversations with no video took 
place.
I used an interview guide approach (Appendix B), because it allowed me to 
follow a focused and structured schedule of questions without completely sacrificing the 
benefit of flexibility that the conversational interview approach allows (Charmaz, 2006; 
Patton, 2002). There can be much variance along the spectrum of interview design. On 
one end o f the spectrum is the conversational interview in which questions are generated 
during the interview. On the other end is the standardized open-ended interview 
approach in which deliberately crafted and ordered questions are strictly adhered to 
without deviation during the interview.
The interview guide approach operates between the two ends o f the continuum 
and, depending on how much the interviewer relies on the guide’s questions to structure 
the interview, can operate either in a relatively structured way or as a support for more 
informal conversation (Patton, 2002). Particularly given the embryonic subject o f study, 
having the ability to adapt questions based on the data that emerged during the interviews 
was critical and extremely beneficial.
In keeping with Charmaz’s (2006) interview recommendations which position 
delving into collective practices ahead o f asking about the individual’s experience o f 
them, I placed knowledge questions about the theory at the beginning o f the interview 
protocol (Appendix B), saving questions about the key thinkers’ personal experiences o f 
the fallback phenomenon for the latter part of the interviews. This allowed me to both 
establish rapport with the key thinkers and to provide them the space and time for 
reflection on their experience o f the fallback phenomenon in their own lives.
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Charmaz (2006) emphasized the importance of not only identifying and exploring 
themes during interviews, but also analyzing the data after interviews and looping back in 
pursuit of answers to still unclear questions and to fill holes that still exist in the theory. 
She wrote, “Grounded theory interviewing differs from much in-depth interviewing 
because we narrow the range of interview topics to gather specific data for developing 
our theoretical frameworks as we proceed with conducting the interviews” (2006, p. 29).
I employed this practice o f building on and clarifying data generated in the prior 
interviews throughout the interview season. The final interview conducted with each key 
thinker excluding Kegan (with whom I only conducted one interview total) was dedicated 
to clarification of ideas and themes that were generated over the course o f all interviews 
with each individual key thinker.
Audio of the interviews was digitally recorded and later transcribed verbatim. I 
transcribed 11 o f the interviews myself. I contracted with a transcriber to transcribe the 
remaining 16, and I also listened to each of these recordings in full while correcting the 
transcriptions where necessary.
The decisions I made about what was included and what was not in the 
transcription process was as important an aspect o f data collection as the interviews 
themselves. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) describe the transition from the evolving 
interaction of an interview, to the abstraction o f audio recordings, to the final fixed 
written transcription. What was in its origins a living and emerging process may become 
the concrete and often, final, word. I was deliberate in my approach to this process in an 
effort to remain true to the experience and affect o f my conversations with the key 
thinkers. I repeatedly returned to not just the transcribed word, but also the audio o f the
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interviews as I prepared for subsequent interviews within and across key thinkers and 
analyzed the data. I made a purposeful attempt to stay as close to the experience o f my 
ongoing interactions with the key thinkers as possible.
One o f the critical components of my research design was the integration o f a 
prior pilot study I had conducted on the lived experience o f fallback in post-conventional 
individuals. The stories generated as a result of this pilot study were recounted to the key 
thinkers during the interviews as I asked them to make sense of the stories. Next, I 
describe the pilot study that served as the impetus for research question number four:
How does each key thinker make sense o f  the stories that post-conventional-measured 
individuals tell about their fallback experiences?
Pilot study. During the spring of 2011,1 conducted a pilot study with three 
participants whose individual developmental action logics were previously measured2 
through the SCTi-MAP Professional Sentence Completion Test3 (SCTi-MAP also known 
as the LDP; Cook-Greuter, 2004). Developmental stage theory posits that those 
operating from later action logics possess a broader understanding o f earlier action logics
2 It should be noted that administration of the instrument occurred at different times prior 
to and not for the purposes of this study for each participant.
3 Building upon Loevinger’s Washington University Sentence Completion Test 
(WUSCT; Walsh, 1998) and Torbert’s Harthill Leadership Development Profile (HLDP; 
Rooke & Torbert, 2005), Cook-Greuter developed the SCTi-MAP (Cook-Greuter, 2004; 
Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007). This instrument consists of 36 sentence stems, and 
participant responses allow trained evaluators to construct images of how participants 
frame their own actions and their worldview. The SCTi-MAP is designed to determine 
the action logic which functions as an individual’s dominant way of making meaning, 
and reference to the participants’ score on this instrument added a quantitative benchmark 
to the pilot study’s qualitative research design.
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by virtue of having already occupied and transformed through them (Cook-Greuter, 2004; 
Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Kegan, 1982; Loevinger, 1997; Torbert, 1994, 2004; 
Torbert et al., 2008). Therefore, the SCTi-MAP was used to purposefully identify 
participants with measurements representing each o f the post-conventional action logics 
categorized as Individualist, Strategist, and Alchemist in an effort to select the most 
information-rich participants who have the developmental capacity to provide salient 
examples, descriptions, and insights on the fallback phenomenon and to analyze patterns 
and anomalies (Patton, 2002) along the spectrum of post-conventional developmental 
action logics.
The interviews with the three participants in the pilot study occurred between 
April 12th and 21st, 2011. I conducted individual interviews with each o f the participants 
totaling 210 minutes between April 12th and April 16th. In addition to these individual 
interviews, I conducted one group interview on April 21st which was 90 minutes in length. 
I digitally recorded the audio of the interviews and transcribed them. This combination 
o f individual and group interviews enabled an exploration o f the phenomenon o f fallback 
through an understanding and descriptive analysis o f how participants constructed 
meaning from the world in which they live (Glesne, 2006).
Data analysis occurred in two phases. The first phase of analysis followed the 
initial individual interview with each participant. I used inductive analysis to identify 
specific patterns, themes, and categories (Patton, 2002) in the individual interview data 
around the concept o f fallback. I then attempted to identify, from a general perspective, 
any over-arching themes across participants.
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Because the participants were measured at different primary action logics, I 
anticipated finding differences between the themes present in each participant’s responses. 
This is significant because developmental theory posits that there is a qualitative 
difference in the way in which individuals make meaning at each stage along the 
developmental spectrum. Selecting participants who were measured as making meaning 
from distinct stages of development allowed me to explore the ways in which fallback is 
experienced and described both similarly and differently by individuals at different 
developmental action logics.
I then conducted deductive analysis by holding up the interview data against the 
existing theoretical framework (Patton, 2002) of stage development theory and 
developmental action logics, specifically (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 
2007; Torbert, 1994, 2004; Torbert et al., 2008) in order to understand how the fallback 
phenomenon fit within and diverged from the existing developmental theory based on the 
stories the participants told about their experiences o f falling back.
The group interview (with the same individuals) served as a source for additional 
data collection, and also allowed me the opportunity to member-check my analysis o f the 
individual data to verify that I had accurately reflected participants’ perspectives. 
Participants’ contributions in the group interview provided new interpretations and ideas, 
which informed the cumulative findings of the pilot study.
The pilot study was an invaluable step in the process o f  exploring the 
phenomenon of fallback. It tested the assumption in the existing theory that development 
is always forward-moving; suggested possibilities for expanding the range of 
interpretations of how one makes meaning differently than one’s center-of-gravity action
81
logic would suggest in given circumstances; and through its generation o f stories about
the lived experience o f fallback, provided a launching point to inform future studies. In
fact, this empirical pilot study revealed that there were many more theoretical questions
that needed answering before further empirical work on the lived experience o f fallback
could be effectively conducted. Charmaz wrote,
Grounded theorists evaluate the fit between their initial research interests and 
their emerging data. We do not force preconceived ideas and theories directly 
upon our data. Rather, we follow leads that we define in the data, or design 
another way of collecting data to pursue our initial interests. (2006, p. 17)
The data and findings from the spring 2011 pilot study were integral to the design
of the interview protocol for the theoretical research conducted for this dissertation, in
that they provided what Glesne (2006, p. 27) describes as an “understanding of direct
lived experience instead of abstract generalizations” along the path to theorizing. Gaps
within the existing theory guided the creation of interview questions for the pilot study
participants. In a reciprocal manner, the findings and the unanswered questions from the
pilot study participants significantly informed the interview protocol that I used with the
key thinkers.
I sent a summary of the findings from the pilot study (Appendix C) to the key 
thinkers in the course o f the interview season. In the grounded theory tradition of 
“mov[ing] back and forth between theoretical interpretation and empirical evidence” 
(Charmaz, 2006, pp. 152-153), specific examples of fallback recounted by the pilot study 
participants (see Chapter Four, Part IV) were posed to the key thinkers in an effort to 
bridge their theoretical understandings with the actual lived experience o f the fallback 
phenomenon.
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The conceptual framework o f stage development theory also informed the 
interview protocol. This interplay o f empirical data and theory in the conduct o f research 
is one o f the tenets of the grounded theory method and is referred to as abductive 
reasoning.
The logic of abduction entails studying individual cases inductively and 
discerning a surprising finding and then asking how theory could account for it. 
The researcher subsequently puts all these possible theories to test by gathering 
more data to ascertain the most plausible explanation. Abductive reasoning 
resides at the core of grounded theory logic: it links empirical observation with 
imaginative interpretation, but does so by seeking theoretical accountability 
through returning to the empirical world. (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 46)
The strategy I undertook in the coding and analysis o f  the interviews is the subject
of the next section.
Data Analysis Methods
Initial codes using structural coding and hypothesis coding (Saldana, 2009) were
derived from the initial interviews. Both o f these coding methods are useful in
exploratory investigations. Structural coding employs the research questions in the
coding process, while hypothesis coding holds the data up against a hypothesis— in this
case, that fallback does exist.
Given that this research is based on the understanding of the phenomenon of
fallback by key thinkers, I employed in vivo coding (Saldana, 2009), using the specific
words o f these key thinkers, which “help[s] us preserve participants’ meanings o f their
views and actions in the coding itself’ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 55).
I first reviewed the interview transcripts applying descriptive and holistic coding
(Saldana, 2009), to broadly summarize the content o f passages as I read them. Both
descriptive and holistic coding comprehensively look at the data, with descriptive codes
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used to identify topics or broad categories, and holistic coding used to identify broader 
themes, rather than focus on line-by-line analysis. This first pass at interview coding 
informed the analytic memos that I would write directly following the coding o f each 
transcript.
The coding and analysis process was multi-pronged and simultaneous. I used 
inductive analysis to identify specific patterns, themes, and categories (Patton, 2002) that 
emerged from the interviews, while also employing deductive analysis by holding up the 
interview data against the existing stage development theory frameworks (Patton, 2002) 
of each of the key thinkers.
Given that the series o f interviews with each key thinker took place over an 
extended period o f time, I returned to both the transcripts and the interview recordings 
when I commenced my data analysis in earnest. I would listen to the audio o f the 
interview while reading the transcript. Then, I would code the transcript, often for the 
second time, but not access the codes from any earlier analysis I may have assigned until 
I had completed the second round. In the cases where an earlier and a later set o f codes 
existed or emerged, I would then analyze the two, taking note of anything that I had 
missed in either coding pass, and also noting and questioning any transformation that had 
occurred in my thinking over time.
In an effort to assess the interpretive validity o f my coding, I asked a fellow 
doctoral student who is familiar with constructive-development theory to separately code 
one of the interview transcripts. My goal in doing this was to test inter-rater reliability to 
see where we matched up, and where we did not, and ultimately to be privy to someone 
else’s interpretation o f the complex ideas and theories that were emerging in these rich
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conversations with the key thinkers. For the most part, the second coder identified the 
same codes as I did, however he also identified a theme I had missed in my coding, and 
this led to my being more cognizant o f this theme as I moved forward.
My analytic memos written directly following the coding o f each interview served 
as a combination of recounting and analysis o f  the codes and data from the transcripts, 
and personal reflection and analysis on my thoughts and felt experience at the time of the 
interview compared with my current experience of it. I would also make connections 
between themes that had emerged across key thinkers, and note questions that were 
generated as a result of the particular interview that I wished to ask any o f the key 
thinkers. I also included a list of individuals and theories referred to by the key thinker 
during that interview as a reminder of additions to the literature review that may be 
warranted.
Once all interviews were re-listened to, coded, analyzed, and documented in 
individual analytic memos, I summarized and analyzed across all memos of a given key 
thinker. I removed all personal reflections and references to other key thinkers, for these 
analytic summaries would serve as a next step in my efforts to ensure interpretive validity. 
Glesne (2006) recommends member checking, also referred to as member validation 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), as a method for validating a researcher’s interpretations 
with one’s participants. I utilized this method with the key thinkers, emailing the 
transcripts from all interviews with each key thinker and the respective analytic summary 
of their data to that key thinker, and asking them to provide any feedback in the form of 
clarification, correction, or additions. Only two key thinkers, McCallum and Berger, 
responded to let me know they had reviewed all of the documents. McCallum provided
85
feedback, noting that he had no additions or significant corrections to suggest, having 
found them accurate, complete, thoughtful, comprehensive, and insightful. Berger 
provided minor clarification on three conceptual points.
The final step in my process was to code the analytic memos written for each key 
thinker and analyze for themes across multiple or all o f the key thinkers. However, it 
would be erroneous for me to suggest that I was only looking for what was there, as I also 
was in pursuit o f what was missing altogether. I interrogated the data by asking questions 
such as: What does it mean? Why did they say that? Why didn’t they say something 
else? Is there divergence between the key thinkers? What’s different about their 
understanding? What’s the significance of that? What are the linkages? What’s not 
linked? What are the holes in the assumptions about fallback? In my analysis of the data, 
I kept in mind the purpose: to end up with arguments and claims that I could substantiate 
about the key thinkers’ understanding and framing o f fallback within the theory, how 
fallback could play a paradoxically positive role in developmental growth, and how 
future research could be designed to open the door o f our understanding o f the 
complexity of fallback and human development even further.
I address my role as a researcher who is simultaneously traversing my own 
developmental path, and the role that this dual relationship plays in this research, in the 
next section.
Researcher’s Role
I have been drawn to the study o f the fallback phenomenon since I was first 
introduced to adult development theory at the outset o f my doctoral program. I found the 
theory’s general assertion that once we progress to a given developmental aptitude, we
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consistently make meaning and act from that level unless we make a conscious decision 
to act from an earlier level, in conflict with my actual lived experience. I regularly find 
myself unconsciously operating from a meaning-making structure that is earlier than my 
measured center of gravity action logic as measured by the Harthill Leadership 
Development Profile. Therefore, my quest to further elucidate and articulate this nuanced 
understanding of development is certainly influenced by the intersection o f the theory as 
it currently exists and the unanswered questions from my lived experience.
Glesne (2006) noted that the researcher’s views, goals, outlook, and interests 
influence one’s choice of the kind of research one conducts; one’s experience of the 
world influences what questions one asks, how one asks them, and what kind of 
knowledge one values; and that the very way one designs one’s research is values-based. 
Charmaz (2006) points out that the researcher’s ways of constructing meaning o f the 
world influences the researcher’s analysis o f the data, findings, and themes.
My intense interest in and personal experience with human development and the 
phenomenon of fallback encouraged a heuristic inquiry approach, in which a focus on the 
researcher’s self-awareness and growth is integral to the research (Patton, 2002). I was 
purposeful at the beginning about how I would attempt to keep my bias in check. I made 
my perspective and voice explicit from the outset o f the study design, through data 
collection, and data analysis. I engaged in reflexivity along the way, adding to the data 
the inevitable subjectivity I brought to the phenomenon being studied and to the research 
design (Patton, 2002), which ultimately contributed greater validity to the research 
(Peshkin, 1988). I took note of what I reacted strongly to (either positively or negatively) 
throughout the research process in my analytic memos, which helped me identify my
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subjectivity, and I included this reflexive data in the overall analysis. Ultimately, I 
believe my attention to my own subjectivity through personal reflection and often explicit 
conversations with the key thinkers helped make this a stronger, more robust, and more 
authentically nuanced body of research.
The research design described in this chapter attempted to combine a theoretical 
exploration of the phenomenon o f fallback in human development within six key thinkers’ 
individual theoretical frames and within the overall framework of constructive- 
development theory, with the lived experience o f the phenomenon in three post- 
conventional-measured individuals. Through this research, I hoped to cultivate a greater 
understanding of the full experience o f developmental expression and movement, and to 
determine under which conditions a seeming fall backwards in development might 
actually generate a developmental leap forward. Finally, I sought to discover how future 
research on the fallback phenomenon could best be designed to move our current 






The purpose o f this study was to examine the phenomenon of fallback through 
interviews with six key thinkers in the field o f developmental theory. In this chapter, I 
address each of my five research questions:
1. How do we more deeply understand the fallback phenomenon as situated within 
current developmental theory?
2. How do key thinkers in the field o f adult development and leader development 
understand the fallback phenomenon within their own theoretical frame?
3. What role may fallback play in developmental growth?
4. How does each key thinker make sense o f the stories that post-conventional- 
measured individuals tell about their fallback experiences?
5. How might the fallback phenomenon be researched with participants in the 
future?
Chapter Four is divided into four parts. In Part One, I address research question 
one: How do we more deeply understand the fallback phenomenon as situated within 
current developmental theory? In this section, I construct the phenomenon o f fallback 
within current stage development theory using an accumulation of data from all o f the 
key thinkers. This situation of fallback within the current theory provides both a 
refresher on constructive-development theory and a new lens through which to 
understand the theory’s first principles.
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In Part Two, I detail each key thinker’s responses to research questions two and 
three. These questions are: How do key thinkers in the fie ld  o f  adult development and 
leader development understand the fallback phenomenon within their own theoretical 
frame? What role may fallback play in developmental growth? In this section I 
separately recount each key thinker’s conceptions o f the definition and distinctions of 
fallback, its causes, the fallback experience, alternative hypotheses, the importance of 
understanding the phenomenon, and the role that fallback may play in developmental 
growth.
Each key thinker’s section is divided by subheadings that reflect specific 
categories for understanding fallback that emerged in the interviews. In many cases, 
these categories are the same across all key thinkers. However, each key thinker gave 
varying amounts of attention to each category. Some categories resonated more with 
some theorists than others. It should be noted that Kegan’s section is much more 
condensed than the others with fewer subheadings. This is because Kegan’s 
contributions were collected in one interview, whereas each o f the other key thinkers 
were interviewed between three and seven times. The key thinkers’ interpretations are 
presented sequentially in the order with which I commenced the series o f interviews with 
each of them: William R. Torbert, David McCallum, Chuck Palus, Susanne Cook- 
Greuter, Jennifer Garvey Berger, and Robert Kegan.
It is important to note that Part Two of Chapter Four in keeping with research 
question two, presents each key thinker’s theoretical framing of fallback. In order to 
present the theoretical interpretations of the fallback phenomenon by each key thinker -  
many of which are presented here in writing for the first time -  most comprehensively
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and authentically, I do not offer my own analysis in this section. My analysis across all 
key thinkers can be found in Part Five of this chapter.
After exploring the fallback phenomenon and the role it may play in 
developmental growth through each key thinker’s theoretical lens, in Part Three, I 
address research question four: How does each key thinker make sense o f  the stories that 
post-conventional-measured individuals tell about their fallback experiences? In this 
section, I present the stories of fallback told by the three post-conventional participants 
from my 2011 pilot study and recount in aggregate the sometimes similar, but often 
divergent sense the key thinkers made of these stories. The inclusion of this research 
question in this study was an important aspect of my research design. The intersection o f 
theory and reality is critical to the grounded theory approach to the research that I 
undertook. Interweaving the lived experience of fallback with the theoretical exploration 
of it allowed each key thinker access to the nuance and complexity o f the human 
experience of fallback that I challenged them to make sense of.
In Part Four o f this chapter, I address research question five: How might the 
fallback phenomenon be researched with participants in the future? As I began to 
conceptualize the design of my own dissertation research, I struggled to identify the 
participants, the settings, the questions, and the instruments that would allow me to 
meaningfully, accurately, and empirically explore the lived experience o f fallback in 
participants. The possible questions were limitless, but the methods for revealing 
answers to them seemed inadequate and imprecise. The vast array o f possible options 
and challenges for pursuing research with participants to explore their own experiences of 
fallback was daunting. Ultimately, I chose to pursue another path in hopes that finding a
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place for fallback in the theory would provide direction for its study with individuals 
outside o f these key thinkers in the future. Therefore, it was critical that in the study I 
undertook with the key thinkers, I attempted to remove the obstacles that lay in the way 
of future research by elucidating the opportunities and avenues for discovery that lay 
ahead. Using data generated from all of the key thinkers, I explore in Part Four the need, 
the design, the questions, and the importance o f future empirical research to further 
elucidate the fallback phenomenon.
Finally, in the last section o f this chapter, Part Five, I undertake the synthesis and 
analysis that traditionally makes up the entirety of Chapter Four in a dissertation. I take 
this departure from the traditional format o f Chapter Four, because of the importance o f 
having the key thinkers’ voices and theoretical interpretations of fallback presented in 
their fullness. This chapter serves as the theoretical debut for much data and 
understandings offered by the key thinkers not only about fallback in human development, 
but about the constructive-development theory itself. Much of what is reported in this 
chapter has not been addressed at all in the constructive-development literature, and 
certainly has not been addressed in the literature in this way. Yet, a synthesis and 
analysis o f these data and the positing of specific claims are equally important to 
understanding the phenomenon of fallback. Therefore, the last section o f this chapter,
Part Five, is dedicated to my synthesis, analysis and claims. In this section, I attempt to 
make sense of it all; to provide some structure to the fallback phenomenon and its place 
in developmental theory through the following six claims:
1. So much exists in the current developmental theory that accounts for the fallback 
phenomenon, yet, the aspects o f stage development theory that focus on the bi-
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directional nature of human development, movement both forward and back, have 
largely been ignored.
2. What is most important in defining the boundaries o f fallback is not whether one 
expresses a less complex developmental capacity through thoughts, feelings, or 
behaviors, but that this expression is in the absence o f  all other options to think, 
feel, or behave differently.
3. Fallback, under the right conditions has significant potential for facilitating 
developmental growth, and given the increased likelihood for these conditions to 
be met in post-conventional stages according to the characteristics that distinguish 
them, growth from fallback is more likely to occur at the post-conventional stages 
of development.
4. Fallback is part o f a mutually-defining term, the other component of which is 
spring forward.
5. There are five overarching causes o f fallback. These include: ordinary triggers, 
physiological brain responses, contextual “gravitational pulls,” challenges to 
identity, and unresolved trauma.
6. Having a theory for understanding fallback acknowledges the full lived 
experience of what it is to be human, exposes the myth of consistency and onward 
and upward development both in self and in developmental theory, and provides 
the basis for reconceptualizing fallback as a paradoxically positive aspect of 
human development, which has broader implications for the exercise of 
leadership.
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Part I, Research Question One: How Do We More Deeply Understand the Fallback 
Phenomenon as Situated within Current Developmental Theory?
Developmental center-of-gravity vs. developmental range. My whole framing 
of fallback at the beginning of this research was based on my own understanding that we 
have a center-of-gravity action logic at which we are capable of making meaning, and 
when we don’t make meaning from that level of development, if not by choice, we are 
falling back. Over the season of data collection, my understanding o f center-of-gravity 
expanded to include a full range o f developmental options for making meaning or sense 
of the world around us. The full range o f options approach to development was one that 
was widely held by most o f the key thinkers, and frequently invoked in their explorations 
of the fallback phenomenon.
Palus was the first to challenge my established definition of center-of-gravity as a 
pinpoint, and as the norm. He explored the center-of-gravity metaphor, noting our 
capacity to be in our center-of-gravity, or an arm ahead, or a foot that’s a few steps back, 
at any time. We have a range o f action logics that we may tap into to make sense, 
consciously or unconsciously, in any moment. He claimed that the center-of-gravity is 
not a fundamental truth. Instead, it is a metaphor, a rule of thumb, a description of facts.
It is the place you live most of the time, and it indicates that you are all there, in your full 
range o f development, all at once.
Berger described our sense-making as “a set o f capacities that we have.” She said, 
“There is something about sense-making that seems to be more stage-y than state-y to 
m e... And, I don't see people sort o f winning and losing those willy-nilly.” She claimed
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that we show up with the same capacities most o f the time. One’s center-of-gravity stage 
describes this: it is the stage at which most o f us, is.
Torbert posited that the center-of-gravity action logic is an illusion, and that one’s 
stage actually fluctuates all the time. He made clear that he envisions some kind o f range 
around one’s center-of-gravity, and that this range is something we access through our 
falling back. He noted that those at later action logics actually spend less time in their 
center-of gravity, often by choice, given that most situations, environments, and contexts 
operate in an earlier action logic space.
When I posed Palus’s exploration of the center-of-gravity metaphor to McCallum, 
he cautioned against taking the metaphors too literally. Nevertheless, it became clear that 
the developmental instruments themselves, while measuring an individual’s center-of- 
gravity, also reveal a range of development. The distinctions between Cook-Greuter’s 
and Torbert’s sentence completion tests and Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview are 
detailed next.
Developmental instruments. Palus noted that Cook-Greuter’s instrument (and 
Torbert’s though not mentioned explicitly) for measuring development, while identifying 
a mean or center-of-gravity, really shows a full distribution o f one’s meaning-making.
He claimed that Cook-Greuter’s developmental assessment, the Integral Sentence 
Completion Test, Maturity Assessment Profile (SCTi-MAP) shows the full complexity of 
how a person makes sense of the world. Berger concurred that the SCTi-MAP measures 
where you developmentally spend most of your time. Palus pointed out that Kegan’s 
Subject-Object Interview (SOI), on the other hand, is focused on getting the person to
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their highest self, their highest capacity to make meaning through the repeated push for 
reflection.
Berger confirmed that the aim o f the SOI is to determine one’s highest sustained 
demonstrated score. She noted that Kegan’s developmental instrument measures what’s 
possible, not where one spends most o f one’s time. It determines how you think, the 
world you see, not what you think about. Berger posited that the highly supportive nature 
of the interviewer-directed SOI offers the benefit o f encouraging growth. She explained, 
“One of the things it does is it pushes you beyond yourself and gives you more 
headroom.” Berger clarified that though the interviewer can help push you to your 
highest, sustained, level o f sense-making, he or she can only do so if  you are already 
capable o f holding the concept.
Cook-Greuter also explored the difference between the developmental assessment 
instruments. She noted that Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview measures cognition, how 
one thinks, how the mind works. Alternatively, her own and Torbert’s sentence 
completion tests measure ego development; how one makes sense including behavior, 
emotions, affect, moral development, and lines o f development (e.g., cognitive, 
relational). Like Palus, Cook-Greuter also explained that the sentence completion tests 
reveal a range of stages, not one primary stage, and one’s center-of-gravity is not even 
the stage most often scored. Rather, as Palus points out, the score on the SCTi-MAP is 
actually the center-of-gravity operationalized; it is the center point of the distribution of 
one’s scores on a normalized curve.
Cook-Greuter noted that her sentence completion test, the SCTi-MAP is a 
projective test, taken without support, which measures an individual’s automatic or
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normal response; “how a person tends to behave most of the time.” Cook-Greuter’s 
instrument reveals a variation in the distribution o f responses to the sentence stems. The 
individual demonstrates their flexibility in responding to different situations, which often 
includes a choice to respond from earlier stages o f development.
Berger identified one critique o f the sentence completion tests as the potential that 
exists to game the instrument, given its privileging o f vocabulary, sentence structure, 
complexity of language use, intelligence, and conceptual notions. She explained that one 
is unable to dig deeper to discover what’s underneath a given sentence stem response.
Cook-Greuter described Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview as measuring an 
individual’s optimal behavior in an environment o f support in the form of an interviewer. 
Cook-Greuter criticized the SOI, noting that its assessment o f one’s highest meaning- 
making capability does not provide a realistic representation of one’s development. 
Further, she noted that the developmental level and subjectivity of both the interviewer 
and the scorer o f the SOI can act as powerful agents capable o f pulling up or dragging 
down one’s developmental score. Berger agreed, noting that the SOI has been criticized 
for the significant role interviewer quality plays in determining one’s score, for better or 
for worse.
Cook-Greuter acknowledged that both instruments have distinct advantages. The 
advantage o f the SCTi-MAP is the rigor of its manual and logical underlying sequence. 
The SCTi-MAP is best at finding out where somebody makes meaning from, and 
revealing the range o f developmental options they use. In fact, she posited that responses 
that span a full range of development indicate a more flexible, resourceful, mature 
individual. Whereas, responses scored only as late stage would indicate an attachment to
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being post-conventional. Cook-Greuter suggested one advantage o f the SOI is that it
provides much data that can be analyzed for other patterns (e.g., personality) beyond the
sole assessment of developmental level.
At present, what all of the instruments seem to focus on in their assessment is a
pole on the developmental path that does not capture the full picture. Palus explained,
It’s looking at a normalized curve, and I guess that’s an operationalized version of 
the center-of-gravity idea. You draw the distribution o f the scoring o f these 
sentences, then you naturally come out with a center. So, that’s where we place 
people. We say that, that’s where you seem to live the most.
Palus pointed out that while the focus o f these instruments on one stage may be
clean, it may not be the most accurate representation of the full complexity o f a person.
He continued,
So, that’s a useful construction, but you can look at it two ways. You can say, 
“Well, it’s a nice summary to say that your stage of development is X,” but, then 
we all do that. We say, “Well he’s an Alchemist. He’s an Achiever. And, she’s a 
conformer.” Is that a helpful summary of that? Or is it actually more correct the 
way it was originally in the scoring? You know that there’s a distribution.. .the 
distribution’s your pattern.
Palus suggested that the theoretical field overestimates the stability o f one’s center-of-
gravity developmental level. His claim is supported by the single most significant piece
of reporting on the developmental instruments as a point on the line o f the full
developmental spectrum.
Cook-Greuter claimed that the various developmental maps -  her own, Torbert’s,
and Kegan’s -  offer a sense o f where one came from, where one is, where one may be
going, and what the challenges might be. However, she conceded that the map is an
abstraction. It provides useful guidance, but “never can do justice to the actual
complexity of human life.”
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Palus’s biggest critique was that, though we do have evidence that we are 
measuring what we say we are, the instruments are an indirect inference and just not fine­
grained enough to reveal the underlying, enduring structure o f one’s meaning-making.
He wondered how accurate these tests really are given the trickiness o f one’s psychology, 
and noted that if  the tests may not be accurate, this also calls into question fallback. Yet, 
Berger contended that while none of the developmental measures are without flaw, they 
are valuable, because they offer a useful piece of information about an individual’s 
development.
Clearly, the field o f stage development’s overestimation of the stability of one’s 
center-of-gravity developmental stage, perpetuated by its developmental assessment 
focusing on a point on the developmental continuum, in combination with its onward- 
and-upward emphasis has significant implications for our current understanding and 
framing of fallback. In the next section, the key thinkers’ conceptions o f the 
developmental stages, their characteristics, and the phenomenon of fallback within these 
are explored as the key thinkers begin to situate fallback within the existing 
developmental theory, making the connection between the two explicit for the first time.
Characteristics along the developmental spectrum. As the key thinkers 
explored the phenomenon of fallback, they often reflected on the tenets o f stage 
development theory and the characteristics o f the stages themselves. This exploration 
revealed that post-conventional individuals have greater capacity to notice, to describe, 
and to grow from fallback, as they begin to see the gap between their espoused ways o f 
meaning-making and the way they actually show up. Further, this capacity is largely
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linked to the later stages’ increasing practice o f awareness, openness to feedback, and 
desire to develop.
Torbert noted,
The problem is, of course, that for the whole first half of the developmental 
spectrum one isn’t conversant with the notion o f consciousness, and so 
recognizing what higher or lower, earlier or later action logics is unusual.
Nobody does it in the first half o f the developmental spectrum, which means 95% 
of all of humanity, or so .. .all o f the children and most o f the adults.
Torbert described the developmental spectrum4 -  from the pre-conventional Opportunist;
through the conventional Diplomat, Expert, and Achiever; to the post-conventional
Individualist, Strategist, and Alchemist -  as marked by a focus on unilateral needs and
actions at the earlier action logics to a focus that is more mutual at the later action logics.
Behavior, generally habitual in the conventional action logics, becomes less so as one
progresses along the developmental continuum. Context, which largely dictates success
or failure in the earlier action logics, may be strategically used as a structuring tool to
facilitate success and development by later action logic individuals.
Cook-Greuter described the characteristics o f each stage during developmental
transition, noting a rejection of the prior stage when one initially leaves it behind. The
Expert turns away from the Diplomat that he was, yet he remains dependent on a network
to give him value. She noted that Experts are edgy and often unhappy. Yet, once
transitioned, the Achiever relaxes. The Individualist rejects the conventional structure
and societal brainwashing that has marked the prior stages. Interestingly, this rejection o f
all that has been known leaves the Individualist unsure of who s/he is. The Strategist is
4 The brief overview of Torbert’s eight main action logics is reproduced from Chapter 
Two in Appendix A for ease o f reference.
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embedded in an historical and global sense o f belonging. This embeddedness provides 
certitude; a felt experience of knowing one’s self, including one’s shadows. Cook- 
Greuter noted that this certitude is sometimes inappropriate and is exhibited as an 
underestimation o f the mystery o f things. On the contrary, the Alchemist is open to 
confusion, paradox, and mystery, living in a mode o f inquiry where nothing is certain. 
Cook-Greuter concluded that those in the differentiating levels (Opportunist, Expert, 
Individualist) tend to suffer more than those in the integrating levels (Diplomat, Achiever, 
Strategist) in their ironic rejection of what remains a part o f who they are.
Berger suggested that the later stage individual tends to be more inclined to 
surrender to the beauty, power, and simplicity of the earlier developmental stages, 
becoming more comfortable leaning into them as one embraces more learning and 
expansion into the earlier self. She noted that post-conventional stages exhibit greater 
acceptance of others’ perspectives and of their own shadow.
However, Cook-Greuter argued that while the ideal post-conventional individual 
has access to all o f the levels before and uses them choice-fully as tools, many post- 
conventional individuals are so attached to complexity and to being at a higher level they 
don’t understand that all levels are necessary for functioning well. As a result, they tend 
to suffer. She suggested this may be a result o f their personality; a need to be more than 
others.
While descriptions seem to cast action logics and their characteristics as distinct 
and often opposite, Torbert offered that developmental terms and concepts are better 
described as moving along a spectrum of consciousness, complexity, awareness, and
101
development. Torbert delved into the spectrum of consciousness from lessening to 
widening that characterizes earlier and later action logics.
The early stages are concerned with the relationship between body and thought, 
and self-awareness is taken for granted. Torbert continued to explain that as one moves 
along the developmental continuum, consciousness increases, and there’s a 
complexification of the subject. According to Kegan’s conception of subject and object, 
one can only be aware of what is object. At later action logics, one does become aware 
that there is a thing that is subject, too. Torbert noted that “development leads towards 
increasing awareness, and increasing self-awareness, and increasing awareness o f the 
subject transforming into object.” Torbert explained that this is so, because at the late 
action logics, causation is interactional, not unidirectional. This means that whatever it 
is, takes place in interaction with one’s action logic. Therefore, one’s action logic forms 
the meaning that one ascribes to a thing.
Torbert highlighted the transition in one’s focus from the Achiever through the 
Alchemist. He explained, “You’re trying to reach goals if  you’re at the Achiever level, 
and you’re paying less attention to process, more attention to content and what the 
outcomes are in the outside world.” Those operating from the Individualist action logic 
are just developing the ability to focus on the interplay of one’s thoughts and behaviors 
and cultivating an attention on what is influencing these thoughts and behaviors. The 
Strategist action logic exhibits an even greater capacity to hold the interplay o f cognitive 
and awareness systems. Torbert contended, “The Strategist action logic is the first one 
that really begins to try to trace whether we are doing what we think we ought to be doing 
in a given moment.” While both Strategists and Alchemists increasingly cultivate their
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own meditative capacities, it’s not really until one reaches the Alchemist level of
development that the very focus of the action logic is this moment-to-moment awareness.
The Alchemist action logic has what Torbert depicted as “this attention that’s observing
more closely the whole inner process, as well as the whole ongoing transaction process
between me and the outer world; me and other people.” Later action logics enjoy not
only greater awareness, but a stronger trust o f one’s own intuition.
The full developmental range reveals a cognitive focus at the earlier action logics,
spanning to a focus on attention at the later action logics. Torbert explained, “Our
attention fluctuates wildly all the time, even when w e’re relatively late action logic.. .The
distinction is that in the movement from Strategist to Alchemist, you begin to distinguish
between the attention and the pattern of thought.” This ever-increasing awareness leads
to a more frequent noticing of the incongruities in one’s life and actions. He continued,
As one moves towards later action logics, one would expect that the person would 
become more cognizant o f those differences between large parts o f one’s life, 
because one’s increasingly looking at one’s life across context and over long 
periods o f time, not just moment-to-moment.
Torbert pointed to the importance o f even having a sense of consciousness and 
when we are acting from the unconscious as factors in fallback. Palus agreed, reminding 
us that stages o f development are in fact orders o f  consciousness. Palus further asserted 
that consciousness is a key component to an understanding o f human development and 
fallback.
The developmental spectrum and the experience of fallback. It seems clear 
that where one sits along the developmental spectrum would influence one’s ability to not 
only recognize and reflect on one’s fallback experiences, but also to grow as a result o f 
them. According to Torbert, when one’s primary developmental action logic is in the
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conventional range, one has less capacity to even recognize that one is falling back to an 
earlier stage o f development, because the awareness o f one’s behaviors and thoughts in 
the moment is not present.
Berger noted that Kegan claims that the third order, or Diplomat, is the earliest 
that one is able to have a sense of one’s own psychology and identity over time, a 
condition that is necessary for the recall of fallback. Based on her own research and 
practice, Berger contended that it is from possibly the Diplomat and certainly the Expert 
stages forward that one is able to access and reflect on fallback experiences. She 
understood why I had chosen post-conventional measured participants for my pilot study 
rather than individuals in the conventional range given that they have language around 
fallback and the capacity to see it.
Torbert explained one’s outlook from a conventional action logic perspective. He
said,
Yes, we can see things, we can hear things, but that’s just natural, we think.
Everything that’s worth anything is out there to be seen or tasted. The one who is
tasting is sort of taken for granted in a sense.
It would follow, that the earlier the stage of development one falls back to, the harder it is 
to emerge from, because there is less capacity to be aware in the moment, from that 
earlier meaning-making structure, that fallback is happening. Likewise, the earlier the 
center-of-gravity action logic one occupies, the longer one is likely to stay in that fallback 
position.
While Torbert’s assessment of the action logic to which one has fallen as a 
determining factor in one’s recovery from fallback was not identified by the other key 
thinkers, his assessment of one’s center-of-gravity action logic as a determining factor in
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one’s fallback recovery was identified by the others. In fact, this was one o f McCallum’s 
findings from his 2008 study -  the later one’s center-of-gravity action logic, the more one 
notices the falling back, therefore the shorter the fallback periods (McCallum, 2008). 
McCallum acknowledged the irony of this in that it may appear that those at post- 
conventional action logics fall back more frequently. When in fact, those at later action 
logics have access to an “encompassing consciousness” that more frequently notices 
fallback -  access that those at the conventional action logics do not possess.
Cook-Greuter also expected that one’s speed of recovery from fallback would be 
pre-determined by their pre-existing developmental level given that the later action logics 
have more in-the-moment awareness to recognize fallback when it’s happening. She 
further claimed that those at later action logics also have access to more tools to recover 
from fallback than earlier developmental action logics. She identified a willingness to 
seek support and an inclination toward self-reflection as two o f these tools.
Cook-Greuter noted that willingness to seek support has been shown to be stage- 
dependent, with individuals at the conventional stages up to Expert avoidant of feedback, 
while Achiever and later stages of development seek it out. Torbert similarly mused that 
those at conventional action logics are unlikely to share their most difficult and 
vulnerable moments with friends. Yet, post-conventional stage individuals thrive on 
hearing friends’ difficulties, sharing their own, and seeing what comes o f it.
Cook-Greuter explained that individuals at the post-conventional stages 
understand that feedback aids self-improvement, enriches relationships and self, and 
helps identify blind spots. However, she also noted that willingness to seek support may 
be personality-dependent.
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Cook-Greuter identified self-reflection as another component o f growth from
fallback. Here again, the later stage individuals have a leg up on their conventional
counterparts, given the natural inclination in the post-conventional stages to reflect,
reframe, imagine the benefit o f the experience, and grow. She elaborated that those in
conventional stages of development are not naturally reflective and often need help in
order to gain a new perspective.
Torbert also pointed to the desire that post-conventional individuals have to
understand and cultivate their own development. He explained,
I think what is true is that only people going into post-conventional stages begin 
to have a deep interest in [fallback]. It tends to be, in general, too threatening for 
people whose identity is completely enmeshed with their actual behavior. Where 
they don’t have any distance between the two. And, it ultimately requires looking 
back and forth between behavior and intent to do anything with it.
However, McCallum offered a different take on this. Based on his research, he
noted that while those at later action logics have more capacities and resources to pull
from to help them catch and recover, they don’t necessarily employ them better than
those at earlier action logics. So, perhaps later stage individuals are capable o f catching
their own fallback quicker, but not necessarily more effective at learning from it than
earlier stages.
Berger noted that post-conventional-measured individuals have the ability to 
notice experiences of fallback to various places along their developmental band either in 
the moment or shortly thereafter. Torbert similarly pointed out that at the later action 
logics “you are more likely to catch yourself more quickly when you’re falling back, 
because you’ve separated out this attention that can notice what you’re doing in real time.”
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Cook-Greuter suggested that not only one’s ability to notice and recover from 
fallback, but one’s experience of fallback would be subjective based on one’s 
developmental level. She noted the existence of darkness and evil at all levels of 
development, and identified an awareness and acceptance o f the inherence o f both good 
and evil in one’s inner processes and one’s tendency for projection, as signs o f 
developmental maturity. She suggested that the earlier stages idealize the darkness away 
and would likely judge and reject the negative internal experience. Whereas, the later 
stages are aware o f the darker aspects o f self, and don’t fight against this awareness. 
Instead, they just notice and accept it, and don't act on it. In fact, Cook-Greuter 
suggested that those at later action logics would be less concerned about a negative 
internal experience and perhaps wouldn’t experience it as fallback. She acknowledged 
that the acceptance o f the whole o f human experience offers freedom to those at later 
action logics.
While Cook-Greuter explored the presence o f darkness, Kegan offered 
perspective on the presence of light. He suggested that many erroneously classify 
glimpses o f oneness, or being connected with those and that which surrounds us (which 
are most often experienced by those at post-conventional levels) as fallback. When in 
fact, he considers these almost always positive experiences “fall forward.” Kegan 
described the dissolution o f the subject-object dichotomy, noting that in Order 0 
(Torbert’s Imperial), the infant’s way, the world is an extension of self -  or all subject. In 
the Fifth Order (Torbert’s Strategist and Alchemist), in enlightenment, one takes the 
world’s perspective, and there’s an emptying o f the subject -  or all object.
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While these theoretical musings on human development are helpful in
understanding one’s developmental experience as one traverses the developmental
continuum both forward and backward, the key thinkers acknowledged that there are
challenges to integration of the theory with practice. These challenges are described in
greater detail in the next section.
Challenges to integration of the theory with practice. Torbert noted the
potential trap of developmental theory, the theory he helped establish, saying,
As we know, plenty of people can become delighted by the mental fantasies and 
disciplines o f thinking developmentally, and they don’t necessarily apply it 
directly to their own awareness, though they may imagine they are. I mean, 
certainly, any theory, and developmental theory in particular, can become a kind 
o f a trap where you ultimately end up lost in words and not actually experiencing 
the moment o f development.
Torbert pointed to the consultants and academics who understand the theory and 
are out in the world teaching it to others, noting that these same individuals, when they 
return to their own work, their own environments, themselves have a hard time 
integrating it. He identified one challenge to integrating this theory with practice as 
contextual gravitational pulls. Many succumb to the path o f least resistance. Instead o f 
challenging self and environment to grow developmentally together, individuals may 
allow themselves to settle into the atmospheric norm.
Palus claimed that the sense o f a developmental hierarchy that characterizes stage 
development theory often leads to feelings o f judgment and shame in those who are 
assessed on the developmental measures relative to others. One-on-one coaching is often 
needed to fully explain the assessment and address concerns, yet practitioners are often 
working with groups rather than individuals, and resources o f time and money are limited. 
He also felt the developmental assessment instruments are problematic to use in practice.
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He stated that the tools we have currently are crude, cumbersome, and require significant 
time and money in development, in administration, and in scoring. Palus believed it 
would be “brilliant” if there could be serial administration o f instruments (time one and 
time two), but the aforementioned challenges hinder this.
Palus identified his own tension at having to use the metaphors o f stage 
development in practice, while not fully feeling that they are sufficient. Nevertheless, 
Palus acknowledged that a theory is useful if people can understand it. Even if not 
perfect, it helps to frame, to have assumptions and a common language.
Finally, Palus -  like Torbert in his earlier noted reference to many succumbing to 
the path o f least resistance -  conceded that questioning leads to a hard life, given that we 
don’t have data to disprove the existing metaphors o f stage development theory. Palus’s 
statements suggest that it is easier to work with what is valuable about the existing stage 
development theory, particularly given his professional focus on practice instead of 
theory, rather than constantly question what doesn’t seem exact. Yet, Palus felt the 
questions still need to be asked, the points still need to be raised, and he and other key 
thinkers do so in the critique of stage development theory, which follows.
Critique of stage development theory. Palus referred to stage development 
theory, stages, and fallback as cultural artifacts. He described them as social 
constructions created in the midst of culture. He defined constructive-development as the 
progression in one’s meaning making. He said, “W e’re constructivists.” We construct 
our meaning. These constructs of stages, stage development, and fallback are 
constructions. All o f this is to say that they are not fundamental truths. They are useful
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metaphors, good rules of thumb, and tools for understanding and talking about the real, 
yet subjective, felt experience o f falling back.
Palus invoked the hero’s journey, and suggested that the Achiever’s interpretation 
of heroic living would be an ending with a neatly tied bow. Yet, a post-heroic 
construction acknowledges the messiness of life and our interaction in it. Palus criticized 
stage development theory for glorifying the later action logics as those where life is easier 
and trauma-free, a critique that Cook-Greuter also offered. Invoking Jon Kabat-Zinn5, 
Palus claimed that we, at all stages of development, are subject to “the full catastrophe of 
life.”
Palus noted that in his work with leadership coaching, the assumptions of 
constructive-developmental theory can be helpful and provide a common language and 
understanding. However, he believes that stage development is a simplistic approach to 
what is likely much more complicated and messy. Palus referenced critics o f the theory: 
Kurt Fischer who claims that adult development theory is too crude to adequately predict 
human behavior and psychological constructs; Michael Basseches who suggests that 
development is chaotic and random, and marked by ups and downs; Daniel Dennett who 
notes that consciousness is constrained, and much smaller than we think, so why even 
focus on the small part o f ourselves that does act from consciousness?
In spite of all o f this, Palus claimed that stage development theory is a proven 
theory that explains how an individual’s complexity o f meaning-making develops over 
time, noting that it has withstood challenges, has held up under rational philosophical
5 Jon Kabat-Zinn is the founder of the Stress Reduction Clinic at the University of 
Massachusetts Medical Center and author of Full Catastrophe Living: Using the Wisdom 
o f Your Body and Mind to Face Stress, Pain, and Illness.
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analysis, and provides a depth of understanding. When asked why do we embrace this
theory, Palus responded, “We love these big theories that seem to account for everything.”
Yet, the constructive-development and stage development theories do not account
for everything. The phenomenon of fallback has largely been neglected in the field. In
the next section, the key thinkers explore why this may be.
The elephant in the room. If fallback is such a clear component o f our human
development, why has it not been studied? Torbert took an historical approach to the
question, noting that the field o f adult development is young. He explained that in the
beginning, studies were on where most of the population is -  the conventional action
logics. At these conventional action logics, individuals are largely unable to recognize
fallback. Even beyond the conventional action logics, it’s difficult to imagine the
concept. Torbert said,
.. .Inevitably, there was more a study of comparative statics. “What does this 
person who’s at this stage do, compared to that person who’s at that stage?”
Rather than, “What is the phenomenological experience of a late action logic 
person?” . ..You have to be able to describe the phenomenon you’re asking about 
to the person.
Cook-Greuter suggested that the reason fallback has not been studied so far, the 
reason she herself has not studied it, is because o f its negative connotations in the midst 
of the positive focus o f those in the humanist, constructivist field in which constructive- 
development theory resides. Similarly, McCallum posited that developmental theory has 
heretofore (and primarily by the integral set) had a fascination with onward and upward -  
the later or higher stages of development -  with a notable gap in appreciation for the 
“hidden divergence in development.” Echoing Cook-Greuter’s and McCallum’s claims,
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Berger criticized the field’s and the theory’s neglect of fallback, claiming that it denies
the real lived experience of fallback in self and others.
Torbert suggested that the inability to concretely describe the fallback
phenomenon stems largely from assumptions among the theorists that they mean the
same thing. Torbert acknowledged,
.. .Nobody’s ever really made distinctions. Like, what is the difference between 
short-term and long-term? And, is it more likely that one would fall back at one 
action logic than another? And, how long will it take? Does the action logic that 
is your center-of-gravity determine how long your fallback is likely to be?
Further, Palus declared that the theoretical field is weak on pursuing empirical
truth, and more specifically, pursuing empirical truth that is disconfirming: that looks for
the outliers, that seeks to discover where the theory breaks down, where the edges
become ragged. He suggested that fallback may reside at the ragged edges o f stage
development theory. He acknowledged that the claim that developmental movement is
forward is questionable, because we are not always able to make sense from our most
complex stage. However, Palus cautioned that making fallback a theory of its own
without poking at the experience would be falling in step with the shortcomings of the
existing theory.
In the next section, I take on Torbert’s and Palus’s challenge to dig more deeply 
into the experience of fallback. My second and third research questions concern the long 
overdue exploration of the assumptions and distinctions of the fallback phenomenon 
examined through each key thinker’s theoretical lens. In the pages that follow, I poke at 
the experience of fallback in hopes o f doing justice to the full, lived experience o f human 
development.
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Part II. Research Question Two: How Do Key Thinkers in the Field of Adult 
Development and Leader Development Understand the Fallback Phenomenon 
Within their own Theoretical Frame?
Research Question Three: What Factors May Facilitate Developmental Growth as a 
Result of Fallback?
William R. Torbert, Ph.D. As an undergraduate student at Yale, Torbert was 
confronted in a religious studies seminar by a professor who challenged the values 
Torbert espoused given his actions in that moment. Torbert was struck by this exercise in 
authenticity and harshness which offered a first glimpse at how conflict, when conducted 
with mutuality as a goal, can transform relationships and individuals, not only in 
academia, but also in the real world. This professor would later become one o f Torbert’s 
most influential mentors, Chris Argyris. Both Argyris and Don Schon, Torbert’s seniors 
in academia and in the field o f action science, devoted their professional careers to the 
exploration of how one can become aware o f and reconcile one’s theory in use with that 
which is espoused. Torbert embraced the criticality of making all aspects o f one’s self 
vulnerable, not partitioning certain aspects off, in both self and organizational learning.
Torbert is among the seniors o f a set o f developmental researchers, which 
includes Robert Kegan and Susanne Cook-Greuter, both by whom he has been influenced. 
His developmental measure, the Global Leadership Profile (GLP) is the latest version o f 
the sentence completion test instrument developed by ego development theorist Jane 
Loevinger, Susanne Cook-Greuter, and Torbert, more or less successively.
Torbert’s understanding of fallback is influenced by David McCallum and the 
findings from his 2008 empirical study, which revealed the occurrence of fallback in all
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eighteen participants. However, beyond McCallum’s research, Torbert noted that the 
theorists all seem to make assumptions that they are talking about the same thing with 
fallback, but the assumptions have not really been put to the test. In the next section, 
Torbert makes his assumptions about his understanding o f fallback explicit.
Fallback defined. Torbert defined fallback as the “unintentional movement back 
...from one type of meaning-making to a different type o f meaning-making,” the length 
of which could span from seconds to months. He described fallback as “a period o f time 
during which you are operating at an earlier action logic than is your supposed center-of- 
gravity action logic, without realizing that you are doing it at the time.”
Torbert distinguished the fallback we were discussing, one in which there is a 
temporary loss of capacity, from permanent fallback. He noted that permanent fallback 
would entail a real loss o f capacity, and could be caused by old age, physical trauma, or 
brain trauma.
We explored the nuance of fallback as a passive versus an active phenomenon. 
Torbert contemplated the components o f the word “fallback,” with “fall” and “back” both 
implying passivity -  the reverse of action. A definition of “action,” what it is, and what it 
is not, was important in Torbert’s frame. Torbert posited that “action is action towards a 
specific intent which one is willing to create new structures in order to realize.” He noted 
that action is not behavior that can be habitual. In fact, Torbert suggested that action as 
described in his definition may be more accurately noted as a factor in development in 
that it is “action against the existing order based on a vision o f a better order.”
Similarly, Torbert suggested that it is important to understand what fallback is not. 
His definition of fallback does not include the active, intentional, strategic, choice to act
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from an earlier action logic, which one might employ as a protective mechanism in 
relationships o f distrust to avoid being taken advantage of. Torbert added, “Or another 
reason you’d use the earlier action logic is because you think that the other person is at 
the earlier action logic and will understand the message from that same action logic more 
clearly.”
During our final interview, which took place a-year-and-a-half after the first six, 
Torbert’s distinction of fallback as focused on meaning-making, and action as a 
component of active growth, not passivity, had changed. In this final interview, Torbert 
identified action as a prerequisite for fallback. He suggested that if one had a thought 
from an earlier action logic, and did not notice or reflect upon it, that it would not be 
fallback. He believed if there was a thought from an earlier action logic, even if  it was 
noticed but still not acted upon, it would not be fallback. In fact, he declared that fallback 
would occur only if the thought from an earlier action logic leads to behavior that one 
notices as different from one’s center-of-gravity action logic, and if this noticing of 
incongruence has an impact on one’s ongoing experience.
Torbert conceded that a challenge in identifying fallback if it necessitates 
behavior is in how one can recognize behavior, given that behavior may in some 
circumstances be a behavior of non-action. He also noted that identification o f fallback 
requires the cooperation o f first and second persons inquiring in real cases. Ultimately 
we will be unable to identify the occurrence o f fallback every time.
As we contemplated potential examples of fallback in thought with no associated 
behavior, Torbert’s declaration that fallback cannot be earlier meaning-making alone if  it 
is not expressed outwardly, softened. In the end, Torbert conceded that fallback could be
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experienced in one’s inward thoughts alone, if recognition and correction take place. 
However, he could see the possibility o f fallback marked by thought only, not action, 
with the conditions noted above, only occurring in those who hold advanced action logics.
In this claim, Torbert identified consciousness as a prominent component o f his 
understanding of fallback. Torbert pointed out that consciousness is usually defined as 
anything that we can reflect on or think about. However, Torbert’s conception of 
consciousness is a distinct form of attention from thought that is capable of 
interpenetrating thought and action. Torbert posited that action logics concern a 
spectrum between cognition and awareness, and that all along the spectrum, attention 
fluctuates. He noted that the form of consciousness that he refers to is rare, and that 
fallback is a trial and error process in search o f higher consciousness.
I asked Torbert if  he thought something could be described as fallback if one has 
a watching awareness o f its occurrence in the moment. Torbert explained that the 
watching awareness that recognizes the difference between one’s normal developmental 
capacity and one’s current incapacity would be an early form of awareness, or “quasi­
awareness.” This early form of awareness would be characterized by a critique o f one’s 
current capacity compared with one’s intent, possibly generated by an intermediate action 
logic that provides critical perspective on fallback, but not fully from one’s center-of- 
gravity. Whereas a true observing awareness produced by one’s center-of-gravity would 
be non-judgmental and would be able to provide options in the moment.
Causes o f  fallback. Torbert suggested that it’s rather easy to conceive of how 
fallback would occur. He noted both biological and societal catalysts for fallback. His 
biological catalysts for fallback included ordinary triggers, developmental transition, and
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unresolved trauma. Context and new learning fall under his second category of fallback
causes, societal catalysts.
Biological catalysts. From a biological perspective, Torbert described
development as a more intricate structure built upon a base self-awareness. He posited
that the “intricate structures might be blown over by a wind.. .and then one would be
back on the ground of the earliest structures.. .” This “wind” often takes the form of an
ordinary, “automatic,” more “passive” digression into habitual, less strategic, and less
attention-al patterns o f earlier action logics. In fallback caused by ordinary triggers,
Torbert claimed that one’s capacity to connect to the moment-to-moment attention is
compromised by factors which include laziness, feeling tired or depressed, getting caught
“in the heat of the moment,” or stuck in group norms, particularly when the culture o f a
given environment doesn’t have the “understructure” to support operating at a
consistently high developmental level.
Torbert described an organizational environment in which he experienced
fallback resulting from ordinary triggers. He said,
We didn’t pay a lot of attention to our organizational stage of development, and I 
was the one who was always trumpeting the importance of doing so. I just didn’t 
even take the analysis o f our situation terribly seriously. I didn’t apply the 
[developmental] theory to us regularly and with real questioning intent.
Moreover, Torbert posited, fallback always seems to be present during
developmental transition. Torbert explained that the very nature o f transition involves a
falling back to what’s known in the process of developing to the newly aspiring (and still
largely unknown and not-yet-mastered) meaning-making structure. He noted,
[In] any movement from one action logic to the next in the leap forward, there’s a 
period when one is ambivalent between the two meaning-making systems, and 
one is simply returning to one’s settled center-of-gravity, and then moving
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forward to the newly aspiring center-of-gravity. So, certainly in the move 
between action logics, one can see it’s inevitable there.
In fact, Torbert suggested that this transition process is often experienced as traumatic.
He explained,
The movement from one action logic to another is itself traumatic. ..In Kegan’s 
[The] Evolving Self. . .he [says].. .that depression is characteristic o f.. .being in 
between action logics. And, he even says there’s a specific type o f depression 
that is characteristic of each particular stage change.
Fallback prompted by trauma, and not just trauma experienced in developmental
transition, is another cause, according to Torbert. He explained,
It seems so often possible to find the cause in terms o f some elements that weren’t 
really well digested as one moves through the action logics to begin with. 
Traumatic events...obviously traumatic events, but probably also other events that 
didn’t necessarily feel traumatic at the time, but established a very strong 
perspective on something that is pre-verbal in nature that we, ourselves, don’t 
recognize. And so when a reminder o f that form of trauma or a person who could 
be seen as playing the role of the traumatizer in the earlier experience, when 
somebody like that comes along, our sense o f being at risk for survival in some 
way comes into play. And, we’re suddenly sort of caught up in the situation 
where we repeat archetypal patterns...The degree o f trauma probably affects how 
often [we] fall back to that stage... We sometimes talk about the most common 
fallback position that different people take, and I think that is associated with the 
relative difficulty of mastering that earlier stage to begin with.
Torbert recalled a personal example o f trauma generated by living in different
cultures, frequently with different languages, early in his life. His family moved often,
which resulted in the loss of friendships and the need to make new friends. Torbert
remembers struggling to feel safe and included, often fearing being outside o f the group
and having no friends. This experience from an early time in Torbert’s development
seems to have some connection to his life-long tendency to fall back to Diplomat in
relational struggles.
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Torbert offered the story of a friend in the throes of a traumatic life event who 
seems to be in full fallback. He suggested that an alternate hypothesis for this trauma is 
that she’s very early in a new stage o f development, and when she is challenged with 
making meaning in this space, she’s reverting to an earlier, known stage o f development. 
He suggested that this experience is being prompted by a current, rather than a past 
trauma that she is going through.
Torbert suggested that the more serious the trauma (either past or current), the 
longer it would take to recover from fallback. Until one resolves this trauma (often 
characterized by stress, fear, physical injury or illness, feelings of exclusion, self­
judgment, shame or depression), one will continue to fall prey to the fallback it prompts. 
However, Torbert noted that the same catalysts for fallback might also serve as catalysts 
for development in a different context or in the midst of different relationships. He 
pointed to injury as an example of a prompt for fallback, noting that injury may also 
result in bringing forth one’s biggest Self. (“S e lf’ and “Selves” is capitalized throughout 
the dissertation to emphasize a reference to the higher or bigger self to which one may 
aspire).
The stability or instability of one’s developmental structure is clearly influential 
in the capacity we bring to given situations. Additionally, Torbert points to society as a 
determining factor in one’s susceptibility to fallback. His societal explanation for the 
ease with which fallback can occur is that given that the majority of the population can be 
found in the conventional action logics, there are larger populations to reinforce the early 
action logics. Therefore, there are more forces, a greater contextual gravitational pull, 
supporting the earlier action logics, and causing those whose center-of-gravity is more
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complex to succumb to less complex sense-making. Societal catalysts for fallback are 
detailed next.
Societal catalysts. Torbert identified the role that society plays in catalyzing 
fallback given that 95% of the population falls within the conventional stages of 
development. Torbert pointed to contextual gravitational pulls as catalysts for fallback 
particularly in conventional stage individuals. He noted that early action logic 
individuals are unable to recognize and influence context, and don’t know how to shift 
their behavior to make the most o f or to “manipulate” the context they are in. However, 
he noted that integral theorist Ken Wilber refutes the claim that context and environments 
have their own action logic. Torbert explained that Wilber believes a higher action logic 
individual who enters an environment filled with lower action logic individuals will 
actually pull the developmental expression o f those in the environment up.
Torbert noted that in the key-thinker-wide, universally-recognized home context, 
fallback often occurs for multiple reasons. He suggested that familial relationships are 
often subject to archetypal patterns, which are the most challenging for one to see. 
Further, parents are invested in their children staying the same, as the parents themselves 
may have largely stayed the same. Torbert also noted that individuals tend to fall back in 
familial relationships and in home contexts simply because they can, whereas in public, 
one is less likely to be forgiven for behaving badly. Further, one expects to be able to 
rest at home. Torbert noted that the experience of fallback at home is often a passive one 
characterized by sleep, possibly as an attempt to escape old patterns that family 
relationships and contexts tend to call forth. He posited that in the home environment, it
120
takes a lot to want to change one’s behavior. Yet, in newer environments this is not the 
case.
However, Torbert also identified new environments and new learning as potential
catalysts for fallback. He explained,
It’s appropriate to go back to the beginning o f the developmental spectrum when 
you’re in a new situation ... When one is beginning over again, one is sent back 
to one’s beginnings. And, so it probably is true that more of the material from 
early encounters in life is brought to the forefront by, again, starting something 
new.
In an earlier section of this chapter, Torbert played with the necessity o f action or 
behavior for fallback to occur. In this section, Torbert explored action in fallback in the 
context of conscious choosing versus unconscious falling. He noted that in a new job 
setting, for example, one generally finds one’s self acting from the Diplomat action logic, 
and often this is not a deliberate choice. Yet, those at later action logics begin to 
distinguish between what is situationally-appropriate and what is situationally- 
inappropriate, and can identify what is situationally-inappropriate as fallback. Torbert 
clarified that when one unconsciously operates, it is fallback. But, once one becomes 
aware o f one’s use of a given stage in a given circumstance and consciously chooses to 
act a certain way, it is no longer fallback. Torbert’s theoretical conceptions o f the 
experience of fallback, including its characteristics, and the feelings, behaviors, and 
actions associated with it are detailed next.
The fallback experience. Torbert posited that the experience o f fallback is 
unique to each individual and is influenced by one’s current center-of-gravity action logic, 
by the action logic to which one falls back, and to one’s own personal history and 
experience of that fallback action logic in one’s initial traversal through it. Nevertheless,
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understanding what the fallback experience looks and feels like for others may provide 
insights into how it manifests in one’s self.
Torbert’s personal experience of fallback is marked by an inability to connect to 
“richness” and his own “vital core.” He describes falling back as a “flattened world 
experience”; a “re-experiencing” characterized by past archetypes along a “familiar 
downward tunnel,” during which he loses the “capacity for choice in action.”
Torbert noted fallback may be generally experienced as: intellect trumping 
intuition, cycling in the fallback position, trauma, shame, depression, and loss of other’s 
perspective and o f empathy. When one is in fallback, he suggested one may feel stuck, 
“struggle-y,” and safer, though he notes that feeling safer is an illusion. Actions and 
behaviors associated with fallback include: blaming others or projecting; repeating 
archetypal patterns from the original event and the action logic at which one was during 
that event; sleeping to avoid further fallback patterns; behaving unilaterally; privileging 
one’s own experience over others; becoming self-protective and minimizing risk; and 
becoming less conversational and less perception-testing. Now that I’ve offered 
Torbert’s understanding of how fallback may be experienced, I outline his thoughts on 
the importance of understanding fallback.
The importance o f  understanding fallback. Torbert identified the importance of 
this research to our understanding of human development and fallback, noting that it 
bridges the historic divide between first-person phenomenological research and third- 
person empirical research. He acknowledged the unique nature of this research on 
fallback in that it employs a combination of first-person experience and third-person 
theory to inform third-person theory that is useful to first persons. In other words, this
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research accesses the phenomenological, lived experience of the key thinkers and the 
participants from the 2011 pilot study, and this lived experience in combination with the 
key thinkers’ theoretical understandings will create a more robust and complex theory 
that will ultimately benefit individuals in their actual experience o f living and developing.
Yet, Torbert pointed out that at this point we just don’t know the answers to these 
many questions. This is new territory. He declared, “I mean you do realize that you are, 
in effect, asking me to probe beyond where I’ve probed before. They aren’t easy 
questions, which is part of why they are good questions.” He noted that having a way of 
understanding fallback within developmental theory provides additional tools with which 
to be able to approach the question of fallback.
Torbert noted the importance o f having both a theory of development and a theory 
for understanding fallback, because the theory helps one to frame, understand, and act. It 
is necessary to releam how we pay attention in order to recognize fallback and to be able 
to use this recognition. If  one can reframe why one is acting from an earlier stage of 
development from a developmental perspective, one is no longer subject to the action. It 
is fallback until one is able to put a new frame of choice around the behavior. Torbert 
suggested that understanding fallback helps one recover from it, because it puts the 
possibility of recovery right in front o f you.
According to Torbert, the phenomenon of fallback exposes the myth that we are 
consistent in our actions and behaviors. He stated, “We have a dream that we are more 
consistent than we actually are. Once we begin observing ourselves more closely, we do 
begin to see that we fall back.” Torbert noted that the importance of understanding 
human development and fallback to leadership is that it helps leaders identify their
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espoused theory versus their theory-in-action, allowing them to respond in a more timely
and authentic manner. He explained,
It allows you to see discrepancy between what you, or your group, or your 
organization claims it means to be doing and what it’s actually doing.. .in order to 
become more response-able at more moments of time. To actually see what’s 
going on and work from that insight rather than operating based on a myth about 
what’s happening.
An understanding of fallback and its role in development allows one to “re­
establish synchrony with yourself and the world,” and ultimately leads to greater success. 
Torbert suggested that understanding fallback highlights that the work in developmental 
growth is ongoing and continual. He noted, “It highlights building the developmental 
process into your everyday activity rather than thinking it will go on somewhere else.” 
The role o f  fallback in development It seems apparent that fallback has the 
potential to play a role in developmental growth. Yet, that begs the question, how? 
Torbert defines developmental growth as a “progressive movement.. .a biologically- 
driven process toward higher self-awareness.” Once one achieves a higher action logic, 
the “needs” characteristic o f the earlier action logics have a different pull, and one’s 
response to these needs will be different. Torbert is careful to point out that 
developmental growth is not sudden permanent enlightenment.
Torbert contended,
Once we begin observing ourselves more closely, we do begin to see that we fall 
back... Once you begin recognizing it, you realize that your whole myth about 
who you are is off kilter... it sort o f highlights that the work o f developmental 
movement is really ongoing and continual. And, indeed, the later the action logic 
to which one has developed, the more one is called to continue to work. The 
work gains in intensity, it doesn’t get easier.
In fact, Torbert argued that developmental growth from fallback, while possible, is not
automatic. He explained,
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Well, of course, it obviously doesn’t do so directly, I mean in the direct sense.
It’s precisely the reverse some might say. It’s developmental decline at the 
moment it occurs. And, so it can lead to developmental growth only if it’s treated 
in a certain way.
We discussed how the cause o f fallback might affect one’s recovery and growth 
from it. Torbert thought that fallback prompted by emotion or trauma would be more 
likely to lead to growth than a more habitual form o f fallback. However, he noted that 
growth from fallback marked by emotion would require more support. Given the 
likelihood of those at later action logics to seek feedback and support for an experience 
that reveals one’s weakness and vulnerability, post-conventional individuals would be 
more likely to experience growth from this kind of fallback than would their conventional 
counterparts.
Torbert suspected that the length o f time one spends in fallback would also
influence one’s ability to recover and grow from it. He noted,
The more extended the fallback, the more stickiness and glue and gravity is being 
exerted in that person’s life, the harder it would be to develop from it. And, even 
McCallum’s findings were that there seems to be some tendency for quicker 
recovery from fallback at the later action logics. So, it seems as though the 
shorter fallback is associated perhaps with a growing practice that helps one see 
these things, whatever that practice is. So, the answer may be that it’s harder to 
turn long-term fallback into growth than short-term fallback.
In the previous pages, Torbert considered the conditions that might influence
one’s ability to grow from fallback. The causes for fallback and the length of time one
spends in fallback were explored and for both o f these one’s ability to recognize the
fallback was a critical element in developmental growth. In the next section, I undertake
an exploration of how one might recognize fallback.
Recognizing fallback. Torbert suggested that one is able to recognize fallback
when one notices the gap between espoused ways o f showing up and actual, between
125
one’s normal effectiveness and current. The first step in the process o f growth from 
fallback, recognition o f its occurrence, is connected to attention and awareness. Torbert 
explained,
It requires developing this sense o f what is sometimes called a “free attention.” 
Attention which, although it notices what is going on outside and inside, is not 
actually captured by it, is not sucked into it totally so that one becomes one’s 
thoughts.
Torbert contemplated the variation with which different action logics may notice
fallback. He suggested that when an Expert falls back, one’s behaviors in fallback are
not noticed as object. However, when an Alchemist falls back, there is more likely to be
a recognition o f primitive emotions and behaviors. He noted that the triggers for fallback
may be the same for both the Expert and the Alchemist, but what differs is the resources
one has to notice and interpret the fallback. Torbert posited that these resources for
noticing and interpreting are consciously learned through one’s development, and that the
tools that individuals use to recover from fallback and the effectiveness o f these tools
likely vary by person.
Torbert believed that fallback could be recognized close to or in the moment o f its
occurrence, and posited that the closer to the state o f fallback one is able to reflect on it,
the faster one’s recovery from it. He mused,
It’s interesting, the more we talk, the more the rapidity with which one can 
transform subject into object, and treat it as object, emerges as really a significant 
element in terms o f how fallback works and how one recovers from it.
The transformation of subject to object may also depend on the catalyst for fallback that
one experiences. Torbert suggested that fallback prompted by ordinary triggers (e.g.,
habitual, exhaustion) would likely be easier to recover from, because one recognizes the
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habit. On the other hand, fallback precipitated by trauma and marked by emotion, which
is based on archetypes, would likely entail a more difficult recovery.
Torbert identified three categories o f methods that support recognition o f fallback:
first-person, second-person, and third-person. He explained,
The first-person methods have often in the past derived from spiritual 
traditions. ..all o f the first-person practices are meant to create a quiet space at the 
core that is able to be attentive to what’s going on -  the physical forms o f martial 
arts, and so forth, are all so that you can be situated and moving at the same time. 
There’s both something quiet and something active at the same time, rather than 
either one or the other. So, that’s what one’s seeking to cultivate ultimately.
Meditation and tai chi are both examples o f first-person structures that are focused on the 
phenomenon of experiencing one’s own attention and getting out of habitual patterns.
Torbert also pointed to reflection as a tool in recognition of fallback, suggesting 
that it may engender one’s ability to see one’s younger self from a different space, and 
with less judgment. Torbert identified an exercise that allows one to delve into a felt 
experience and put new words to it, thereby taking what is subject and transforming it 
into object. This process of transforming what is subject into object cultivates a subject­
awareness, a self-awareness that is wider than thought itself. It is an exercise in 
developing one’s trans-conceptual or pre-conceptual awareness that Torbert noted is so 
important to the post-conventional individual.
Torbert suggested that it also helps to have someone around you who is willing to 
point your fallback out to you. This led to the oft-raised question throughout the 
interview season: is fallback in the eye of the experiencer or o f the observer? Torbert 
responded that fallback can only be determined by testing it out with the person 
supposedly experiencing the fallback. Identification o f fallback in others necessitates 
inquiry in each case. However, Torbert noted that fallback might be empirically
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impossible to measure when one doesn’t notice it in self and isn’t confronted about it by 
another.
Torbert explained that second-person methods are built around
.. .observation o f the activity you are engaged in with the other second-persons. 
Just as you can set aside time to meditate, you can set aside time in a group for 
process reflection, after-action review, pre-action preview, check-ins and check­
outs. So, you begin to divide the time so that it doesn’t automatically go into 
whatever line o f thought is first introduced in the meeting... You institutionalize 
an effort to generate ongoing observation o f how the group functions.
Torbert suggested that within these second-person environments, parallel
practices and structures coexist alongside pyramidal practices and structures allowing
productive action to take place while at the same time building a capacity for
effectiveness and reflection into the process. He terms these “beginning liberating
disciplines” and “communities o f inquiry.” Examples include “group dynamics
observation methods” (such as the conference studied in McCallum’s 2008 research), and
cross-functional teams and self-monitoring groups in work settings.
Torbert claimed, “Third-person methods I think are the least known in a sense.
Third-person methods would be better ways of making collective decisions.” These are
useful as a tool for avoiding fallback into paralyzed and polarized positions. Third-
person methods involve directing attention to one’s own actions and external information
that contributes to an understanding of the situation. These might take the form of
reflective writing on a group’s process undertaken by one or several members o f the
group and shared with the others as an additional source o f data which is frequently
experienced as an effective method of perspective-taking.
Treating fallback. Once recognized, the second step in transforming fallback into
developmental growth is to treat it. Torbert identified several methods for so doing. At
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the top o f the list is analyzing past actions without attaching “sharp, harsh, mental
judgments.” Instead, Torbert suggested approaching the fallback episode with tolerance
and forgiveness. Thinking about fallback developmentally may help with this. Writing
about it may serve this function, as well. Torbert reflected,
My ability to see my own experience in the moment was informed by the kind of 
insight I got from writing the autobiography.. .Once I wrote my way through it, I 
came to realize that yes, my conscience was being developed by this crisis.
Torbert suggested that developmental growth may be characterized by one’s
ability to take a different perspective and respond to the same situation differently
following recovery from fallback. One aspect of this treatment may be staying in
community, staying engaged in the environment and with people who provoked the
fallback.
Communities of inquiry such as those described in the second-person recognition 
o f fallback may also provide support for its resolution. In these settings, an observer 
brings the group into the capacity to observe in a non-judgmental way by making the 
incongruities visible as an involved participant, demonstrating the next steps and how 
these next steps can be more effective. Torbert offered the “difficult conversation 
method” as a tool in this work. Through this second-person analysis o f first-person 
practice, an individual is given the opportunity to work through desired outcomes and the 
frames supporting these outcomes, in contrast to the actual outcomes and frames that 
have influenced the situation thus far.
The middle step in developmental growth from  fallback -  participate. Torbert 
added a middle step in the process o f growth from fallback that lies between recognize 
and treat', participate. It is in the space of participation that structured interventions and
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contexts may help support growth from fallback. Contexts supportive o f development 
would be those in which skills are developed and feedback is given related to the next 
level o f development. Torbert pointed out that late stage individuals (i.e., Strategists and 
beyond) tend to recognize environmental effects on their developmental capacities and 
attempt to structure the environment to support their development. How might one do 
this?
Torbert suggested recognizing patterns, fortifying oneself to not respond in the
same way, and exhibiting a willingness to suffer the repercussions o f challenging the
norms in relationships. He advocated viewing every action, every moment, o f every day
as an opportunity for development, and “consciously choos[ing] to put the structures in
place that will support our developmental growth -  whether that’s communities of
inquiry, or surrounding ourselves with higher action logic individuals, or pursuing
spiritual forms of reflection.”
Torbert noted that fostering developmental growth in one’s self
.. .ultimately requires a willingness to put specific times into practice on a daily 
basis. But, as part of gradually sculpting the life so that the productive work and 
the practice work on the awareness are permeating one another. And, that you’re 
not just practicing at certain times, and doing what you have to do in life at the 
other times. But, in a way, you can almost back into it by creating more and more 
little moments of practice, then it kind of gives a different definition to the 
moments that aren’t practice.
Torbert earlier identified context as an overarching cause of fallback. He also 
claimed that context is a determinant in one’s recovery from fallback, aiding in providing 
the feedback and support for developing skills at the next level of development. He 
explained, “If you’re in a context which gives you feedback and support in developing 
skills related to the next action logic, then probably it’s easier to move.” Torbert
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suggested that structures enticing people to begin to learn about themselves provide a
starting point for development. Additionally, those at later action logics have likely
engaged in the most work themselves, and may therefore provide a broader repertoire o f
tools to others to aid in recognition, recovery and growth from fallback.
To be sure, challenges exist to creating these structures. Torbert claimed that
across all structures one commonality is imperative: participation within them must be
voluntary. “If they’re required to do it, the more you force them to do it, the less they’re
going to want to volunteer for it. It’s important that they be choosing into it themselves.”
Participation within these environments requires vulnerability, “a reducing o f one’s
armory.” Torbert noted that much of the population is at the conventional action logics
and would preceive these developmental structures and interventions as a threat, because
it requires you “to be with people in a way where you’re self-disclosing rather than
putting up a front.” In some ways, these structures must be kept partially hidden to limit
negative responses from those who are unable to developmentally “hold” these
interventions. Yet, he said,
It’s difficult to know how to make them available, so that people who are 
attracted to them have the choice to move toward them. But, so that they don’t 
invite negative responses from people who can’t yet digest why they would do 
that kind of thing.
Torbert acknowledged that ultimately, the most effective structures would vary by 
the center-of-gravity action logic o f each individual. This proves a daunting task: first in 
the identification of each individual’s action logic, and second in the design and delivery 
of customized structures within comprehensive settings. For instance, individuals in the 
conventional range are unlikely to share their most difficult and vulnerable moments with 
friends. Therefore, therapy may be a context in which conventional stage individuals can
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reflect, participate in identifying other options, and treat the fallback differently. In
contrast, friendships of support and challenge may provide the conditions through which
growth may be sparked from fallback in post-conventional individuals who are more
likely to make themselves vulnerable to others. Torbert further noted that Strategists and
Alchemists tend to increasingly cultivate meditative capacities, making meditative
structures another tool in growth from fallback.
Unquestionably, developmental growth requires work. Torbert explained, “No
matter what anybody says about this kind of work, it’s not going to be done unless I want
to do it. In other words, there’s no one to do it for me. So, it only becomes important as
we ourselves give it importance.”
David McCailum, S.J., Ed.D. David McCallum recounted the lineage of those
who influenced his understanding of developmental theory. It began with Robert Kegan,
whom McCallum encountered in his pastoral counseling work as he began to apply the
developmental frame to individuals dealing with their faith and life challenges. Through
Kegan and his neo-Piagetian, constructive-developmental approach, McCallum
discovered Ken Wilber. McCallum’s study o f life stage theories led him to Carl Jung,
and then to Bill Torbert and Susanne Cook-Greuter.
McCallum first came across reference to fallback in developmental theory in Bill
Torbert’s work, and through Torbert’s writing, he discovered reference to fallback in
Cook-Greuter’s work, as well. He noted,
There’s not a lot of mention of it, as you know. There is sometimes, I think, a 
blind spot in the literature of adult development that focuses on the upward and 
onward attitudes toward the benefits that come with increasing levels of 
consciousness or cognitive capacity. But, they’re very static in the sense of how 
that direction can actually be reversed under certain conditions. So, Bill’s 
[Torbert] work is the first place I recall having it referenced.
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McCallum’s own life experiences further influenced his understanding of fallback, 
as he began to notice the difference between his measured center-of-gravity and the way 
he “showed up” under certain conditions. He then began to notice it with others. 
McCallum’s 2008 dissertation is the only published research in which empirical evidence 
of fallback has been reported. In fact, all eighteen of McCallum’s research participants, 
no matter their scored center-of-gravity (as measured on the SCTi-MAP), experienced 
fallback.
Fallback defined. McCallum defined fallback as “a temporary regression of an 
undetermined duration that is catalyzed by experiences of anxiety and distress such that 
individuals behave with a logic of action that is markedly less complex and adaptive than 
their developmental potential suggests is possible.” He added that the experience of 
fallback is a cognitive constricting of capacity, one in which no options exist.
McCallum believed that fallback does exist and that it is inevitable in life, given 
that the interaction o f both internal and external environments will not always match up. 
He noted that there is so much empirically available to support this in our own 
interactions, in observation of others, in our environment. He pointed to the contextual 
occurrences of sin and criminal acts as supporting data. He noted that while these are not 
our constant state o f being, they do happen.
McCallum classified fallback as a state. He claimed that fallback only becomes a 
stage when it is long-term. He also made mention of permanent fallback noting that he 
thinks it could occur when the actual self meets so many instances of not living up to the 
idealized self over an extended period, that it gives up. He noted that permanent fallback 
would be very much influenced by external environment.
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Causes o f  fallback. McCallum identified three primary causes o f fallback 
including contextual “gravitational pulls,” “disorienting dilemmas,” and ordinary or 
regularly experienced circumstances. He suggested that ordinary fallback might be 
prompted in situations of uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity, and illness.
McCallum emphasized the importance of environmental context in our ability to 
bring our best Selves at any time. He identified one’s home or community, 
organizational settings, new learning, and society as contexts that frequently prohibit that 
from happening. McCallum identified going home as a catalyst for fallback, a catalyst 
which seemed to be universal amongst the key thinkers. He noted that it is often 
experienced with dread, resistance, and a pull back to former roles. Napping is a normal 
activity, serving as an opportunity to withdraw and also to shore up for what is to come. 
McCallum acknowledged that he, too, takes naps when he goes home to slow down from 
the pace of his normal life and to meet the pace of his mother’s.
McCallum noted that being in community, whatever that is, the place that we live 
in company with others at other developmental levels, is another place where fallback is 
experienced. He suggested that there’s something about the present home holding 
environment, perhaps the one that has known us for some time, that pulls us back to who 
we were earlier. However, one’s home or community may be only one o f several 
environments that are ripe for pulling one back into the context’s action logic.
McCallum identified a significant catalyst for fallback in his own life as “work 
mode.” He described work environments as having a “gravitational pull,” bringing 
individuals down on a fairly consistent and sustained level to whatever the culture’s 
action logic is. McCallum described this issue of discrepancy between an organization’s
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culture and an individual’s action logic as “goodness of fit.” He suggested that when
there’s a goodness o f fit issue one has the choice to leave, to stay and transform culture,
to stay and conform to culture, or to carve out a supporting space.
McCallum identified unfamiliar circumstances and environments as potential
catalysts for fallback. He explained,
When we are taken out of our familiar circumstances, and the kinds of 
conventions and supports that prop up our best behaviors, our best capacities, are 
taken away -  yeah, that’s going to be a condition that’s probably going to 
instigate a little bit of regression.
McCallum pointed to deep change processes in organizations in which individuals’ roles
and functions are shifted as an example of this. Inevitably, he noted, individuals will
experience an implementation dip. On the societal level, McCallum noted that the
removal of social supports and expectations may result in survival conditions in which
one may experience a loss of belonging, security, and the capacity to meet basic needs.
McCallum identified sociologist Jack Mezirow’s notion of “disorienting
dilemmas” as another catalyst for fallback. McCallum described disorienting dilemmas
as experiences that transform or challenge one’s perspectives, unsettle one’s meaning-
making, add complexity, and cause cognitive dissonance. The realization that one’s
biases are no longer adequate for describing reality has a real emotional impact.
McCallum noted that particular causes often prompt fallback to specific
developmental stages. These and the experience of fallback through McCallum’s lens are
explored next.
The fallback experience. McCallum described some o f the typical fallback 
action logics and their corresponding behaviors. A characteristic fallback action logic 
prompted by conflict is Diplomat. The Diplomat may play nice in an effort to maintain
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relationships at all costs. Yet, a fallback to Expert may present as an attempt to get
control, manage, learn, or prepare. The individual falling back to Achiever may push
aside feelings, focus on purpose, mission, and achievement. While individuals have the
capacity to exhibit all o f these behaviors at any time even when not experiencing fallback,
what characterizes these behaviors as fallback is an individual’s lack o f conscious choice
in a given moment or situation.
McCallum noted that the experience of fallback is often marked by anger and an
egocentric feeling sorry for self. This may take the form of passive-aggressive, snippy
behavior. Other experiences o f fallback include uncertainty, loneliness, hurt, and loss. In
fact, loss was frequently referenced by McCallum when exploring the experience of
fallback: loss of choice, capacity, adaptive resources, connection, creativity, possibility,
dimensionality o f the human experience, presence in the moment. For example, in the
case o f conflict, what is lost is the knowledge that conflict can often lead to creativity,
and when it is constructive, can lead to deepened, more authentic relationships.
McCallum offered another loss: forgetting what we know we are when we are at our best.
In other words, we lose a sense of our highest Self.
To guard against this loss o f self, McCallum recommended remembering and
connecting with our exemplars. He explained,
Our interaction with our heroes; the religious figures that we are drawn to and 
inspired by; the example o f people who are dear to us and have managed similar 
challenges in a really graceful way -  we actually have these kind o f introjects 
available to us in our internal repertoire to help us. Like, “Oh yeah, I can show up 
in a different way here. I have access to these better angels o f my nature, if  I can 
just sort of pause for a moment and take a step back.”
McCallum acknowledged that in fallback there is a loss, there is suffering, there is 
something that we must experience as absent that can snap us back to attention, make us
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notice, make us question. He argued that this noticing might bring us closer to God. He 
explained,
[Jean De Caussade] had this notion that every adversity that comes up in our lives, 
is actually God’s invitation for us to transcend our egos... He wrote a book called 
The Abandonment to Divine Providence, and basically it’s suggesting that every 
life experience, ordinary as it might be, trivial, mundane, tedious -  these are all 
opportunities for us to move into union with the divine. And, again it’s like the 
wisdom literature. It’s a way o f framing experiences o f suffering, of loss, of 
disorientation as opportunities for the good. It’s a basic orientation in faith that 
really, God means for our well-being and not for our woe. If  that’s our 
fundamental, existential orientation, then regression itself is something that is 
precious, at some level.
The exploration with McCallum to this point has focused on the phemomenon of 
less complex meaning-making than one is optimally capable as explored through the lens 
of fallback. In the next section, alternative hypotheses to fallback in human development 
are explored.
Alternative hypotheses fo r  fallback.
One center-of-gravity or variance across domains. McCallum explored the 
possibility that there may not be one center-of-gravity action logic that one sometimes 
falls back from. That instead, one may have multiple action logics in one’s different 
contextual domains or along one’s different developmental lines. However, this 
explanation does not fully make sense to McCallum, because he believes that one has a 
central line of cognitive awareness or self-concept that is immutable across domains. 
McCallum suggested that some people may just have a personality that leads them to be a 
Diplomat in conflict situations, for example, no matter their developmental capacity.
Thus McCallum argues in favor o f a center-of-gravity developmental concept which 
allows for one to fall back to a less complex developmental stage than one is capable in
certain contexts.
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The brain/mind connection. McCallum offered that the cognitive structures of the 
brain may play a role in one’s experience o f fallback. He explained that the limbic 
portion of the brain, where emotion and primitive fight-flight responses are housed, when 
stimulated can override the prefrontal lobe, where cognition resides. Effectively, he 
argued, there is a biochemical response to certain stimuli that may not allow one to access 
the cognitive developmental tools that may constitute one’s best Self -  one’s 
developmental center-of-gravity. McCallum also noted that the ability to quell the 
brain’s response to these stimuli are the very same awareness/mindfulness practices that 
are also so seemingly important to avoiding fallback, recovering from fallback, and 
growing from fallback; and also those practices that tend to be most used by those in the 
later developmental action logics.
The importance o f  understanding fallback. McCallum pointed to the 
constructive-developmental field’s focus on the positive, forward-moving aspects of 
development. He suggested that an understanding o f fallback reveals some of the “blind 
spots” in the existing theory, painting a more realistic picture that acknowledges our 
shadows.
McCallum mused that when we understand and acknowledge the fluidity in 
developmental movement, we are able to recognize our hypocrisy and build humility. 
Understanding fallback helps to remind us that we need to be diligent to our own 
development, to minding the way we show up in the world, and measuring it (without 
shame or judgment but with a commitment to reflection) against the way we like to tell 
ourselves and others that we do. An understanding of fallback allows us to reframe it as a 
ground for possible growth -  a positive spin on what at first glance seems to be a
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negative, though inevitable experience in human development. McCallum drew parallels
between fallback and depression. He reflected,
When you grow in depth, you’re sorting through stuff in your unconscious, you’re 
developing self-awareness, and a kind of capacity for emotion, and also for 
empathy with others who suffer. I started to realize all these beautiful benefits 
and treasures that were hidden in the muck and crap [of depression].
In this statement, McCallum makes clear how having a perspective from a higher place
on an experience o f fallback can be beneficial.
McCallum noted that many of the same benefits of understanding fallback for
developmental theory can be applied to the importance of its role in the exercise of
leadership and leadership development. Fallback provides a recognition that we don’t
always show up at our best, helps us expand our options in how we do show up, and
encourages us to set explicit intentions for our interactions. It promotes a sense of
resiliency -  the ability to learn, to fail, to adapt, and to learn again. McCallum argued
that an understanding of development gives us more freedom and opens up new
possibilities. The fallback framework reinforces the practices that support development:
debrief, diagnose, determine next steps, and return to action. Understanding fallback
allows us to not take the practices o f leadership (e.g. making sense of our own and others’
fallback, failure, and conflict) for granted.
McCallum applauded organizational cultures that recognize development as a
process. Though he acknowledged it is often impossible to meet everyone where they are
developmentally, there is a way in which one’s thoughtfulness about the meaning-making,
fears, and motivations of individuals at each stage o f development may help those
exercising leadership make a meaningful step in that direction. The kind of environments
that can be created to support individuals bringing their best Selves can also be given
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attention. But perhaps most importantly, the developmental perspective and 
understanding that it is not always onward-and-upward may allow us to have empathy for 
others and how they make sense o f the world as they are. And, this acceptance might be 
just what prompts development.
The implications to leadership development and practice of this work, the theory 
of human development, and the seeming reality of fallback within it, often seem 
somewhat detached and vague. However, McCallum made them tangible. Leaders need 
to: (a) create the environment in which individuals can bring their best Selves, and (b) 
when they don’t, support individuals in their recognition, learning and development from 
the circumstance. In the next section, McCallum’s understanding o f the role fallback 
may play in developmental growth and the conditions necessary for this to happen is 
made more explicit.
The role o f  fallback in development. McCallum hypothesized that the shorter, 
more dramatic fallback episode may be more effective in getting one’s attention, and that 
the longer, protracted fallback period, may require help from others to recognize it, given 
that one is likely more embedded in it. Yet, he suggested that the catalysts for fallback 
are likely much less important than the resources one has in one’s repertoire for arresting 
the fallback and rebounding from it.
He identified recognition of fallback, reflection, feedback, reframing, and 
acceptance of its inevitability as tools for developmental growth. McCallum suggested 
that one is able to recognize fallback in others, because they wear it on their faces and in 
their bodies. There’s an unwillingness to show vulnerability, a grasping for control
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(often in the form of unilateral decision making by leaders), and an acting and speaking 
from the head.
McCallum noted intention as a factor in noticing fallback in one’s self. If one has 
a stated intention o f living congruent with the way one desires to show up in the world 
including how one interacts with others, noticing when one doesn’t happens more 
frequently. McCallum championed the importance of awareness, which extends beyond 
the mind in recognizing fallback -  getting to the balcony about our mental processes, 
checking in with the heart, paying attention to one’s desires -  resulting in an expansion of 
freedom to choose to make sense and act differently. McCallum acknowledged that this 
noticing o f incongruence is something that is more a goal and a reality in the later stages 
of development.
McCallum pointed to intention as an important factor in not only noticing but also 
learning from fallback. He gave two personal examples o f falling back. In the first, 
while attending a group relations conference, McCallum was obliged to remain 
physically present and to be in relationship with the person with whom he experienced a 
conflict. In this environment there was also a voluntary opting in and implicit intention 
of growth. Both the necessity o f staying present and the implicit intention o f growth 
seemed to play a key role in McCallum’s development from his experience o f falling 
back. In the second example McCallum offered, the “real world” example, there was no 
such implicit intention, and the players could and did walk away from each other and the 
situation. There was escape, an opportunity to not remain present.
McCallum also explored projection -  both the light and shadow of it -  and the 
role it may play in fallback. He recalled from his study that the later stage individuals
141
seemed to have the awareness to identify both when they were being projected upon and 
to realize when they were projecting on others. This helped them either to catch 
themselves in the midst of falling back as a result o f projection, or to work through it 
more effectively when they did fall back.
McCallum suggested that what is also important in growth from fallback is a 
recognition that falling back is part o f life; we are not in control. Again, he pointed to the 
paradox of fallback: that suffering and pain are often necessary in order for growth to 
occur, for something new to emerge. McCallum claimed there is a spiritual 
understanding that can be gleaned from fallback. It brings us closer to the divine. 
McCallum noted,
That kind of disorientation and sense o f suffering, or whatever kind o f emotional 
language you might attach to that experience -  upset -  will actually prompt a kind 
of reflection process. And, if  we actually do get to the point o f revising our 
perspectives, our biases, then a kind o f transformation has taken place that has 
widened our view. It’s given us another level of depth in our interpersonal, social 
intelligence. And, that becomes a huge asset for the future. So, my tendency is to 
see regression in a potentially positive way.
McCallum suggested that framing the fallback as an indication that something
positive, some growth is on the horizon, is helpful in both recovery and learning from
fallback. He explained,
I find some people just have an instinct that life is about learning. Yes, we make 
mistakes, and we do things that we regret. And, from a certain religious 
perspective, we sin... You know, one way o f thinking about sin is from the Greek 
hamartia, “to miss the mark.” “I’ve missed the mark, and now I’m going to learn 
and figure out how to hit the mark the next time.” That’s really healthy and 
adaptive as a stance towards life.
McCallum reflected on the paradox that suffering can lead to insight when we 
make the choice, or when it is made for us, to turn shame and regret into gratitude. So 
much seems to have to do with the way we approach the world in terms of the outcome of
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suffering. He noted that individuals are powerfully capable o f shifting the meaning they 
make from their experience. Yet, that capability seems to be very much influenced by 
one’s developmental level. Perhaps the individuals who are “powerfully capable” are 
those who have traversed the earlier stages and are now supported in their later stage for 
doing so.
McCallum acknowledged that while fallback would seem to be inevitable, what 
can support one’s growth as a result o f fallback are one’s internal and external structures. 
These structures supporting development from fallback are detailed in the next section.
Structures supporting development from  fallback, McCallum identified one’s 
holding environments (the environments where one lives and works), relationships, and 
internal self-scaffolds (those interior tools and resources that one calls on during times of 
fallback) including practices, experiences, and instincts as critical in supporting one’s 
development from fallback. He described techniques and practices that support one in 
the cultivation o f the highest Self, even when doing so in the course o f one’s hectic life 
can be challenging. He suggested focusing on the beginning and ending o f the day and 
the transitions in between. He encouraged making it appealing, incorporating rituals or 
symbols as reminders, and releasing expectations o f perfection or exactness in practice. 
McCallum listed the benefits to the practice as greater awareness and feedback in the 
moment, and also feedback when one has fallen away from them. McCallum indicated 
that the spaces in between that are carved out through these practices allow for the 
diminishment of ego, and the privileging of the beauty, connection, and possibility in the 
cosmic whole. McCallum concluded that the goal is to access all tools -  the mind, heart,
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and gut -  for perspective-taking and reframing without judgment which allow us to pay 
attention to patterns, experience resiliency, accept, and recover.
McCallum admitted that the internal self-scaffolds noted above are not profound 
or unreachable. One has access to them all the time, yet one does not. It’s not until the 
later stages of development and potentially the later stages o f life with the benefit of 
earned experience, that one begins to be able to take a deep breath, connect with spirit 
(whatever or whoever that is for each person), embrace an outlook o f curiosity, and fight 
through the shame and guilt o f falling back to take perspective, that may actually make 
fallback developmental. But, then, sometimes one — no matter one’s level of 
development -  does not access one’s internal self-scaffolds. And, McCallum does not 
know why that is.
McCallum also identified the external resources that aid in one’s recovery from 
fallback. He noted the importance of relationships, o f having people in one’s life that 
help point out one’s fallback and support one through honest, direct, and timely feedback. 
He referenced the importance of narrative (one’s own individual, familial, environmental, 
societal) and environment to how one responds behaviorally and developmentally to 
fallback. McCallum claimed that context matters, both in getting us there, and getting us 
out.
McCallum described developmentally-supportive environments as those that prize 
experiential learning, recognize development as a process, and that offer a positive and 
constructive framing. McCallum stated that environments supporting both recovery and 
learning from fallback include dynamic states that are safe, empowering, and that both 
allow and prompt deeper insight, perspective, and safe reflection with no judgment or
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threat. He identified classrooms, situations o f one-on-one counseling, confession and
organizations as settings that can hold this space, but argued that real thought must be put
into how to create and sustain these environments. McCallum noted the presence o f both
support and challenge as key to environments supporting growth, in general, and in
response to fallback.
McCallum pointed to those at later developmental levels as having not only a
responsibility to bring their highest Self, but also to create the conditions for others to do
so. He argued that there’s a sense o f a moral imperative to shepherd the development o f
a world that looks beyond self to the sustenance and care o f all.
Chuck Palus, Ph.D. Palus identified Robert Kegan and his book, The Evolving
Self, as the initial influences o f his understanding o f human development. He noted that
Kegan synthesized the work of Piaget, Loevinger, and Kohlberg, explaining,
These were all people who saw development as sort o f  a ladder or stairway to 
heaven kind of idea. And so, first o f all, it influenced me in that sense of, well 
okay, there’s widespread agreement that development has these sort o f growth 
characteristics.
Palus listed the “constellation of assumptions” of humanism as upward progress, lower to 
higher, less to more consciousness in development. Palus also appreciated Kegan’s 
humility about the theory that can be seen in Kegan’s claim that theory itself is a 
construction, an attempt to understand people. Palus noted that Kegan says 
“development is messy,” and his theory doesn’t try to exactly account for everything. 
Palus elaborated,
That’s maybe why I’m comfortable with the idea, yeah sure fallback, why not? 
And, how are we to know how it actually works. Because, our research hasn’t 
been that thorough to tell you the truth. We have a lot o f good research, not to put 
it all down. But, the unknown is larger than the known.
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Palus identified Michael Basseches and his theory of dialectical thinking as
influential in his understanding. Basseches’s theory identifies humans’ ability to hold
opposing thoughts, see systems as dynamic and change as normative (though Palus
acknowledged that Kegan would likely categorize this as a post-formal concept).
However, unlike the stair-step approach to stages in stage development theory, Basseches
describes the “stochastic” acquisition of a chaotic mix of tools for living; tools that we
later employ to address what life calls for. Palus explained, “It doesn’t necessarily
assume forward progress. It assumes more a journey through life that naturally goes up
and down. That growth isn’t naturally forward.” Palus went on to explain that these
tools can be acquired through indoctrination or experience, and mused that the definition
of maturity may be that the tools for living are “increasingly based on experience, rather
than rote learning or indoctrination.”
Bill Torbert also had an influence on Palus’s thinking about development. He
said Torbert’s theory emphasized “that people are complicated, that we can’t neatly put
them in any stage of development. That even using these instruments that put a person in
a stage, that they’re actually somewhat crude instruments.” Susanne Cook-Greuter was
critical in building Palus’s understanding of the scoring o f the developmental instruments.
Through her, Palus came to understand that while the instrument reflects a full range, it is
one’s center-of-gravity, where one lives most of the time that is reported.
Finally, Palus pointed to evolutionary philosopher Daniel Dennett as theoretically
influential. Palus mused,
...I think I’ve taken from him ...an idea that actually consciousness, our conscious 
behavior, the place where we live in language, which is a lot o f what this is about, 
is a very small part perhaps o f who we are as people. So, there’s a very
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fundamental mistake that people tend to make, which is how to inflate 
consciousness. And to think, “I ’m in charge. I have free will.”
According to Palus, Dennett claims that our consciousness is constrained by the norms
around us. Palus explained, “He believes that consciousness has a material basis in our
genetics, and evolution, and our brains, and our society. I also believe that.” In response
to my question about who influenced his perspective on human development, Palus noted
that Dennett’s theory may largely differ from much of constructive-development theory.
He said “in making me think about Daniel Dennett and other ways to study consciousness,
I think it’s probably corrective. I think the humanists have probably assumed too much.”
Fallback defined. Palus offered a “traditional” definition of fallback:
Fallback is an inevitable part o f a growth process, in which people realize that 
they fail to consolidate some aspect o f their growth, and whether consciously or 
unconsciously, they are unable to enact an action logic or stage o f development, 
and they find themselves operating at a lower level than what they had hoped.
Palus liked the subjective, phenomenological, emic-perspective nature o f this definition,
which is also representative o f a theory of growth. He found this to be a good tool that is
true to a person’s experience of the fallback phenomenon. The subjective aspect o f this
definition seemed to offer some freedom to Palus as I pressed him to defend or clarify
some of the words he chose such as “inevitable,” “consciously,” “unconsciously,”
“operating,” and “hoped.”
A potentially conscious inability to enact: Yes, according to Palus, the subjective
experience of fallback is marked by an awareness or consciousness that one’s behavior is
not as one had hoped. Yet, it can also be an unconscious inability to enact? Yes,
confirmed Palus, there is a subjective awareness of operating from a lower action logic
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than what one would hope (hope implying consciousness), but there is also an uncertainty
of where that lower action logic operating is coming from (unconscious).
Palus agreed that this definition also gives something o f a subjective license for
diagnosis of fallback in self and in others. After all, fallback as a thing doesn’t exist.
What exists is our construction o f it. So, this definition allows for the subjective
experience of fallback entering our awareness. We become cognizant o f fallback,
conscious of it, in self and others. And, the subjective definition gives us a tool for
naming something that is often experienced as scary.
I asked if operating from an earlier action logic is inclusive o f thought and
meaning or only action. Palus confirmed that operating is action, noting that after all,
these are action logics. In fact, he suggested that the presence of a lower level feeling
with a choice not to act at that lower level is indicative of a higher stage o f development.
Therefore, Palus described fallback as becoming subject to an earlier level of
development, accompanied by an awareness o f the gap between your most evolved
capacity to act and the way you actually show up. He explained,
So, if  a person’s just sitting there sort o f internalizing all of this and being 
overcome by childish feelings or something, if you don’t act on those, then that’s 
almost the definition of a higher stage. So, for me it’s like you’re almost a puppet 
of this lower level. And, you’re aware enough of it to be kind of taken aback by 
your own behavior.
I continued to probe, asking if fallback is in fact an inevitable part o f a growth
process. Palus responded,
I’m not always sure it’s fallback, per se, but everything I know tells me that this 
experience of not being sort o f self-consistent, is fundamental, and yes it's part of 
the growth process. It might be the fundamental thing that we come up against as 
we grow older, is that we are inconsistent. And, growth is either taking steps to 
close the gap, or to sort o f live in peace with your inconsistencies. But, either of
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those are about growth. So, yeah, whatever it is, it’s a part o f growth. That’s for 
sure.
I restated from Palus’s definition, “ ...they find themselves operating at a lower
level than what they had hoped." Does one hope to operate at their center-of-gravity or
highest possible action logic? Palus answered that, no, one’s hoped for developmental
expression differs by context. He reflected on his own personal experience. He said,
I don’t think that I hope, when I go out into the world, that I ’m always a Strategist 
or something. Even though I ’m capable o f that. Wow, I’m not surprised if I ’m 
not... Come on! If  I could just be sort of socially, self-consistent, Stage 3. If  I 
can be aware of the feelings of others, wow, if I can just stand in that successfully, 
I’m good. That’s all I hope for, sometimes. Just let me not insult this person...
So, I think sometimes I’m happier -  people are happy to be operating wherever 
they are. And, it’s only really fallback if they say, “Oh, this is not working. This 
is not good. Wow, I could really use some higher order wisdom here. But, I can’t 
get there.” That to me is more the essence o f fallback.
It would follow, Palus argued, that what fallback is not is acting from a lower action logic
than that which you are capable. Rather, it is only fallback if the highest action logic of
which you are capable isn’t working, and you seek access to, but can’t get it.
Palus noted that while this traditional, “party line” definition o f fallback is useful,
it is not set and final. It is just one step in our discovery o f the full truth. He explained,
There is a conscious aspect o f it. But, as I said before, I think a lot o f what is 
actually going on is unconscious. It’s the tip of the iceberg, sort o f thing. So, we 
just have to be careful. W e’re talking about the tip o f the iceberg, here. And, all 
of our theorizing about the tip of the iceberg, runs the risk o f ignoring the iceberg.
Criteria. Palus argued that fallback does exist as an observable phenomenon, but
it could be interpreted in different theoretical ways. He cautioned not to just throw
everything under one fallback theory and assume it all fits. Palus emphasized the need
for criteria, for thresholds, for tests to determine what rightly counts as fallback.
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Time was one of these. Palus identified 30 days as a potentially good measure, 
noting its connections to historic Outward Bound programs, Center for Creative 
Leadership (CCL) programs, CIA initiatives around brain-washing -  a period o f time that 
is beyond normal human perturbations, that would indicate a real spiritual crisis.
Thinking o f McCallum’s research setting -  a three-day group relations conference -  
Palus wondered if the essence of developmental challenge leading to growth can be 
distilled into say, three days. Are there settings that allow fallback and possibly growth 
to happen in a shorter timeframe?
Palus wondered if McCallum’s research participants were describing fallback. Or, 
were they describing a temporary discombobulation that is just part o f new learning?
Palus asked, should another category o f fallback be created called pseudo fallback  or 
apparent fallback that names those learning experiences that have similar characteristics 
to fallback, but may just be about new learning? Does it need to be externally diagnosed? 
Would this even be possible given the limits o f our measures for objective assessment?
From here, Palus offered that another categorization for fallback could be the 
emic versus the etic perspective. He recalled from his academic days that emic referred 
to one’s subjective experience, and etic to the objective diagnosis of an experience. He 
considered if it is enough that an individual subjectively self-identifies their 
phenomenological experience as fallback, noting that one’s phenomenological experience 
may feel like fallback, but it may be temporary disequilibrium. Palus suggested that 
perhaps what is needed is the criteria that allows one to provide a self-diagnosis. One o f 
those criteria may be a subjective sense of fundamental incapacitation.
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Palus also noted his pull to want to think of fallback as an uncharacteristic and 
dramatic fall to an earlier stage; to classify it as almost a deterioration of an action logic 
that may be permanent. He referred to the Christian theme o f “fallen” which would seem 
to be irreparable fallback, requiring God-like intervention.
Palus explored his personal experience of fallback. The normal ups and downs of 
development have not been a surprise in his life story. He noted there’s nothing dramatic 
there, and his ordinary experiences o f being at his limit or unable to figure things out 
have seemed just normal. So, how does one distinguish what is just the normal ups and 
downs o f life, and what is fallback? Palus emphasized making the criteria for fallback 
stringent, representing something dramatic, a higher bar, not just trivial happenings. His 
consistent recommendation o f this stems from his desire for the construct o f fallback to 
be both theoretically and practically useful. He noted, “I don’t want to see it everywhere.”
Cautions. Palus cautioned against an understanding o f fallback that encourages 
identifying it in order to separate from and reject it. Instead, the positive part of knowing 
more about me in that state o f fallback is that I ’m not going anywhere. Palus suggested, 
“It’s an ‘and’ place when you fallback, it’s not an ‘or’ place. It’s not flipping between 
poles.” He posited that one must take a long-term perspective on the whole self, the full 
range.
Palus also cautioned against theory abuse -  imposing our theory on the lives o f 
others. He said we just don’t know enough. That this is the problem with a theory of 
fallback. There is not enough data. The science is not precise. And, in fact, what we 
may judge as fallback, may be the individual living in the post-conventional space, 
accepting what life is -  the whole o f it. Palus told the story o f the monks who give up
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everything to sit on the side o f the road with their rice bowls. He said if they are doing it 
to seek enlightenment, it doesn’t work that way, and he noted that would be an Achiever 
motivation. But, if they just are, if they just accept that it is, that is the path to 
enlightenment. And, Palus noted, perhaps a developmental measurement wouldn’t show 
that.
Finally, Palus cautioned against characterizing the back-and-forth-movement
between the meaning-making one knows and that to which one is aspiring that is inherent
in developmental transition as fallback. He noted that in CCL’s Learning from
Experience program, they have identified an S curve, which depicts an implementation
dip followed by ascent to a higher level o f functioning -  learning is marked by a
temporary setback leading to a positive gain. This also describes what seems to happen
in developmental transition and the fallback that is inherent in it. One encounters a
challenge to understood ways o f knowing and making meaning, which often throws them
down to an earlier way of understanding, perhaps in an ongoing see-saw motion between
the two, and as part o f the reach to the next level of meaning-making. While this makes
sense to Palus, he claimed that it is just what naturally happens. It’s not an exception.
And, fallback, to Palus, seems to necessitate an exception.
Causes o f  fallback. To the when and why o f fallback, Palus responded,
I’m going to press this a little bit and say that fallback is almost the norm, and 
operating at the higher level is often the exception. So, I ’d say when is actually 
more common than maybe the field wants to say. I think we’re under a certain 
illusion that there’s a real stability point at this advanced level. I’m really 
entertaining the idea that the when is most of the time, and the why is because we 
can’t help it.
Palus identified family relationships, organizations, and societies as providing a 
gravitational pull that keeps us in the lower level. Where does this gravitational strength
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come from? Palus noted that the majority of individuals reside in this less complex space. 
He explained that post-conventional individuals are rare, so the norm is lower. He 
posited,
Dyads, as we know, tend to replicate family dynamics, which also can be lowest 
common denominator sorts o f things. Organizationally, collectives also will tend 
to operate at their lowest common denominator. And, societally, I think, if  you 
just read the paper, you see how God-awful low most o f the dialogue is almost all 
the time. I think it’s a little bit o f a fancy we have to think that there’s significant 
numbers o f people spending significant amounts o f time at this advanced level, 
and that it’s kind of rare that they fall back.
Given that a significant percentage of the population can be found in the 
conventional range of development, it’s no wonder that the limited number o f individuals 
who inhabit the post-conventional stages would be pulled down to the contextually- 
predominant level of development expression. In support o f his claim that fallback is the 
norm and advanced sense-making is the exception, Palus suggested one only need look at 
the evidence that surrounds us to see that this is the case.
The fallback experience. Palus reflected that many o f the transformational 
experiences identified by his dissertation participants through phenomenological, 
subjective, self-report, could be categorized as regressive experiences of a negative 
nature. In fact, Palus noted that a lot were “dramatically negative,” horrible, stressful 
experiences in a “primitive state.” During these experiences, Palus noted, the participants 
felt isolated, alone, were incapacitated, rendered stupid, helpless, unable to cope, existing 
in a primitive survival state during which the “machine is having trouble working” and is 
experiencing “breakdown.” Palus wondered what the relationship is between 
incapacitation and fallback.
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Palus hesitated to name these negative transformational experiences fallback. He 
seemed to prefer the term regression. However, he did acknowledge that the 
incapacitation described by his participants may be analogous to fallback, or perhaps 
overlapping, or a category of fallback experiences, or “possibly a fallback of kinds.” He 
described his participants’ experiences in “a survival action logic” as traumatic, 
debilitating, a loss o f later developmental bandwidth during which they were not fully 
intact or awake.
Palus again referenced the CCL program, Learning from  Experience, in which 
participants often described experiencing an implementation dip in learning: “it felt 
awful,” “I was emotionally challenged,” “there was a loss o f effectiveness,” “I was 
stumbling around.” All of these descriptions, both from the CCL program and from 
Palus’s research participants can and have been used to describe one’s experience of 
fallback.
At other times throughout our interviews, Palus described the experience of 
fallback as difficult, dissonant, developmentally negative, trapped, unable to function 
high on Maslow’s hierarchy, unable to self-actualize. Palus observed that whether 
fallback is experienced as shocking and disruptive does seem to vary by one’s highest 
level o f complexity. He suggested that there’s more an awareness and acceptance of the 
reality of that part of self in the later action logics. Therefore experience of fallback just 
is.
Palus also noted the effect o f cultural narratives on one’s experience o f fallback 
and development. In the West he pointed out, the emphasis is on progress. In the East, 
the focus is on now. Palus encouraged embracing the Eastern view: be still, be mindful
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of now, expand now. Don’t attach to your own development. Accept the full catastrophe 
of life with all of its ups and downs.
Palus accepted fallback as a phenomenon, as a thing that people experience. 
However, he did not embrace the theoretical framing of fallback as a departure from what 
normally happens in one’s development, even if  developmental theory doesn’t emphasize 
this fact. His alternative hypotheses for the lived experience o f fallback are described 
next.
Alternative hypotheses fo r  fallback.
The fu ll catastrophe o f  life. Palus offered an alternative explanation for fallback 
that is based on the center-of-gravity developmental metaphor. From this metaphorical 
perspective, one could actually be spread out through many stages o f development at 
once. So, operating from an earlier developmental stage than is one’s center-of-gravity 
would not be fallback, because one has access to any o f those stages at any given time, or 
“living in a different part o f your mass.” He explained, “So in that sense, fallback isn’t a 
reversal o f growth. It’s just acknowledging that we’re complicated people, and we have 
all these things going on simultaneously inside o f ourselves.” Palus, remembering 
Kegan’s claim that development is messy, asked, what if fallback is the norm?
The alternative hypothesis that Palus is proposing is that it is the whole 
experience of life. Palus charged that currently the field o f adult development tends to 
take a cookie-cutter approach in both its theory and practice, resulting in an Expert-level 
discourse, much o f the time. He called the framing o f  fallback, likewise Expert. Palus 
argued that what is needed is a paradigm shift in the framing o f fallback. How might one 
approach the framing of fallback from the different developmental stages? And, might it
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be conceived completely differently from the post-conventional stages? Might fallback 
be seen as just a part of the full catastrophe -  the whole thing?
Palus suggested that perhaps the distinguishing feature of fallback is not if  it 
occurs (assuming that it always does), but how one responds. For instance, if  one is 
aware of it happening in self, is it fallback? Palus noted that the Ironist/Unitive 
perspective is said to have the ability to be aware o f what other layers are doing; a 
detached center point. There is a succession o f masks spinning, and the Ironist is aware 
of this succession of masks spinning. He wondered where that awareness comes from.
Palus acknowledged that moments of heightened consciousness are experienced 
more frequently by the Alchemist. Yet, the Alchemist also has just as much access to the 
less conscious, less complex parts of the whole. Though the Alchemist may embrace the 
presence of those, may construct a completely different relationship to those (one that is 
less about denial, shame, judgment and more about acceptance, inquiry, and even humor), 
may express those earlier action logics differently, the Alchemist is all the same just as 
exposed to the “travails of humanity” that show up as our more primitive, shadow self, as 
the Expert is.
Palus criticized stage development theory for glorifying the later action logics as 
those where life is easier and trauma-free. He claimed that we, at all stages o f 
development, are subject to the full catastrophe of life. Palus invoked James Hillman, a 
Jungian, who calls for embracing the whole o f the human experience, the darkness and 
the light, “the ashes.” He also recalled Susanne Cook-Greuter’s reminder to him that the 
Ironist’s perspective, the unified perspective, calls for the unification o f darkness and 
light, good and bad, growth and decay.
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Palus argued that fallback is the norm no matter your stage o f development. He 
suggested that what I’m terming fallback is really just the human experience, is really just 
the Jungian archetypes, that don’t go away, that are bigger than us. We shouldn’t be 
shocked when it happens. He noted that unresolved trauma is not an individual 
experience. Every human experiences it to some degree. Fallback is just a handy rule o f 
thumb for understanding acting in a regressed way.
Palus conceded that fallback does exist as an observable, felt phenomenon. Yet, 
he insisted that we just don't know enough. Fallback needs to be better understood. It 
needs to be validated. Calling it fallback, making it “a thing,” a theory, seems to deny 
that it is part of us all the time. He cautioned that there is danger in posing fallback as an 
anomaly of who we really are, and taking that as a proven theory. Palus’s interpretation 
of fallback is just that: a rejection of, a cutting-off from the earlier me. To him, fallback 
seems to say, “I ’ve fallen back. I’ve regressed to something that I am no longer.” It 
assumes movement, rather than acceptance of the whole system. It frames fallback as, “I 
do not accept it as me. It’s something that I need to fix.”
Consciousness is small. Consciousness is a key component to an understanding 
o f human development and fallback. Yet, Palus pointed out that our consciousness is 
actually very small in the full realm of the whole. He likened consciousness to a raft on 
the ocean. If fallback is housed in consciousness, then it sits on that raft. He claimed that 
the raft doesn’t determine the weather or the ocean. Rather, the raft is determined by the 
weather and the ocean. Therefore, we can’t just look at the raft to the exclusion of all o f 
the forces acting upon it. We have to look at the whole thing, and much of the whole 
thing might be housed in the unconscious.
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Palus’s understanding of consciousness and its scope is informed by Daniel
Dennett who posits that our consciousness is limited, therefore most o f the time, we are
likely operating from what is automatic or the unconscious. Palus wondered how often
action logics permeate the unconscious mind. He clarified that unconscious is outside of
our willful control, and can be characterized as reactive and instinctual. If this is the case,
and fallback is an unconscious operating from an earlier stage of development, Palus
claimed that fallback is probably more the norm than the exception. Palus explained,
Maybe action logic is a teeny, tiny, little thing in consciousness. And, most o f the 
time, we’re actually operating somewhat unconsciously or automatically. That’s 
not fallback, that’s just the norm. And, you’re lucky if  you ever operate out of 
your action logic.
Palus also proposed that perhaps we have a higher center-of-gravity that is more 
conscious, and a lower center-of-gravity that is more instinctual, engrained, survival- 
oriented. Maybe our “habitual” fallback action logic is actually our lower, more 
primitive one. In his own life, Palus believes in something he calls primary and 
secondary stability. He described primary stability as our conscious acting from our 
center-of-gravity action logic. When that fails, our more primitive, instinctual secondary 
stability kicks in.
Alternatively, Palus wondered how much action logics, consciousness, and 
complexity override characterological orientations such as being emotional? He asked, 
does that change, or is that constant through all of the developmental levels?
Ultimately, Palus believes we’re in all stages of development all o f the time. H e’s 
not sure that something is lost and then recovered in one’s experiences of fallback.
Rather, he thinks it’s just the norm o f having all of one’s self available all of the time. 
Palus believes that the developmental integrity of the whole is very different from
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consciousness. We can lose conscious awareness o f the whole, but our developmental 
integrity continues to work. He cautioned against trying to measure or diagnose fallback 
solely based on what one is consciously aware of.
Palus advised that to explore the tip o f  the iceberg (consciousness) without paying 
attention to the whole iceberg (consciousness + the larger whole including what happens 
in the space of the unconscious) would be a mistake. The unknowns about human 
consciousness far outweigh the knowns. Therefore, Palus argued it’s imperative that we 
keep our ideas open and not settle too easily on a constructed truth that is only one facet 
of the whole picture.
While Palus was skeptical that developmental theory can account for everything, 
and that fallback as a construct offers any greater clarity, he was willing to entertain the 
possibility, offering an example of fallback from his work with individuals in 
organizations. Palus suggested that fallback can and does happen at the individual level, 
in dyads, teams, organizations, and societies. It also happens all along the developmental 
spectmm. Palus pointed out that even the Alchemist doesn’t claim to be operating up 
here all of the time.
The fallback example. Palus offered an example o f a CCL client and walked 
through the different levels o f analysis. At the individual level, Palus told o f Bob, a 
measured Alchemist behaving in a unilateral, authoritarian, pulling rank way. Seemingly 
motivated by anger and fear and a sense of needing to be protective, this episode marked 
by high emotion lasted between eight and 24 hours. Palus noted that what is interesting 
about this example is that it could be interpreted either as a fallback -  an unconscious 
acting from a less complex stage -  or as a conscious choice to use one o f the tools in the
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Alchemist toolbox, employing an earlier action logic to preserve the holding environment 
of learning. It was a powerful example most noticeably in the way that Palus thought his 
way through it. Through this one example, Palus explored: catalysts for fallback, 
recovery from fallback, and alternative hypotheses to fallback.
Palus pointed to the gravitational pull o f organizations as the catalyst for Bob’s 
fallback. Jane is a worker at Bob’s company who was in charge of managing the 
leadership development program. She represented the norm o f Expert that likely is also 
the organizational action logic. While Bob is an Alchemist, he is navigating the tension 
between the levels, the pull o f the system. Palus introduced Bill as Bob’s right-hand-man.
Palus believed that Bill was pivotal in Bob’s recovery from fallback. He 
identified the power o f dyads, the strength in numbers of post-conventional measured 
individuals, and described the dance o f one falling back and the other stepping forward. 
Palus also pointed to the technical aspects of Bob’s recovery from fallback, noting that 
this included huddling, dismantling, and rebuilding through reflection, discussion, and 
feedback.
Palus offered multiple alternative hypotheses to fallback in this situation. He 
pointed to the limited scope o f one’s consciousness, noting that we act out o f our 
unconscious most of the time. Palus offered the alternative hypothesis that fallback is the 
norm and an advanced center-of-gravity is the exception. He described Bob’s behavior 
as reactive and instinctual and wondered if Bob’s action logic was actually permeating 
his unconscious mind. He pointed to primary and secondary stability, observing that 
when Bob’s primary stability, his center-of-gravity action logic failed, his more primitive, 
instinctual secondary stability kicked in. Palus wondered if Bob’s higher center-of-
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gravity that is more conscious, was overridden by his lower center-of-gravity that is more 
instinctual, engrained, and survival-oriented.
Palus also noted the theoretical field’s overestimation of the stability of one’s 
center-of-gravity developmental level. He noted that Bob is often described as emotional 
and, in fact, admits this about himself. Palus contemplated the extent to which action 
logics, consciousness, and complexity, override characterological orientations such as 
being emotional? Does that change, or is that constant through all o f the developmental 
levels?
The example Palus provided offered seemingly limitless possibilities for making 
sense of the experience of fallback. Yet, Palus remained unconvinced that fallback, not 
as a phenomenon, but as a theoretical construct, added value to an already imperfect 
theory. While he acknowledged that there was recovery from fallback, Palus did not say 
explicitly that there was growth. Accordingly, that was my next line o f questioning.
The role o f  fallback in development, Palus was fairly pronounced in his 
skepticism about an easy relationship between fallback and growth at the outset. 
However, as we explored the idea, talking extensively about the participants in his 
dissertation research, he seemed to come to the conclusion that many developmentally 
transformational experiences actually are quite negative in nature.
Palus’s dissertation explored positively transforming experiences in the adult 
lifespan. The “transformational threshold” that Palus sought to describe in his study 
included experiences that were powerful, life-changing, significant, a clearly important 
part o f the participants’ narratives. In his research, conducted with adult males 
(potentially exclusively, since Boston College was at one time men only) o f all ages, who
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were largely middle- to upper-class, bright, and successful, Palus identified going back to
school, getting married, and having a child as transformational experiences.
Other transformational experiences that Palus recounted from his participants’
stories sounded very similar to other stories o f the experience of fallback. He described
his participants’ transformational developmental experiences as,
I had to go down, I had to crash into the wall, I had to have an awakening. I saw 
that, boom, it really hit me, because o f this thing. It stopped me in my tracks and 
made me look at life differently. So now I have this precious narrative that I hold 
onto. It's my faith. There was a deep dark woods, and I went into it and suffered 
a bit, but look I'm still on my feet. I’m doing alright in the world.
There is growth, there is development, there is ascension from the ashes in these stories
Palus’s research participants told o f their transformational developmental experiences.
Frequently, Palus pointed to the importance o f narrative in growth from fallback.
Interestingly, he noted a common recurrence o f the hero’s journey in these stories. He
often identified the hero’s journey as the narrative o f the Achiever, the narrative of
confident, well-bred, middle-class men, the narrative of the American culture/dream.
Palus suggested that growth was more likely to occur from temporary fallback
rather than long-term fallback. He said that long-term fallback would indicate living in a
smaller space for longer and would be caused by illness or “crashing.” And, while that
would be challenging to deal with, it is part o f the human experience that no one is
immune to. It is, in the words o f Jon Kabat-Zinn to whom Palus referred often, “fiill
catastrophe living.” Palus acknowledged that “learning [and living] involves struggle.”
Palus clarified that while fallback may prompt developmental growth, it doesn’t
always. He identified three options from fallback: you can go down, you can go up, or
you can stay where you are. In order to go up, certain conditions must exist including:
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taking one’s self as object, directing one’s attention to one’s own earlier action logics and 
their behaviors, reflection, learning from and embracing mistakes, perspective-taking, 
trying to have a bigger mind, and environments of challenge (which reveal earlier action 
logics and behavioral correlates) and support (offering new perspectives). A detailed 
examination of these tools supporting growth from fallback is conducted next.
Tools supporting development from fallback.
Narrative. I asked how Bob, from the organizational example o f fallback that 
Palus offered, ever got to be an Alchemist if  the space he lives in is an Expert one. How 
does one leap forward? Palus, invoking Dan McAdams and Ken Gergen6, responded that 
it’s our narrative that gets us there; a narrative that today is built on multiple identities as 
a “condition o f the modem world,” each springing from the one that blew up before it. 
Palus noted that both Torbert and Cook-Greuter understand and use the role o f narrative 
in stage development, employing developmental autobiographies and their inflection 
points as indicators of one’s developmental complexity. Palus suggested that narrative is 
also a prominent component o f Kegan’s fourth order (Achiever) “authoring]” of life 
story. Palus claimed that what allows one to escape the gravitational pull o f one’s 
environment are the multiple identities that make up one’s life story. One is able to see 
one’s self as distinct from the identities which one was characterized by before, earlier in 
one’s life. Bob is an Alchemist, because he has a story, a narrative that gets him there.
6 Dan McAdams is a personality and life span developmental psychologist and author o f 
The Stories We Live: Personal Myths and the Making o f the Self. Ken Gergen is one o f 
the leading figures in social constructionism and author o f The Saturated Self: Dilemmas 
o f Identity in Contemporary Life.
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In addition to one’s individual narrative, Palus identified the significance of 
cultural narrative. In Palus’s own dissertation research, transformational experiences 
during decade age frames (e.g., 30s, 40s, 50s, etc.) were prevalent. He pointed out what a 
western construction this is, noting that there’s nothing inherently different about turning 
30 versus 33. Yet in Palus’s research, the occurrence of transformation at the decade 
markers was notable.
Palus identified both the presence of reflection and differentiation from our earlier 
selves (taking self as object) as a prompt for growth in his participants’ American, 
privileged construction o f life. If taking one’s self as object supports developmental 
growth, these Western-constructed opportunities to do so, would therefore lead to growth 
at those times. Palus illustrated how this idea may be construed: “I, at 40, am so different 
from who I was at 20. That was me then, earlier, less mature. This is me now.” He 
noted it’s the Achiever’s story that is supported by our culture’s Achiever orientation -  
the success-driven, onward-and-upward story of the hero’s journey. Palus noted that 
inherent in this “objectification” is a rejection of the earlier me.
Palus identified the prevailing story of growth from fallback as socially and 
culturally constructed, and Achiever in orientation (in the West). Palus proclaimed, 
"Nothing can stop you. No setback is permanent. Always upward. You have a higher 
self, now go for it." Once again, it is the hero’s journey, the American success story, 
with Jungian archetypes inbuilt, but also confounded by social class. Palus argued that 
it’s a story that only a limited few may be able to relate to. He wondered what is the 
narrative of those living in poverty and incapacitation? Nodding to the problematic
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surround o f some peoples’ lives, Palus asked, might they not “have good stories to live 
into, anymore?”
However, Palus also warned against imposing our stories, our theories, on the
lives o f others. Throughout our interviews, he cautioned against proclamations and
judgment about fallback, because we just don’t know, we don’t have enough data, the
facts aren’t all available. Yet, he later noted that the truth, the facts, can lead us down a
destructive path. He identified “wisdom communities” such as religious or secular
spiritual traditions and aligning one’s self with the growth aspect of these communities’
narratives as supporting growth from fallback. He suggested that society is in danger of
killing these narratives. Palus recalled,
I read a story in which a fundamentalist Christian woman who believed in 
creation, six-thousand year-old creation, said that she got involved in studying 
evolution and science, and went into a part o f  her life in which she was actually, 
like, thinking systemically about biology and about history from a Darwinian 
viewpoint. But then she said, “That was a big mistake. Because, it really took 
away, it kicked the foundations out from underneath me. I lost my faith, and I 
want it back. I think it was wrong. I don't think this evolution stuff is correct. I 
think it's Godless. Now I’m in a place in which I'm trying to sort o f work my way 
back to a simpler faith.”
Perhaps the stories we live into lead to more constructive development when they 
are not necessarily completely factual, but they are positive. Through Palus’s exploration 
of this alternative approach, the truth, the validity o f a theory, came up in a different way, 
a way that privileges not having all the facts, because the facts can sometimes be 
destructive. Palus wondered, in the absence o f a constructive narrative, when one 
experiences fallback, what vices does one turn to?
Resources. Palus acknowledged that many of the negative experiences that his 
dissertation participants spoke of were ultimately positively, constructively
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developmental -  the participants were constructing their experiences. I asked how? Why
are these growthful experiences? Because, Palus responded, these participants had every
advantage to make them so, not the least of which was financial. They had insurance,
they could get therapy, and often their families were a source o f support, as well. The
holding environments that supported growth were inclusive o f physical well-being,
mental well-being, social class, and wealth. Although those with wealth may have more
access to resources to support their development, the role o f environment in one’s growth
from fallback is equally as important.
Environment. If  one does hope to operate out of a so-called higher stage versus a
lower stage, how does one do that? Palus’s answer was definitive: “It’s social.” One’s
development can be influenced by external supports. He claimed that society is a factor
in individual developmental expression. One’s developmental stage is societally and
culturally influenced. We “catch” ideas and ways o f making meaning like an epidemic,
from our surroundings. He explained,
Some of this developmental stuff is in the water. Kids are just more comfortable 
with, multiculturalism, for example. It’s a post-formal sort of idea, yet it’s almost 
the new floor level of consciousness -  to be multiculturally aware to some degree. 
There’s new things happening in society in terms o f orders o f consciousness that 
don’t require necessarily you growing them, so much as tuning in to them, and 
aligning yourself with them. Growth is partly who and what you align yourself 
with.
What other structured environments might support growth from fallback? Group 
relations conferences and Shamanistic ceremonies were two environments that Palus 
acknowledged seemed to generate fallback, and in which growth from fallback seemed to 
have occurred (taken from the empirical research conducted by McCallum and my own 
pilot study). When development is an integral part o f a coaching business, when one-on-
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one coaching is a component, and when using organizational or cultural developmental 
levels instead of individual, Palus noted there can be successes in developmental growth.
The importance o f  understanding fallback. Palus confirmed that growth from 
fallback is possible, and that reason alone provides evidence that it’s important to 
understand fallback. He also explored CCL programs focused on leadership through 
which one can see the correlations between the lessons learned and what may be learned 
from fallback.
Palus noted that in CCL’s youth-focused programs, the development o f leadership 
is supported by plotting one’s life trajectory, being made aware of developmental options, 
and giving deliberate attention to leadership development. This is similar to human 
development, and it led me to think and ask about the connection between fallback and 
leadership development. Palus again referred to the CCL program, Lessons o f  
Experience, in which individuals recount lessons they’ve learned from experience, with 
the hopes that others may learn from these same experiences. They also have a program 
called Learning from  Experience that was generated in response to questions from 
participants such as, “If  these are the experiences, how do you learn from them?”
In the Learning from Experience program, one category of leadership 
development is hardships and the ability to create a positively transforming experience 
from a negative event. Palus noted a correlation here to optimism, which CCL views as a 
hallmark o f leadership. He explained that how one treats failure is a good indicator of 
their leadership ability, and the effective treatment o f failure would include practices such 
as acknowledge, reframe, inquire, embrace, and re-engage.
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In Palus’s descriptions of these CCL programs, he identified assumptions about 
leadership development that closely parallel those in human development and in an 
understanding o f the role that fallback may play in both: development requires a 
deliberate focus, there are lessons to be learned from when one fails, and these lessons 
teach us that failure is a powerful tool in growth. While the programs he described were 
similarly positively-oriented and precise in their proscription of the steps in one’s ascent 
up the ladder, Palus continued to take issue with the field o f adult development.
Yet, in spite o f Palus’s emphasis on the flaws of the theory, he pointed out that 
constructive-development theory and an understanding o f fallback are useful even if they 
are viewed from a specific frame of development, or are not complete or completely 
accurate. Does it work when I try to operationalize it? Does it make sense to others who 
I work with? Does it give them some sort of framework to work with -  a launching point, 
so-to-speak? Palus suggested that this is the measure of the value o f a theory. Is it a 
good tool?
Finally, Palus noted that the life-long, process-orientation of development allows 
us to look at and be looked at as a whole person in process, not just the person as we 
appear now. Palus told a story o f a conversation he recently had with one of his clients 
who was making a comparison between culture change in organizations and 
developmental stage transitions. The experience of this is interestingly similar with 
feelings o f being: in the middle; not this, but not that; not fully embracing what worked 
before, yet not yet good at what we aim for. And, the experience o f culture change and 
developmental transition: it doesn’t feel good, discouragement, mental overload. As a 
result, many individuals act out and/or quit. Palus suggested that perhaps we can help
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people going through transitions by pointing out the whole process in that it may offer 
hope. He claimed there’s an empathy that comes from understanding development and 
fallback -  for self and for others.
Susanne Cook-Greuter, Ed.D. Susanne Cook-Greuter’s understanding of 
human development has largely been influenced by Robert Kegan, Jane Loevinger, and 
William R. Torbert (through their years o f work together). Kegan’s focus on the need for 
support and challenge in human development has been particularly influential in her 
understanding and work.
What Cook-Grueter loved about Loevinger’s theory was its measurement o f the 
whole human’s approach to life using language. She felt the Loevinger Washington 
University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT) provided an ideal marriage between 
psychology and the measure of ego development. From Loevinger’s sentence stem 
instrument, and embracing the rigor that a scoring manual could provide, Cook-Greuter’s 
own sentence completion test, the SCTi-MAP was built.
Cook-Greuter’s understanding of fallback has been influenced by years of 
thinking about it and the lived experience o f others. However, she noted that studying 
fallback has not been of interest to her, because she’s been focused on the positive of 
development, not the hurdles. She did acknowledge that fallback is part o f learning and 
was explicit about the fluid and bi-directional nature of development, saying that in her 
experience, developmental movement is often two steps forward and several steps back.
Fallback defined. Cook-Greuter originally defined fallback as “a way of 
responding to life, less than the ordinary or the well-established way one is capable of.” 
She identified three types of fallback based on recovery times: total regression, temporary
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regression (lasting a while), and situation-related momentary (brief, not visible over a 
longer time). However, over the course of three months and three interviews, her 
definitions and types evolved, revealing the complexity of fallback in her quest to 
understand it. Components o f Cook-Greuter’s developing definition at different times 
(during my research and interview process) and for different types included: “a way of 
responding to life, less than the ordinary or the well-established way one is capable of;” 
not a choice; opportunity to come back/recover; an inevitable “part of meaning making as 
a human process;” something that happens to me; “helpless being subjected to the 
experience;” involuntary; “at some level you remain capable.”
Cook-Greuter ultimately settled on definitions for two different kinds o f fallback. 
First is temporary fallback (initially she referred to this as “temporary regression” and 
“situation-related momentary”), which is prompted by stressful situations, going home, 
and encountering old triggers. For a period o f time, there’s an earlier behavior, but there 
may also be awareness o f that earlier behavior in the moment. In temporary fallback, she 
explained, there is an ability to come back up, to return to one’s well-established stage of 
development. Second, she defined permanent or long-term fallback (initially she referred 
to this as “total regression”), which is marked by a total loss o f capacity to reason, to see, 
to feel what one saw, felt, and reasoned before -  a complete loss of access to the later 
level. Cook-Greuter stated, “The whole thing goes down.” One is helplessly subjected to 
the experience. She explained, “If somebody even under the best o f circumstances in that 
situation asked you, ‘So can you imagine?’ you just can’t even imagine, anymore what 
you were able to totally have as part o f your repertoire before. Just gone. Completely 
gone.”
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Cook-Greuter contemplated the metaphor o f fallback, which would seem to imply 
that there is some return; there is an opportunity to come back. Accordingly, when she 
later identified permanent occurrences o f complete loss of capacity catalyzed by a serious 
life event or when one’s physical survival is at stake such as at the end o f life or terminal 
illness, she decided that perhaps a different term was necessary. Serious regression is the 
term Cook-Greuter coined for acting from an earlier stage o f development from which 
there is no return, or no hope of return. Cook-Greuter gave an example o f an older 
woman measured as Unitive (Torbert’s Ironist) at one time, and as Achiever ten years 
later. Cook-Greuter suggested that hers was a choice to permanently regress as she 
embraced the functional needs of her final years.
Cook-Greuter was pronounced in her distinctions about what counts as fallback 
and what does not. She claimed that fallback requires action. It is separate or different 
from who we are. She argued that fallback is not fantasizing, because fantasizing is 
normal in humans at all levels o f development. Fallback is not thoughts, or internal 
processes, which are all part o f who we are as humans. In Cook-Greuter’s definition of 
fallback, action or behavior is a condition. However, she conceded that behavior can be 
broadly defined.
Cook-Greuter emphasized that an important distinction to make in defining the 
criteria for fallback would be the time o f one’s noticing and recovering from fallback, 
and how it differs in earlier versus later action logics. At the earlier stages of 
development, she suggested there would be a longer time to notice and recover. At the 
later stages, there is almost simultaneous awareness, and one has the choice to respond 
differently. In fact, Cook-Greuter asserted that being able to take perspective in the
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moment o f one’s acting from an earlier stage would suggest that one has not helplessly 
fallen back, because there are options.
Cook-Greuter proposed that the temporal unit of analysis of fallback might 
influence its framing. If one is doing a moment-to-moment analysis, the back and forth 
motion would be constant. Whereas a look at one’s overall development over a longer 
period of one’s life would more clearly show a starting and ending point with the 
possibility o f turbulence in between. Cook-Greuter suggested another important 
distinction would be the number o f stages one falls back -  the distance between one’s 
most complex stage and the stage to which one falls.
Ultimately, Cook-Greuter noted that understanding fallback is valuable even if all 
we have are definitions and distinctions. She argued that these basic distinctions are 
crucial in providing some thing that can be accepted or challenged based on further data. 
In her opinion, the distinctions must include the length of time in fallback and the 
distance between one’s most complex and one’s fallback stage.
Causes o f  fallback.
Challenges to survival. Cook-Greuter suggested that catalysts o f permanent or
long-term fallback could be serious illness or the end of life. In these situations one may
become completely self-centered and survival-focused. She believed long-term fallback
would entail a loss o f faculties, a loss of concern and capacity to care for others, a loss o f
a questioning mind, a lack of flexibility, and a real clutching to attachments. In long-term
fallback there’s an involuntary loss o f other options to act differently. She explained,
And, that happens certainly sometimes at the end of life. It can happen to serious, 
serious illness. I have one example o f somebody with a heart attack, and later 
reported that during the time the person was in the hospital, she completely 
became self-centered. And, the only thought she could have was about, “How do
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I survive?” The family, everything else, went away. And, later on, after recovery 
and all that, she was responding that the greatest surprise and hurt that she felt 
really, she couldn’t imagine that she would ever lose the capacity to care for 
others. Or, to be concerned what the family would go through. But, she did. So, 
that to me is a total regression. Even so, this one was temporary, but it was total 
for that time.
Cook-Greuter noted that though there was a complete loss o f other developmental 
capacity during the period of illness, when the individual recovered, what was lost to her 
during that fallback period, returned. On the contrary, had the individual’s 
developmental capacity not returned, the permanent loss o f her more complex capacity to 
make sense would have been a serious regression according to Cook-Greuter’s 
definitions.
Challenges to identity. Cook-Greuter identified stressful situations as catalysts 
for fallback, such as those generated by the group relations conference at which 
McCallum conducted his research, and at which Cook-Greuter was present. It was 
during her thinking about this study that Cook-Greuter added to her definition o f 
fallback: behavior different from what the SCTi-MAP would indicate. In thinking of the 
McCallum study example, she hypothesized that post-conventional or later stage 
individuals would recover from fallback more quickly than those at the earlier stages. 
This hypothesis is in keeping with developmental theory that posits that the later 
developmental stage one is capable of, the more awareness, more resources to recover, 
and more recognition of fallback they would have.
In McCallum’s study, his participants had access to their internal processing, but 
there was often not action associated. The falling back was an internal felt experience, 
not an external behavior. I asked Cook-Greuter if action as a criteria for fallback still 
held in this context. She did not respond directly to the question. However, she noted
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that group relations conferences reveal gaps between one’s ideal self and the way one 
actually shows up. Cook-Greuter reflected on the extreme challenge to self-identity that 
is experienced in this environment. One becomes aware o f being projected into roles by 
others, and this confuses one’s own behavior. She noted that these settings often reveal 
how individuals at all levels are still so little in control.
Attachment. Cook-Greuter identified attachment as another catalyst o f fallback. 
Attachment to being right, to having all of the answers, can be seen in a fallback to 
Expert which is common when one is operating in one’s area o f expertise. She identified 
clues that this is happening including when one’s tone changes, one’s general openness 
and questioning mind goes away, and there is certainty without humility -  “I know this.” 
Cook-Greuter claimed that even those at the post-conventional stages experience fallback 
of this kind. Cook-Greuter offered an example of the Magician’s (Torbert’s Alchemist) 
attachment to complexity, even when it’s not appropriate. She suggested that a loss o f 
flexibility may provide a clue that fallback prompted by attachment may be at work.
Environmental norms. Cook-Greuter’s work with Bill Torbert over the years 
revealed the challenges that organizational norms pose to post-conventional individuals 
trying to work within and transform organizations. Cook-Greuter explained that 
organizations with these norms often do not appreciate what their post-conventional 
members have to offer, and overwhelm them with the “ordinary daily stuff.” Strategists 
experience this as a loss of ideals and vision, which are not seen as practical by the 
organization. Individualists experience it as a loss o f  imagination and exploration, which 
are not understood or appreciated. These stressor situations cause individuals to revert to 
what’s most familiar rather than what’s most complex, and Cook-Greuter identified the
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organizational pull to what’s functional as one cause o f long-term fallback that may be 
exhibited through burnout and ultimate giving up o f  capacity.
Would she always characterize this organizational gravitational pull as fallback? 
She acknowledged that it depends. If an individual is adaptable, one may make the 
choice to operate from a less complex developmental level in this environment. On the 
other hand, the pressure from the organization may force one into this smaller place.
Cook-Greuter identified going home as another environmental norm-induced 
cause of fallback that may express itself through feelings and behavior. Why is this so? 
She explained,
Just the ancient triggers. There are, you know, even probably, I’m just guessing, 
but from what we read about neurobiology; that there must be pathways in the 
brain that are so strong, because they have been there for so long, and reactivated 
again, and again, and again, that they’re just very strong. So, when they get 
triggered, you know, it happens.
The going home example was one in which she noted that later stage individuals may
have the capacity to watch it in the moment, while earlier stage individuals may only
realize what happened once they leave the environment. Cook-Greuter classified this
kind of fallback as temporary. When one leaves the trigger environment, one recovers to
one’s “average” developmental capacity and has the opportunity to see differently
through self-insight.
Cook-Greuter identified another environmental circumstance in which one’s
identity is challenged -  communication in an unfamiliar language. She explained that
being unable to express oneself and not being perceived as one is accustomed, one feels
clumsy, dumb, like a child. She noted that a slightly different experience is a change to
cultural context, whether it involves a different language or not.
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Cook-Greuter explained that contextual norms in the form of organizations, 
families, or cultures may result in a shift in the way one presents oneself, because the 
context won’t recognize the more complex individual. I wondered if showing up 
differently than one’s most complex self would be fallback or a choice. Cook-Greuter 
noted that perhaps the answer lies in the experience o f the individual.
Alternative hypotheses fo r  fallback.
Fallback is the norm; center-of-gravity is the exception. When I posed one of 
Palus’s alternative hypothesis to fallback -  that fallback is the norm, and acting from our 
center-of-gravity stage is the exception -  Cook-Greuter conceded that this could be so. 
She noted this may particularly be the case for post-conventional stage individuals, 
because the reality o f daily life falls within conventions. It’s a functional adjustment to 
decide to show up in a way that one can be accepted and recognized. She noted that 
perhaps the norms of an organizational culture pull developmental expression down in 
that environment in certain individuals, yet one’s full developmental capacity is still 
available in its greater complexity in different domains.
“Trigger back. ” Cook-Greuter created a new term, “trigger back,” to describe 
occurrences o f developmental dips when one encounters a nonintegrated, never- 
developed aspect o f self. She included trauma as a type o f “encapsulated” area (in the 
words of nationally-recognized developmental psychologist Gil Noam) and suggested 
that these are triggered within. She offered the example o f a student engaging in passable 
learning of a topic in school, then later relearning the topic when it becomes valuable to 
the student to do so.
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I questioned if the ancient triggers that Cook-Greuter identified in fallback 
generated by a return home to family may take the form of encapsulated aspects o f self, 
and that these are themselves catalysts for fallback. Cook-Greuter did not respond 
whether she agreed or not. However, later in the interview we revisited an earlier 
discussion about how certain sentence stems on the SCTi-MAP that are particularly 
related to parent/child relationships often do generate a lower level response that 
continues for a few sentence stems following the catalyzing stem. Cook-Greuter noted 
that in discussions of these sentence stem responses, individuals often become quiet and 
withdraw. She acknowledged that the dip in score and shift in behavior around these 
stems may indicate an unintegrated aspect of self related to family, with the stem possibly 
even serving as a prompt for fallback.
Cook-Greuter identified several potential catalysts for fallback including 
challenges to survival, challenges to identity, attachment, and environmental norms, as 
well as some alternative theoretical explanations for what may take place during one’s 
experience of fallback. In the next section, I explore to what degree fallback may play a 
role in developmental growth.
The role o f  fallback in development. Cook-Greuter noted that one does have 
choices in one’s recovery from fallback to either forgive one’s self or to change one’s 
expectations of one’s own identity. She claimed that growth from fallback occurs when 
one accepts that part of one’s identity is having a broader range of being in different 
circumstances.
Cook-Greuter thought that growth from fallback may be dependent upon “going 
in” conditions: one’s most complex developmental capacity, or the severity o f the
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circumstance, or possibly both. She also noted that the length of a fallback period may 
affect one’s ability to grow from it: the shorter the fallback period, the more likely one is 
to grow from it; a longer fallback period would suggest greater distance from one’s more 
complex self, and therefore would be less likely to result in growth. However, Cook- 
Greuter suggested that what prompts fallback likely has less to do with one’s growth 
from fallback than the circumstances of one’s recovery from it.
Cook-Greuter identified the “coming out” conditions supporting growth as one’s 
pre-existing support system that could remind one who one was, and/or one’s willingness 
to ask for support. Coaching, therapy, and dialogue groups in which process issues and 
questions are discussed may provide the kind o f structured support that aids 
developmental growth. At all levels of development, Cook-Greuter suggested that a 
mentor relationship is extremely valuable to one’s development.
Cook-Greuter pointed to societal movements as having the capacity to catalyze 
developmental growth in subsets of the population. The women’s movement was one of 
these, prompting development in many women from Diplomat with identification as 
helpmate and mother o f children, to Expert with their own lives, their own jobs, their own 
identity.
However, Cook-Greuter acknowledged that while developmental growth is often 
seen as positive, there can be fallout, particularly in relationships. The person who grows 
may challenge or leave the partner who has not. She identified the transition from 
Achiever to Individualist as particularly challenging when the partner remains in the 
conventional developmental stages. The newly post-conventional Individualist often 
rejects their conventional partner, unable to appreciate what the individual in the earlier
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stage has to offer. Yet, if the relationship can survive this transition, when the 
Individualist transitions to Strategist, often their perspective on their conventional partner 
shifts. Cook-Greuter noted that Strategist and later individuals have the capacity to see 
everyone and everything as sources o f learning and joy, and have less o f an attachment to 
the hierarchy of developmental levels. She declared that it is a post-conventional 
responsibility to have compassion for those at earlier stages and how they make meaning.
In fact, Cook-Greuter criticized many in the field o f  adult development for their 
attachment to privileging developmental transformation, vertical growth (development 
through the stages), over horizontal growth (development within the stages). She argued 
that the best way to aid others in their development is to support them where they are and 
celebrate successes. She advised preparing the soil, watering, providing sun and 
nutrients, and seeing what happens, rather than attachment to another’s development for 
one’s own gratification. She stated, “You don’t blame the little seed that doesn't grow for 
being one that didn’t.” When one is at home with one’s self, growth is natural.
Cook-Greuter acknowledged that getting stuck is as much a possibility as growth 
from fallback. She said, “It seems that any event in people’s lives has the potential for 
both greater growth, and inside on a kind of standstill or a fallback, actually.” Why does 
standstill or even deterioration happen? She suggested that one circumstance is when the 
gravitational pull of the environment supports the functional and practical Achiever, not 
the later growth of the post-conventional, which is a luxury. Ultimately, Cook-Greuter 
does not know why sometimes there is growth from fallback and at other times, not. She 
attributed it to “the mystery of life,” claiming that though we don’t have the answer, it is
179
still our responsibility to provide the container for growth to occur; one that includes 
support, challenge, and rewards.
Cook-Greuter noted,
I think fallback is probably a natural part of, as I said, of the process o f just being 
alive. But, certainly having the perspective o f compassion would help the 
recovery, would help the process, would help one’s self to forgive for the 
moments when one did experience one’s self as falling back.
While the fallback phenomenon may be an inevitable part o f  life, it seems to be an
inevitable aspect that has eluded further discussion and research. She added that an
understanding o f fallback will lead to the creation o f a road map for what is currently
uncharted territory, a road map for continuing growth.
Jennifer Garvey Berger, Ed.D. Jennifer Garvey Berger’s understanding of
human development is most strongly influenced by Robert Kegan who served as her
dissertation chair at Harvard University. She’s a trained interviewer and scorer for
Kegan’s meaning-making assessment instrument, the Subject-Object Interview (SOI).
Based on the SOI, Berger created the Growth Edge Interview, a non-research focused
instrument that she uses with clients in her human and leadership development consulting
business. The Growth Edge Interview differs from the SOI in that she uses it to assess an
individual’s developmental range rather than the highest sustained developmental level,
which is assessed through the SOI.
Susanne Cook-Greuter, William Torbert, David Rooke, and Kurt Fischer have
also influenced Berger’s understanding of human development. Specifically, what she is
drawn to is their focus on developmental bands and ranges to determine the way we
actually live in the world, as differentiated from Kegan’s constructive-development focus
on one point on a line of developmental possibility. Cook-Greuter and Torbert, both
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descendants of Jane Loevinger’s theory of ego development, have most influenced the 
way Berger thinks about fallback, specifically given their exploration o f one’s “range- 
ness,” or the full range o f one’s developmental capacity.
Berger noted that Kegan rarely writes or talks about fallback, barring his 
reference to a footnote in his book, In Over Our Heads (1994), in which he states that to 
have a personal experience of fallback, one must have a vantage point on it from one’s 
bigger self. Berger’s own personal experiences of fallback have helped her develop a 
more nuanced approach to developmental theory; one that includes developmental “bands” 
(a term that she uses to describe an individual’s full range o f developmental capacity), 
“tethers” and “holes” (terms that she uses to describe the events or circumstances that 
pull one back to an earlier stage o f development, and the subsequent place to which one 
falls).
Fallback defined. Berger offered two different conceptions o f fallback, and in 
both she noted that fallback is an inevitable part o f the human experience. The first she 
defined as occurring within an individual’s developmental bandwidth or range, a 
deviation from one’s center-of-gravity big Self to one’s smaller self. She distinguished 
that what makes operating from an earlier self within one’s range fallback is the complete 
loss of higher order meaning-making capabilities. While in fallback to one’s smaller self 
within one’s developmental range, an individual has fewer capacities to make meaning of 
the world, and makes sense through a constrained “smaller aperture.” Berger noted that 
the size o f one’s range and amount o f time that one spends in one’s smaller self is 
dependent upon the individual. She said this kind o f fallback is to a developmental place 
we know well, though we don’t always like it.
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Berger noted that in her work with clients, she sees a tendency for a favorite 
fallback action logic, rather than a regular occurrence of multiple fallback action logics 
within an individual’s developmental range. She suggested that fallback to this “basin,” 
“cup,” or “second home” can be triggered under certain circumstances, and often 
individuals can identify what those circumstances are. Berger pointed to parent/child 
relationships and interactions as catalysts for fallback, to which one brings one’s smallest, 
least developmentally-capable self.
Berger’s second conception of fallback is a falling to a significantly smaller self 
outside of one’s normal developmental range. In contrast to fallback within one’s 
developmental range, which one knows well, this is a place o f meaning-making that is 
not well-known; a place of sense-making that is abhorrent and outside of one’s regular 
life.
The length of time one spends in fallback seemed significant in Berger’s 
exploration of it within her own frame. She noted that long-term fallback occurs in 
places in life when we are smaller and have fewer capacities for a long time. During 
long-term fallback, one’s perspective narrows such that one is unable to get out of 
“stuckness” at this time, when one would have had the capacity to get out before. Berger 
identified environments and circumstances prompting long-term fallback as illness, 
unemployment, bad marriages; places where we feel trapped or stuck.
Berger noted that fallback by its nature must be temporary. It could not be 
permanent, because permanent would then be a new normal o f developmental sense- 
making. In permanent fallback, Berger suggested, there is a shrinking of capacities and 
options. Individuals are unable to see the fallback, because they are it.
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Through Berger’s examples of fallback in her own life, another distinction
seemed to come forth. Perhaps in temporary fallback, you maintain the knowledge that
you will recover what is lost. Whereas in long-term to permanent fallback, there is no
such certainty that what is lost will return.
I offered Cook-Greuter’s hypothesis that fallback necessitates acting from an
earlier stage of development. In other words, if there are only earlier thoughts and
feelings without action, Cook-Greuter would not classify the phenomenon as fallback. In
response, Berger made this distinction in her own definition o f fallback: fallback occurs
when one’s perspective narrows, and one can contain only one idea for a time; when
there is a loss o f something that you would otherwise have access to. It is fallback if an
earlier thought, feeling, or action exists in the absence of other thoughts, feelings, or
actions. Stated differently, it’s fallback if  the earlier meaning you make is in isolation; if
you lose the capacity to make meaning from your biggest Self.
Berger continued her explanation, pointing out that a condition for fallback is that
there must be a loss of capacity with the knowledge that you could do a thing (e.g., take
more perspectives, hold a bigger picture, etc.) before or in another circumstance. She
pointed to her own experience of fallback when she moved from the United States to
New Zealand. She recalled,
I had the feeling that there were parts of a house, and I ’d explored the whole 
house, but some doors were shut. And, I knew there was stuff behind those doors, 
and I knew that they had been in my house, but in that moment, I knew that I 
couldn’t get into them.
Berger also explored experiences o f “falling” that feel good: falling in love, 
falling in bed together, thrill rides, getting lost in a book, alcohol and drug use. She
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identified these as states o f consciousness that are not fallback, and perhaps the 
distinction is that each o f these examples involves choice.
Throughout the interviews, Berger’s ideas about fallback progressed. She began 
to notice, not just during our interviews but in her own life and practice, the difference 
between fallback and regression, and the connection between fallback and growth. She 
wondered if fallback should be one side of a mutually-defining concept. She offered that 
just as big Self as a concept cannot exist without small self, perhaps fallback requires 
spring forward. Perhaps fallback is not regression, but regression with perspective and 
growth. She suggested that the dual nature o f the concept helps make it “identifiable, 
nameable, study-able, possible.” Her ongoing reflection seemed to impact how she 
identified fallback, which is important as she continued to explore the potential causes of 
fallback examined next.
Causes o f  fallback. Berger identified four overarching catalysts for fallback, 
which include ordinary triggers, contexts, major life events, and unresolved trauma.
Ordinary triggers. Berger posited that we all encounter triggers for fallback in 
our daily lives that cause us to feel our capacities shrink. She noted, “It's clearly true that 
when you are totally stressed out of your mind, or you’re exhausted, or whatever, we all 
know that you do not have your full capacities. We know that. We can feel them slip 
away.” She identified stress, fear, tension, crisis, exhaustion, jet lag, rage, shame, loss, 
overwork, failure, and hunger as ordinary triggers o f fallback.
Contexts. Contexts and the individuals and relationships that inhabit them can 
also be catalysts for fallback, noted Berger. These domains that encourage the smaller 
self are often identifiable by, but vary across individuals. For some, organizations and
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their norms “pull” on one’s center-of-gravity. Berger stated that often these 
organizational pulls take the form of evaluation methods, promotion methods, clarity or 
lack thereof o f goals, lack of or too much leadership, or the organization’s approach to 
failure.
For others, the home environment and parent/child relationships provide the
context in which fallback is likely to occur. Berger noted that in her experience with the
SOI, responses to questions about parent/child relationships often indicated a less
complex level o f sense-making. She recalled, “I realized early on that I would steer
people away from times when they were talking about their parents or even their children,
because somehow those times felt less productive to me.” Berger explained that these
primal, genetically enmeshed relationships have a tendency to call forth a younger self
whose history and meaning is tied to an earlier identity. Berger mused,
.. .The relationships we have with our most primal companions are our parents 
and our kids, I think. Those are ancient relationships.. .ancient in our lifespan, 
and also ancient in our mammalian progression. They bring up drives to protect 
at all costs. They have wandering and confusing overlapping identities. They are 
genetically... they are us, you know, and yet they’re not us. I think there’s a way 
that.. .just as we know that you can have superhuman strength when you’re trying 
to save your baby, you know, all that kind of stuff.. .1 think there’s some genetic 
pull that calls on us to be more enmeshed with those relationships. And as we get 
older.. .and the one especially with our parents, we all know it’s hard to grow and 
evolve relationships as people grow and evolve. And I think it’s probably really 
hard for our parents to see us as our biggest Selves.
Berger offered further clarification of the relationship between context and one’s
developmental capacity. She explained,
I clearly do believe that development is mediated by context so that it’s not like it 
has no impact. But, I don’t think that context creates development, so that we just 
bring some random self from place to place. I guess this is where the idea o f a 
band is most helpful. Our context can bring out our bigness or our smallness.
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Berger also noted that one’s identity is dependent upon who one is in relationship with 
others (e.g., funny, smart). Therefore relationships are the context in which one’s identity 
is formed. If you remove the individual from these identity-forming relationships, the 
center-of-gravity of identity may be thrown out o f whack. Berger pointed to the 
importance of context and relationships in the developmental capacity we have access to, 
noting that sense-making happens “of and with” context.
Major life events. Berger pointed to major life events as possible triggers for 
long-term fallback: unemployment, bad marriages, the death o f a loved one, illness or 
injury. She remarked that in these circumstances, one often feels one’s capacity become 
constrained. In the case o f physical illness or injury, life may literally get constrained as 
physical capacities are lost and one loses control, prompting one to feel victimized. Yet, 
she acknowledged that even these events that could in no way be construed as positive, 
do sometimes provide the spark for one to bring one’s biggest Self rather than falling 
back to one’s smallest.
Berger noted that major life events are often new experiences. She offered the 
examples of the uncertainty, the lack of knowing o f first time motherhood, taking a new 
job, and moving to a new country as triggers for fallback. She remarked on the paradox 
of these “rich learning zones,” in that these seemingly positive circumstances, those that 
are often cited by the theorists as catalyzing developmental growth, allow us to be in 
touch with our full capacities, both big and small. Again, she noted, what triggers 
fallback is dependent upon each individual.
Unresolved trauma. Also specific to each individual are “buttons” that may 
trigger fallback related to unresolved trauma, suggested Berger. This trauma, which may
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not be psychologically diagnosable trauma, but instead represents unintegrated aspects of 
one’s earlier development, provides what Berger identified as a negative magnetic 
developmental pull to an earlier sense making. She referred to unintegrated aspects of 
self variously as “potholes,” “earlier rings in the tree,” “earlier layers o f the onion,” or 
“tethers” to our smaller self. Berger explained that when one is triggered by someone or 
something representing something unresolved and unintegrated from an earlier stage of 
development, it’s like hitting a pothole in one’s development. She noted that 
development is like an onion or rings on a tree, and fallback would represent holes in the 
onion of development or “pockets drilled in.”
Berger connected this magnetic pull to earlier sense-making prompted by 
unintegrated aspects of self to the Kegan and Lahey big assumption exercise, now known 
as immunity to change. She suggested that assumptions bom in a younger self become 
tethers for fallback later. She guessed that these younger assumptions are bom when one 
is between seven- and twelve-years-old, when one is aware enough of the world to start 
believing things about it. Berger explained that these immature assumptions that were 
true when one was young and provided a mechanism for sense-making then, never grew 
with the individual. Now these assumptions provide the magnetic pull to one’s smallest 
self in certain circumstances, eliciting a “worm hole effect” in one’s development.
Not developmental transition. Berger noted that developmental transition would 
not be identified as a catalyst for fallback within her theoretical frame. She suggested 
that the see-sawing back and forth between two adjacent stages of development during 
developmental transition is a normal piece of growing. One has not yet fully transcended
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the next stage of development at this point. Therefore, perhaps it’s only fallback when 
one is all the way forward, secure or embedded in a developmental stage.
In this section, I identified what constitutes a catalyst for fallback and what does 
not through Berger’s theoretical frame. In the next section, I explore her specific 
understanding of the experience of fallback.
The fallback experience. Whatever the catalyst for fallback, Berger argued that 
the experience of it generally doesn’t feel good. She described it as feeling: self slipping 
back, constrained, smaller, not into our fullness, the field shrinking, certainty solidifying. 
She also suggested that there can be an almost pleasurable experience o f fallback 
allowing one to even feel powerful as a rush o f testosterone pulses through. Berger noted 
that one’s experience of fallback may be largely influenced by one’s surrounding cultural 
narrative; one that extends from family, to organization, to environment, to broader 
society as a whole.
Berger suggested that fallback is marked by loss: o f perspective, o f full capacities 
to be bigger, of ability to answer questions and imagine possibilities, o f options, of 
language/theory/distinction, o f the idea that you can make a thing different. She 
explained that during fallback, there may be a shift in mindset from one that is growth- 
oriented to one that is resigned to circumstances as just the way the world is.
Berger offered that behaviors in fallback can be primal, or experienced and 
viewed as “behaving badly,” acting impulsively out o f anger and hurt, the inability or 
unwillingness to take perspective, black and white, brittle. She noted that those with an 
early center-of-gravity action logic can feel as though “everyone is against me,” and the 
experience is marked by projection, a victim stance, and blame of others.
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Yet at the post-conventional level, the experience o f fallback can differ. She 
reflected that often it is not shameful, there’s a bit o f a “glint in the eye” as the post- 
conventional individual uses the experience to recognize the fallback as an indication that 
something is important to one’s self. Berger used analogies o f a washing machine or 
ocean waves to describe the jarring quality o f fallback that lets you know that you are 
growing.
Berger told of her relocation to New Zealand from the United States. She said she
felt back and forth, smaller and bigger for days at a time. She had no connections, didn’t
feel whole, and she had this tremendous sense of not knowing. Yet, she knew that in
another circumstance, she would know how to handle the experience. She remembers,
.. .1 really had this sense that my identity was hung up on a clothesline, flapping in 
the wind. And, I didn't know which pieces o f it were going to blow away, and 
which pieces of it were going to stay on the line, and which new things were 
going to come up. It just felt so in process.
During this prolonged fallback, Berger had experiences all along the developmental range, 
dipping down to earlier capacities, and revisiting old territory that she had already left 
behind. She recalled, “I feel like I visited all of the rooms.”
Yet, how did she know she was in fallback? How does anybody? Berger thought 
that recovery from fallback would differ by person, and the ability and length o f time to 
recovery would be dependent upon one’s developmental level. She suggested that those 
at earlier action logics would recognize fallback only after the fact, or possibly not at all. 
Those at later action logics would be able to recognize fallback after the fact, and 
possibly in the moment as they noticed a gap between the ideal Self and the actual self. 
However, she argued, even when one is aware of fallback happening in the moment, one 
may still be unable to eschew the feeling and experience of it completely. She said,
189
. .my Magician friend.. .watches it and sort o f dances with it. He takes it as a signal, 
and still he gets swept up in it.”
Berger believed the length of time that one is in fallback may also play a role in 
one’s ability to recover from it. She mused that the longer one is in fallback, the longer 
one has no vantage point, the longer the bigger Self is lost. The shorter the period of 
fallback, the quicker a vantage point is gained allowing one to see a gap in ideal and 
actual self.
Berger identified behavioral clues for identifying fallback in others: they dig in, 
polarize, stop listening, shut down. She noted that there are all sorts o f protective 
metaphors that describe the observed experience of fallback in others and mentioned two: 
they “go to grounds,” “circle the wagons.” Yet, perhaps the experience of fallback which 
one may believe is dictated by the mind, may in fact be dictated by the brain. This 
alternative hypothesis to fallback is described next.
Alternative hypothesis fo r  fallback. Berger noted that there are circumstances in 
which individuals are physiologically incapable of accessing their most complex 
developmental capacities. She identified catalysts that trigger primal responses as having 
a connection to the amygdala, a part o f the brain that is not mediated through language. 
Stress conditions on the brain may result in a reduction of cognitive capacity, leading to a 
constriction of meaning-making experienced as fallback. Berger suggested that there are 
likely innumerable biochemical and neurochemical factors in the body and the brain, as 
well as clinical, psychological factors that might explain the fallback phenomenon.
These various lenses are useful in providing other possible interpretations for the fallback
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phenomenon. In the section that follows, Berger explains how fallback may facilitate 
developmental growth.
The role o f  fallback in development Berger believes that fallback and 
developmental growth are connected, “woven from the same cloth.” She contemplated, 
“A piece o f growing forward has to be this potential that our earlier selves show up. I 
don’t have a theoretical way of understanding that not being a companion to 
developmental growth.”
However, Berger noted that growth from fallback does not always occur. The 
outcome o f fallback can be that one grows bigger, one shrinks smaller, or one’s 
developmental capacity remains untouched. She believed that growth from fallback can 
only occur once one is able to reflect on the experience from one’s bigger Self.
It would follow then, that how or what causes one to grow from fallback likely 
differs across the lifespan. Berger claimed that in the earlier action logics, in which 
awareness and self-reflection are not as readily available, growth occurs in opposition to 
one’s earlier self. The unsuitability of prior sense-making systems is a catalyst for 
growth. Yet, later in the developmental spectrum, moment-to-moment awareness and 
self-reflection are hallmarks. Berger described her Magician (Alchemist) friend’s 
experience o f fallback, noting that he’s able to touch his earlier developmental spaces and 
learn from them; he gets sucked in, but then notices and learns. She argued, one may be 
able to deny it for a period, but one is unable to un-know a more complex world, so there 
may be no choice but to “fall forward” in response to fallback.
Berger was quick to point out that she doesn’t think fallback in isolation, no 
matter where one sits on the developmental spectrum, leads to developmental growth. It
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is the reflection afterwards allowing one to stretch and to make choices that plays a role 
in developmental growth. She noted the factors that lead to growth from fallback as: 
losing capacity and then getting perspective on the loss of capacity, noticing what one 
can’t do, acquiring nuance and distinctions, and watching one’s self as different from the 
Self one otherwise knows.
Berger suggested that one’s narrative of self offers a touchstone against which to 
hold up one’s current behavior or meaning-making. One’s story allows a comparison of 
both the ideal and the gap, offering language, perspective, recognition and the possibility 
of developmentally springing forward. She claimed that the power o f narratives in one’s 
development extends beyond the individual to all levels of context: the familial, the 
organizational, and the cultural.
Berger identified self-reflection as another tool that aids in making fallback a 
developmentally positive experience. She identified reflection from others as another. 
Kegan notes in his writing that remaining in community with people who are both able to 
reflect the person one has been, and the person one is becoming, is a significant 
supporting factor in developmental growth. Berger concurred that being surrounded by 
people who can help reflect one’s fallback to them, name it, and who are willing to hold 
one accountable are factors in support of developmental growth from fallback. She 
explained that these connections with others serve as anchors in the construction o f self. 
Reflection on self and by others is key to meaning-making and growth.
In the case o f fallback precipitated by unintegrated aspects o f self, or “earlier 
layers of the onion,” Berger offered that growth may occur when one “fills in” the 
context or relationship creating the onion hole, or gets out. Once the unintegrated aspects
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of self are brought forward, she noted, recognition o f one’s own growth may occur, as re-
encountering an earlier stimulus reveals how one’s ideas have shifted.
Berger posited that growth from fallback can occur when we acknowledge that it
is all us, and accept that it’s not going anywhere. Naming fallback provides a way to
understand and position it. She suggested asking, “What does it give you to go there?
How can you grow in relationship to it, without rejecting what it represents?” Berger
again returned to a story o f fallback in her Magician friend in his relationship with his
mother. She recounted,
He then could reflect on that, and talk about how those sort o f more primal 
emotions and experiences of all that was a signal to him. That something really 
important was going on for him, and that there’s real richness in this relationship, 
and that he was sad that his mom was going to die. That he could see the days of 
her presence on the planet counting down, and that there was some kind of 
howling despair in him about that.
Berger championed the need to pay attention to fallback (including awareness o f 
physical cues such as the need to eat, sleep, breathe), make friends with it, name it. She 
recommended approaching it with curiosity and compassion. Don’t seek to deny it. 
Berger argued that when one has a love of one’s younger self, one can see it as an 
indicator of “sacred territory,” and growth from fallback is more likely to occur.
It seems clear from Berger’s reflections, that fallback may play a pivotal role in 
prompting developmental growth, particularly in those further along the developmental 
spectrum. In the next section, I recount why she feels an understanding o f fallback is 
important to individuals at every stage o f development.
The importance o f  understanding fallback. Berger shared that in her work with 
leaders of organizations, questions about fallback in human development are the most 
commonly asked, because this felt experience of the role one’s small self plays in one’s
193
life is so prevalent. Yet, the current focus in the field o f human development, in all fields 
she claims, is on going forward. She explained, people are seduced by the biggest Self, 
and don’t like the earlier self much. Most individuals wish to reject that earlier self, and 
Berger notes that it’s not easy to get to a place of learning from it, when you reject it.
Berger highlighted the value in bringing attention to what is holding people back 
in the smaller self. She noted that in individuals, understanding fallback can help reduce 
the amount of time spent in the small, out-of-control self. In organizations, leaders need 
to make space for fallback to occur, for the small self to show up, “for people to be full 
humans.”
In groups, fallback can be talked about, teams can identify the pulls on smallness 
in their individual members, identify pulls on bigness, and build psychologically spacious 
environments that pull people towards the biggest Self. She noted that insomuch as 
fallback may be seen as a form of failure, or that failure may be a catalyst for fallback, 
framing fallback in a positive light may be an important contributor to organizational 
success. She referred to research that has shown that organizational cultures with a 
mindset that growth occurs from failure, experience greater innovation, creativity, 
healthy treatment o f conflict, and team success.
Berger pointed to stress and stressful environments as common causes o f fallback. 
She noted that given that “leaders are often stressed out o f their minds.. .and work with 
people who are stressed out o f their minds” fallback is going to show up often. Berger 
argued that leaders need to understand the distinction between personality characteristics 
and stages of human development. Fallback offers leaders a frame to understand that 
people are growing and changing, not still.
Berger posited that naming fallback, and having language and a framework 
around it, helps people understand the phenomenon that is taking place. She explained, 
“You’re making developmental theory more textured, more nuanced, more whole, by 
describing this piece of the theory that people have mostly ignored. Because, 
developmental theory is so forward-looking, and it’s necessary to also be looking back.” 
Berger suggested that this research in which we are attempting to create distinctions, 
“stake out territory,” establish boundaries, “fence the field,” allows the terrain inside or 
on the edges to be studied, “played with,” and for a new set o f  questions to be asked.
Berger posited that the experience o f fallback helps shift our thinking about 
developmental theory to one that is more nuanced, that makes room for developmental 
bands, rather than a fixed pinpoint o f meaning-making; one that includes space for tethers 
and holes to earlier stages o f development. She argues that there are lessons to be learned 
from falling back. The experience o f fallback may encourage an appreciation o f 
development as something you have to work on.
Berger invokes the onion metaphor to help individuals understand that in human 
development, we contain it all, all of the stages that have come before. She identified 
fallback as an integral piece o f what makes an individual whole. It’s not always positive, 
and it doesn’t always feel good. However, primal emotions and experiences are a signal 
that something important is going on, providing a wake-up call that may lead us to our 
bigger Self. She championed the need to pay attention rather than reject the feeling.
Berger suggested that naming fallback, having a place for it in the theory of 
human development, helps people recognize it and recover from it more quickly.
Naming it allows you to become friends with it and find out what it’s trying to tell you.
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She declared, “I think it’s really hard to learn from things you hate [and deny].” Berger
noted that understanding fallback leads to the ability to use it and work with it differently,
which makes the experience o f fallback less painful in the long run. She recalled telling
her son during his periods of fallback,
“I want you to know, everybody feels this way. This way that you are feeling, it's 
a momentary feeling. I don't know whether it's going to last a little while or a 
long time. But, there is this now, and then there is something else that comes 
after now. This is a moment.” And, it reminds me o f all of those “It Get's Better” 
videos that were so moving. That idea that when you lose yourself, you are going 
to find yourself, again. When you’re in your small self, big Self is not gone. It's 
just not with you right at that moment.
Berger was clear on her belief that fallback is part o f a common human
experience. She suggested that fallback teaches you to be gentle with yourself, and
allows you to have compassion for others without trying to fixing them. She called the
full range o f development a gift. She said,
It is normal that we dip into these places.. .it's not wrong or bad. It feels like what 
it is to be alive. And so, what it is to be alive is to stretch into the full range o f our 
humanness.. ..the full range o f our development.
Robert Kegan, Ph.D.
Fallback defined. Kegan defined fallback as occurring when one makes use o f 
meaning-making structures that are less complex than the most complex meaning-making 
structure that one has developed. Kegan navigated his way around a scope and 
understanding of fallback by exploring distinctions and conditions. The definition of 
fallback he offered, he originally classified as regression in a developmental context.
Soon after, though, he began to assert that genuine regression would actually be 
devolution; the complete loss of complex functions. Whereas, he asserted, fallback
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would be a temporary inability to use one’s most complex functions. He also thought 
fallback could be identified in the place, the gap, between competence and performance.
Kegan offered that parents and going home are a typical prompt for what many 
like to describe as regression or fallback. In the example he gave, a twenty-three year-old 
girl felt like a kid in the company of her parents, one particular interaction prompting her 
to go “ballistic,” and actually behave like a child. In this moment, she felt like she was 
ten-years-old and involved in power struggles of that time. This emotional and immature 
response to her mother resulted in her feeling horrible, with the worst part being that she 
could see herself feeling and behaving like a kid -  a recognition that “this is not me; this 
is not me today.”
In our dialogue about the twenty-something’s experience of going home to her
parents, Kegan noted that she had a frame to look at the situation, to make a judgment, to
have feelings about it, and to recognize the gap between her “competence” and
“performance” that would not have been present if  she had fully lost her most complex
self. He explained to her,
That can’t be a full-on regression where you lost your current capacities 
completely, because your current structure, your current way o f knowing yourself, 
your current way of looking out on the world, didn’t actually disappear 
completely. And, you didn’t actually fall back from it completely, because it was 
still there observing you feeling like and acting a little bit like a ten-year-old. And, 
then not liking seeing yourself acting this way.
As a result o f this higher level observing o f lower level meaning-making behavior, 
Kegan posited that fallback did not occur in this situation. However, when I asked if she 
had potentially lost access to her complex self, lost other options, even for just a moment, 
he conceded that she may have. He said,
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Maybe fallback is a good word here for naming a situation like that, where in a 
sense, you can’t have utterly lost it, because how did it come back so quickly?
You can’t have devolved; then suddenly re-evolved. There just may be some way 
that you temporarily lose touch with that more complex self. And, maybe 
fallback is a good term for that, because it’s not making this hard claim that you 
regressed in the sense that you kind of lost that complexity. It’s still, that system 
is still there, but you just couldn’t connect with it in that moment.
He continued,
.. .If any part of you is feeling or thinking, “Oh this is childish,” then that can’t be 
the child, you know, who is doing that analysis...That’s got to be the more 
complex self. So, you’re kind of pushing here in a good way as to whether I 
actually think there could be situations where you kind of lose that entirely, at 
least for a time. And, if you’re asking me whether I think that kind of thing can 
occur, yeah. My answer would be yes. And, that might be lots of different 
situations.
Kegan also explored the idea of there being situations in which one may choose to 
suspend the complex self, but he was unsure if that choice would result in a full loss o f 
complexity and perspective. The data from the interview suggests that he did not think it 
would. Instead, one could effortlessly choose to return to one’s more complex meaning 
system at will.
He asserted that fallback happens many times a day, every day; and, that when it 
happens, you’re not your best self, and it would be better to be your best self. Yet, he 
also entertained the idea that maybe fallback is not all negative. He acknowledged that 
the implication of fallback to developmental theory is that development is not so clearly 
linear.
As our conversation progressed, a more nuanced definition o f fallback emerged. 
Fallback is one’s un-chosen use of meaning-making structures that are less complex than 
the most complex meaning-making structure that one has developed, such that one has 
temporarily lost the capacity to see the gap between how one is showing up and how one
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wants to show up, to frame, to judge, and to have feelings about the experience from 
one’s most complex self in a given moment. In this or these moment(s) o f fallback, one 
is not able to have perspective on or take as object the experience. The more complex 
self is taken over by something simpler.
Causes o f  fallback. Kegan felt there could be many catalysts for fallback 
including those o f the ordinary, getting triggered variety. He additionally noted three 
other catalysts for fallback, and one developmental phenomenon during which fallback 
takes place, but for which the experience is already highlighted in the existing theory.
SCARF and the brain/mind connection. Kegan noted his interest in the 
connection between the brain and mind, and from here emerged an explanation of the 
parts o f the brain, where what is housed, and how one part influences the other. There’s 
the neocortex, the rational part o f the brain. Kegan sees his theory o f developmental 
complexity matching up with the theory of development o f  the neocortex. Then, there’s 
the amygdala -  the part o f the brain that does not evolve and that has the job o f assessing 
threat.
Kegan referenced brain scientist David Rock, and his SCARF model, each letter 
indicating a specific threat area: S = status, C = certainty, A= autonomy/freedom, R = 
relationships, F= fairness. Kegan explained that when a trigger that threatens one of 
these areas is set in motion, the amygdala may jump to action in protection o f the once 
physical, and now more often psychological, self. Once there is no perceived immediate 
threat, the neocortex can take over and begin to take perspective on the perceived threat 
and one’s reaction to it.
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Kegan referenced one’s parents as powerful people in one’s psychological
landscape who are often experienced as triggering one of the SCARF areas. He also
acknowledged that developmental transition may trigger a “raw area” which the
amygdala may experience as a threat to one’s existence. These triggers can lead to the
experience of being taken over by a less complex way of making meaning, o f feeling
destabilized and at psychological risk, of losing connection to the neocortex.
Not developmental transition. Kegan confirmed that fallback is a frequent
occurrence in developmental transition. However, he noted that the concept o f the back-
and-forth movement, the fluidity between the stage that held you and the stage that you
are moving into, is already part of the “natural experience o f transitions,” and they are at
present accounted for in the literature. Kegan described the multitude o f developmental
distinctions between levels that can be identified along the path to developmental
transition through the Subject-Object Interview. He explained,
You may know from the whole Subject-Object Interview scoring system that first 
of all, theoretically, there’s an infinite number o f developmental positions 
between any two equilibrated systems... Like between the third and the fourth 
order, you know there’s the position where you’re enough able to kind o f see that 
you tend to be kind of dependent on the external world to define reality for you. 
And, you have begun to have some uneasiness with that. But, you don’t yet have 
a kind of internal place to stand for your own. And, that’s sort o f a little beyond 
the third order. We call that 3(4).
And, then there’s a place you can identify where the person has a tendency, 
they’ve begun to construct their own position, but they’re still very influenced by 
significant others. So, they tend to kind of move back-and-forth. You can 
sometimes see it in an interview over the course of an hour, between the three-ish 
and four-ish side. And, we call that 3/4, or 4/3, depending. We just kind o f have 
to make a choice whether we think they’re more on the new side, the four side, or 
they’re more on the three side. So, those are two identifiable scores, identifiable 
developmental positions. They are both transitional positions -  as was 3(4) -  but 
they’re places where you’d expect to see a lot of fallback all the time, because the 
person doesn’t have an absolutely firm place to stand anymore. They’ve got the
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old way of making meaning. And, the new way has started to emerge, but it 
hasn’t necessarily kind of won the field, yet.
And, then there’s the place where the self-authoring has kind of won the field, but 
it has to work very hard to not be sucked back into, and drawn back into, let’s say 
the feelings or expectations o f the very closest people, and most important people 
in your life. So, you’re using your self-authoring energies, but largely to keep the 
person at arms’ length. Kind of like, “I almost don’t want to hear what you’re 
evaluation is, because I ’ll get too drawn to it.” We call that 4(3).
Now all these transitional positions -  3(4), 3/4, 4/3, 4(3) -  they’re all transitional 
positions. They’re all ones where, especially the 3/4 and the 4/3, you should see 
lots of fallback if you want to call it that. But, it’s really just kind of the process 
o f being dis-equilibrated, gradually moving to some new equilibrium.
In this detailed example, one can see the constant forward-and-backward
movement that can take place almost constantly in the midst o f developmental transition.
In contrast to what he described occurring during developmental transition, Kegan
posited a non-developmental transition experience o f  fallback would occur when one is
fully equilibrated in one stage, but gets triggered and is taken over by an earlier
developmental position. Using Kegan’s example above, this would be a person who is
already fully embedded in order 4, but falls back to order 3.
Trauma. Kegan agreed that trauma may be a catalyst for fallback. He offered a
description about what happens developmentally when one undergoes trauma and then
later works to reintegrate that aspect of self. He said that when trauma happens at a time
in one’s life when one is constructing the world in a simpler way, there is a literal or
psychological feeling of one’s life being at risk. Kegan explained,
People may have a kind of experience, which we could call dissociation. And, the 
way that you survived that situation was to kind of remove yourself in some way 
from it. So that it’s not happening to you. And, that is in a way a brave and 
heroic thing to do. To essentially keep yourself from being psychologically 
annihilated in those kinds o f situations. And, it has a big cost, which is usually 
that some piece of your experience gets bracketed off. Or encapsulated, in the 
terms o f a colleague of mine, Gil Noam.
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Kegan suggested that while the rest o f the self develops and becomes more complex, the 
bracketed self is left at that historical and developmental time, and that way of meaning is 
preserved. Kegan explained that later, when one is psychologically strong enough, one is 
able to reintegrate parts that were left behind.
Kegan noted that in these situations, therapy is often a structure that supports 
recovery and reintegration from the fallback caused by trauma. The therapist allies with 
the more complex self, they talk about the experience, and the emotions can be 
discharged. Kegan stated that without this kind of support when fallback from earlier 
trauma is triggered, the emergence o f memories may lead to a debilitating experience o f 
fallback. In fact, one’s se lf and the way one responds to the outside world was identified 
by Kegan as another catalyst for fallback.
Self. In discussing the concept o f self, Kegan said,
My bias is that as you become more self-authoring and beyond, that you should 
have more facility in kind of taking responsibility for what’s going on inside you, 
and kind of being better able to regulate it. So, you would at least be less inclined 
to say, “You triggered me,” and more that, “I triggered myself.” So, one of the 
important but very hard ideas for people to grasp once they start learning about 
triggering and all of this, is that no one can trigger you but yourself. People can 
do outrageous things. But, it’s only a consequence o f how you are responding to 
those outrageous things that lead you to be triggered. So, that kind o f taking 
responsibility that you kind of did that to yourself, is a capability that seems to get 
better with, if  not ultimately require, this fourth-order, self-authored kind of 
thinking that I was talking about.
In the above statement, not only does Kegan assert that an individual may be 
triggered to fallback, but that same individual may be a significant determinant in 
whether the trigger is experienced as a fallback, thereby making the individual a potential 
cause of fallback. The capacity for one to take responsibility for one’s own role in 
making fallback a phenomenon that one is subject to, or instead taking the fallback
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trigger as object and deciding to respond differently, depends upon that individual’s level 
of development. In fact, Kegan noted that it’s not until his self-authored fourth order o f 
development that one is able to take responsibility for one’s own fallback, thereby no 
longer playing a catalyzing role in fallback’s occurrence. The potential for fallback to 
facilitate developmental growth is addressed in the next section.
The role o f  fallback in development As Kegan noted, one’s willingness and 
capacity to take responsibility for being triggered seems to be influenced by one’s 
developmental stage. He also hypothesized that one’s developmental capacity may 
influence one’s recovery from fallback. Kegan noted that the frequency o f falling back 
would likely be lower in later developmental levels (specifically fourth order; Torbert’s 
and Cook-Greuter’s Achiever, and beyond), decreasing with one’s meaning-making 
complexity. He suggested that at these more complex developmental orders, one would 
have greater recognition and avoidance o f trigger situations. Further, when fourth order 
and later individuals did fall back, he thought they would be more adept at recovering, as 
they would have a greater ability to choose mental activities to get themselves un­
triggered.
It’s clear that individuals, particularly those at the later developmental orders, are 
capable of recognizing and recovering from fallback. But, can fallback prompt 
developmental growth? Kegan didn’t know how to answer this -  had, in fact, hardly 
considered it before our conversation -  yet, he continued to remind me that he was 
skirting the question throughout our interview and ultimately came back to it. He 
analyzed the question according to the different prompts we had discussed for fallback.
To go to the question that I never really addressed, because I don’t really know
what I think about it, but this thing about whether I think fallback could actually
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be in the service o f further development. I think in that particular situation, the 
trauma situation, that it certainly could be. It could be that the thing that is 
making it more difficult for the person to move forward is that there are things 
from their past that really need to be reclaimed, and worked through, and brought 
into the light -  not just the light of consciousness day, but also the light o f your 
currently more complex self. And, in doing that, you may be aided in making a 
transition that was otherwise in some way blocked.
Can fallback caused by ordinary triggers prompt growth? Kegan confirmed that 
in circumstances that involve reflection and identification o f the gap between how one 
showed up and what’s desired, the result can be a “strengthen[ing of] the muscle that is 
developing.”
Kegan identified a similarity between the research he is doing on organizational 
cultures that are deliberately developmental, and our interview about fallback and its 
ability to prompt development given the right conditions. In these environments that he 
is studying, the organization is attempting to deliberately trigger out o f control, un­
composed, “touch the nerve” responses. The goal is to identify one’s limitations in order 
to support one overcoming them and connection with one’s growing edge. He suggested 
that the environment may not be so developmental if  that’s where it stopped, but these 
organizations have also put in place structures supporting growth such as deeper 
explanation, unpacking of situations, and showing concrete examples. He explained,
They’re basically putting this in front o f the person, and people get triggered. 
Okay, and you can call the way they behave falling back. Because, they do the 
things people do when they’re triggered. They either fight, or they flee. 
Sometimes, they literally flee. One I watched on tape where the person just broke 
into tears, and just walked out o f the room and slammed the door. But, usually 
it’s a more psychological flight. They get very quiet. They become depressed. 
They feel embarrassed, and shame, and so on.
However, on the second and third days, when the necortex has an opportunity to 
respond following the initial response o f the amygdala to the threat, the individual has a
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new relationship to the weakness or limitation, and Kegan believed this new relationship
is the result o f the fallback experience. Kegan said,
Most people come to feel that even though it was maybe their most painful 
experience at work -  it’s very embarrassing, and so on -  that it was just like a 
huge boost forward in their development. Because, you know by the second and 
third day, they’re not triggered anymore. They’re looking at this kind of thing, 
and they kind of, it’s given them a whole new relationship to what is a real 
weakness, or a real growing edge, that they never would have identified on their 
own if they hadn’t been triggered first.
Kegan was the last key thinker I interviewed during my season of data collection, 
and his thoughts on fallback close this section on the sense each key thinker made of the 
fallback phenomenon through their respective developmental frames. The next section of 
Chapter Four focuses on the key thinkers’ responses to the specific stories that pilot study 
participants told of their own lived experience o f fallback.
Part III. Research Question Four: How Does Each Key Thinker Make Sense of the 
Stories that Post-Conventional-Measured Individuals Tell About Their Fallback 
Experiences?
In the Spring o f 2011,1 conducted a pilot study to explore, beyond my own 
occurrences, what the on-the-ground experience of fallback is in post-conventional 
measured individuals. The findings from that study were particularly telling for me in 
that none o f the pilot study participants even attempted to say that they didn’t fall back. 
Moreover, they all believed that fallback has, when treated a certain way, contributed to 
their development. Yet, while I had set out to elucidate the phenomenon o f fallback 
through the lived experience o f individuals, I found myself with more questions that I felt 
needed addressing by the theorists. A critical question for this study was how the key
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thinkers through their developmental, theoretical frames made sense o f the lived 
experience of fallback described by the pilot study participants.
Each key thinker received a brief summary o f findings from the pilot study, which 
was to serve as a launching point for our interviews, and as contextual background on my 
thought processes coming into this research (Appendix C). Therefore, the key thinkers 
had “met,” at least briefly in written form, the participants from the pilot study early on in 
the interview process. During the course o f interviews with each key thinker (with the 
exception o f Kegan with whom I had only one interview), I posed different scenarios that 
were offered by the pilot study participants describing their experiences o f fallback. I 
then asked the key thinkers to make sense o f these stories that the participants had told.
In this section, I share one-by-one the pilot study participants’ stories, and the 
subsequent interpretation of them by the key thinkers.
Liz, Individualist.
When something comes up and I  get pissed off, and I  think, "You don’t 
know, I  know better. ” Well, tha t’s kind o f  falling back into that, “I ’m better than 
you, I ’m smarter” thing. Now, i f  that isn 7 falling back into an Achiever, I  don 7 
know what is. You know, the competition. Your ego triggers something. "Fine, 
do it your way. ” You know, instead o f  just being open even though the other 
person annoys you. Not being annoyed. Being able to see there’s another 
perspective that's important instead o f  competing with the perspective. And, I  get 
caught in that a lot...at home.
Berger often assessed the participants in the pilot study as operating in a smaller 
self, but a self that is part of their developmental band. She offered Liz’s story o f finding
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herself operating from an earlier developmental level at home, as an example o f fallback 
within Liz’s developmental bandwidth. Berger attributed Liz’s identification o f home 
triggers as catalysts for fallback to the magnetic pull backwards of certain relationships 
and events.
Mitch, Strategist.
When the recession hit this practice, I  went into a degree o f  panic mode, and 
Ijust was not functioning well, and I  didn 't quite know how to pull m yself out. It 
was a combination o f  the passage o f  time, I  got some consultations o f  different 
types from  business people, ju s t a variety o f  different things, and I  finally pulled  
myself out o f the panic and started making more effective decisions. There were 
moments Iju s t fe lt paralyzed...I ju s t wasn ’t sure what to do. There’s a reduction 
in income in a situation where there are relatively faced overhead expenses, like 
malpractice insurance, rents, sta ff salaries, etc. And, I  just needed to figure out 
how to get through that, which involved laying o ff some people, cutting some 
expenses, shifting the business in different ways. So, the panic that I  fe lt was ju s t 
a kind o f  regression. I  was a wreck fo r  a while. It was probably several months.
I  remember thinking I  was ju s t going to call a businessman I  know in 
Atlanta and say, “You've got to come out here, y o u ’ve got to take over, I ’m ju st  
going to give this thing to you. I  don’t know what I  m doing. ” I  was ju s t going to 
capitulate. And, I ’m normally a take-charge kind o f  person... “give me the bad 
news, and we ’11 figure out how to deal with it. ’’ But, this w as...Ijust wanted to 
put my head in the ground. And, that...I do n ’t know how far down that 
progression went, but this is not normally how I  would solve problems.
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There was really an emotional sense o f  terror that I  was going to run 
through all o f  my savings...that I  wouldfinally just be homeless. And, I  was 
having a hard time making realistic decisions, so I  tended to fa ll into some 
inactivity fo r  a while. I  can still fee l moments ofpanic, but they tend to last 
seconds versus much longer stretches o f  time. And, /  think I  have realistic back­
up plans i f  needed. So, I  don’t think it resulted in...it might have resulted in some 
delayed decisions...I don’t think it resulted in any impulsive decisions. And, a 
rededication to what we ’re doing and not doing.
In contrast to her assessment of Liz’s fallback tendencies at home, which she 
classified as occurring within Liz’s developmental range, Berger identified Mitch’s 
recession-prompted fallback experience as taking place outside of his normal 
developmental band. Berger highlighted the absence of other options in Mitch’s story. 
Mitch described a fallback experience marked by inaction, in contrast to the action that 
Cook-Greuter suggested is a prerequisite for fallback. Berger described Mitch as being 
tethered to an earlier stage of development. She suggested that when his context shrunk, 
he shrunk, too. She observed, “He’s locked in. Yeah, he's not saying, ‘should I be 
paralyzed, or should I do something else?’ He's just paralyzed, that just was it.”
Torbert noticed the basic, primal fears that marked Mitch’s experience o f fallback, 
likening Mitch’s story to some of his own personal experiences of fallback in which he 
experienced “sheer woundedness” or injury. He noted that fallback may be “extreme” in 
the length of time one experiences it.
Torbert’s categorization of Mitch’s fallback as extreme and Berger’s assessment 
of it as outside Mitch’s normal range suggests classification as extreme both because o f
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the length o f time of the fallback and the quality of it knocking his entire world for a loop. 
This second knocking fo r  a loop explanation helped add distinction to Berger’s second 
definition o f fallback as outside one’s normal range. Additionally, Mitch’s example o f 
fallback may indicate the across-the-board shutting down o f capacities in every 
relationship and all realms of one’s life that Berger also referred to as “a place o f sense- 
making that is abhorrent and outside of our regular lives.”
When I described Mitch’s story of his fallback experience when the recession hit 
his business during the interviews, I described him as being “thrown back” which raises 
the question of the nature o f a relationship between being “thrown back” and “falling 
back.” Perhaps when one is thrown back, it represents a complete assault to one’s 
meaning-making structure, which may be similar to the primal response one often has to 
threat.
Berger offered a possible alternative explanation based on the role that fear may 
play in meaning-making, imposing a physiological constraint on the brain. She 
wondered, “What is the role o f those chemicals that are our friends when we are trying to 
get away from a tiger, and not so much our friends when we're trying to get away from a 
recession?” However, she noted that the six-month period o f  fallback that Mitch 
described is a rather long time for these neurological chemicals to exert influence.
Torbert pointed out that Mitch’s approach to the situation and fallback catalyst is 
now, post-recovery from fallback, different from his original experience o f it. This 
difference in perspective on the fallback situation is one of the tools that the key thinkers 
identified in one’s capacity to identify and grow from fallback. In the moment, Mitch 
had significant fears of not having his basic needs met. Yet, later, with time, distance,
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perspective, and growth, he realized that those things that society seems to think are the 
most important, were no longer so important to him.
Allie, Alchemist.
But, when I, I  mean the times when I ’m not quite on top o f  it... making a 
choice, tend to be in, what I  would say...like I  can kind o f recognize being at a 
lower frequency situation. I ’ve been a little lax about practices, but I ’m tired, you  
know, that sort o f  thing, and it ju st kind of, I  get into a space of, "I don’t care. ”
So, mainly what happens is the mind will take o ff daydreaming, that sort o f  thing.
I  can recognize it... things w ill...I’ll be annoyed. I ’ll really get a response o f  
impatience, impatience and annoyance with people at the house or, whatnot. But, 
then, that’s really a clue to me. I  mean, now I  know i t ’s happening, and it doesn ’t 
fee l good is the thing. But, what I ’ve realized with that is the importance o f  when 
I  do fin d  something like, “that really annoys me ” or “that ticks me off, ” the 
importance o f  really letting that in. Not denying saying, “I ’m not really ticked 
off, ” or “This is silly to feel this way. ” But, I  feel the need to really let in the 
feeling. And, that’s a little hard, too, because there’s a dimension o f  that that 
feels embarrassing, shameful, you know, like I  thought I  was beyond this. But, i t ’s 
really key fo r  it to grow through it. I  mean it doesn’t always happen in ju s t one 
time. But, I  really have to try to embrace whatever that is and not deny that i t ’s 
happened or happening.
In response to Allie’s example of getting frustrated with individuals with whom 
she lives and getting lax about practices, Cook-Greuter categorized the experience as 
being all in the head, just processing. Cook-Greuter noted that while that is how
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Alchemists make meaning, it is not how those at the earlier stages do. She posited that 
the absence o f action in this story challenged her to find any fallback in it. She also made 
a distinction between the subjective back-and-forths in streams of consciousness, which 
she described Allie’s story as, and what she claimed as the very different experience of 
fallback provoked by going home. Later she referred back to this story and noted that it 
has both behavior and reflection upon it, which indicated that she might have considered 
it fallback, after all.
McCallum suggested that Allie’s examples o f the conditions under which we can 
get easily triggered by things that we think w e’ve outgrown, certainly alludes to what 
happens in fallback. He noted that in addition to Allie’s example pointing to an 
experience o f fallback, she also makes it a lesson in self-awareness, intention, and 
development through her response o f noticing the conditions, letting the feelings in, and 
not succumbing to her first reaction to deny or diminish the experience.
I offered another o f Allie’s examples, this time of an extended period o f fallback. 
She shared,
I  probably had months and years when I  was in fallback. There were 
times when I  was just caught in something fo r  a long time. I  remember there was 
a...one thing...where I  was really caught in this kind o f  victim stance. Like, what 
had been done to me that was so unjust and so unfair. It went on fo r  a really long 
time. And, I  was just so convinced that I  was totally blameless, and it had nothing 
to do with me. It was just this terrible person that had seized upon an innocent 
victim. And, I  don’t know i f  it ...I ’m ju st not even aware enough to know what 
level o f  consciousness I  might have been at and how it was a fallback. I  mean it
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was certainly a fallback. I  can remember having fantasies about what I  would 
like to do to this person... I  never did it. It was probably a fallback. So, yeah, I  
think you can be in that fo r  really long periods o f  time, you know when there are 
these, these strong patterns and beliefs that are really rooted pretty deeply in us. 
You can get pretty hooked by them fo r  a long time.
You know part o f  [coming out of] it was time and distance. And, then it 
was bit by bit, I  did see the things, you know the things I  was particularly upset 
with, different things, I  saw in myself. You know, my versions o f  them. Then it 
was just. It wasn’t, it wasn’t by particularly working on that. It was just...other 
understandings developed where, you know i t ’s like seeing that most people are 
doing the best they can. Hardly anybody chooses, you know, I ’m not going to do 
the best I  can. We ’re doing what we think is right. And, then, it's like getting that. 
But, it was a long time before I  fe lt really healed.
Cook-Greuter termed the months and years Allie described as being in a victim 
stance, “drag back.” Cook-Greuter defined drag back as occurring when a situation 
triggers an unintegrated aspect o f self; a piece that is not in sync with the rest. She noted 
that unintegrated stuff gets stuck and is kept separate while the rest o f self grows, and 
noted that this encapsulated area is subject to repeat triggers. Cook-Greuter claimed that 
once these pieces are integrated, growth is possible. She offered an example o f drag 
back; when a student just gets through a subject in school with a passing grade, but later 
finds that nonintegrated information crucial, and returns to fully learn and integrate the 
knowledge.
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Similarly, Berger assessed Allie’s recounting of her extended period o f fallback in 
which she felt very much in a victim stance as fallback catalyzed by an unintegrated 
aspect o f self. She mused that Allie’s fallback experience seemed to be around one 
relationship, not all relationships in her life, leading Berger to think that this fallback was 
prompted by a relationship “pothole.” Berger noted that we make sense “o f and with” 
context, and in this context, with this person, Allie’s capacities were diminished.
Though he described it using different terminology, Palus’s interpretation of 
Allie’s fallback was similar to Berger’s in its reference to different developmental 
capacities in different contexts. Palus allowed that integral theorist KenWilber’s lines of 
development could possibly be used to interpret Allie’s self-described victim fallback 
experience. Palus invoked Jean Piaget’s term “decolage” which refers to development 
being fragmented, and compared this to Wilber’s early interpretations o f lines and the 
capacity to be at different developmental levels in different domains o f one’s life. He 
stated, “I'd be wondering, were there other lines of her life in which she was feeling more 
Alchemist? Or, was it like the whole damn thing sort of came down around her ears, and 
she couldn't be an Alchemist, anywhere?”
The idea of having different levels of development in different domains of one’s 
life could fit within Palus’s hypothesis that the whole of the development spectrum is 
present at all times though he did not say this explicitly. In Palus’s exploration of Allie’s 
possible full shut-down of developmental capacity there is also some o f what Berger and 
Torbert assessed in Mitch’s experience of the recession; an extreme fallback, outside 
one’s developmental range.
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I offered Cook-Greuter the possibility that what Allie experienced might be 
connected to Wilber’s states, stages, lines distinction, which posits that instead of having 
one center-of-gravity stage, we actually have different stages for different lines o f our 
development or in different domains. Cook-Greuter suggested that watching thoughts 
and producing them as they come along, a stream o f consciousness, is a state, which 
seemed to indicate that she did not consider fallback to be a state. In contrast, Palus and 
McCallum in the course o f our interviews, both defined fallback as a state, not a stage.
I suggested the alternative hypothesis to Torbert, that as the pilot study 
participants described the different ways they show up developmentally in different 
aspects or contexts in their lives, this could be made sense o f through an understanding of 
having different developmental stages for different lines of one’s development. Torbert 
could see this possibility that one may be more advanced in one line, and not yet there, in 
another. Yet, he noted that the advanced line would begin to have a perspective on the 
earlier line. Further, he described the occurrence in terms o f two adjacent stages, which 
seemed to suggest that he attributed the presence o f two different stages o f development 
in different lines or domains of development to what happens during developmental 
transition, rather than what happens in daily developmental life.
When I pressed him about how this might show up outside o f developmental 
transition, and in circumstances in which the space between the different presenting 
developmental stages is vast (such as a Diplomat action logic for one line, and an 
Alchemist action logic for another), Torbert conceded that one could, and some have, 
made a case against one center-of-gravity action logic across all lines o f development. 
According to this alternative hypothesis to fallback, each line has a separate action logic,
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and he likened this to how different situations elicit different stages. He offered
examples o f how individuals may, in fact, use the more advanced action logic to avoid
development of the less developed line.
However, Torbert also challenged this conception that disputes one center-of-
gravity action logic. He suggested that while earlier stages would be okay with, would in
fact likely not even notice the discrepancy in how one shows up in different areas o f life
or self, later developmental stages would respond to the discrepancy differently. He
noted that this alternate hypothesis would perhaps only make sense in earlier stages,
because later stages would be motivated to develop the lines that are earlier.
Further, Torbert critiqued the alternative hypothesis given our limited capacity to
prove it. How would we know? How could we measure it? Ultimately, Torbert felt it
would be important to understand how the lines operate together, as a whole, an
understanding that he claimed does not currently exist. He noted that this is all new
territory in need of exploration.
McCallum was drawn to the possibility that what Allie described as fallback
could have been her last hurrah in one developmental stage before transitioning to the
next. He’s found that prior to some of his own periods of growth, he experienced an
intense resistance to what he now can see was a loss o f self-concept that he was overly
attached to at the time. McCallum also pointed to the importance o f framing these
experiences of loss and resistance as key to growth. He explained,
I think there is something really powerful about being able to see.. .the resistance 
is in some ways the gathering of steam for a potential breakthrough, a potential 
kind of loss o f oneself, and a kind o f movement into that transition space which is 
very messy and disorienting before a sense o f a new self begins to really 
consolidate, and emerge, and find a sense o f competence in the world again.
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Cook-Greuter was adamant that Allie’s experience was not an example of
fallback, pointing out that the story Allie told was all about meaning-making, processing,
and thoughts -  not behavior. I offered Cook-Greuter’s assessment o f the scenario as not-
fallback to McCallum, who had otherwise agreed that it was fallback. McCallum could
see the merit in Cook-Greuter’s claim and being reserved about naming this fallback,
noting that what is preventing the fantasies she was having from being acted out must be
some sort o f higher order reasoning. Yet, he also noted that there are many different
interpretations o f acting. McCallum explained,
So you could feel in a triggered state, and there’s always an action o f some sort. 
Whether the person is actually mobilizing to do something is kind o f an extreme 
form. There’s lots of ways o f thinking about what action is, and the relationship 
between feeling states, thinking states, and the way one’s showing up.
The idea o f disorienting dilemmas, which McCallum had suggested as a cause o f
fallback also seemed present in Allie’s description. She talked about the strong patterns
and beliefs that are rooted pretty deeply inside o f us. Perhaps these were challenged by a
disorienting dilemma. Later Allie said, “There’s something about being confronted with
the evidence or the data in the moment, which makes it less easy to run from or deny that
can make it really powerful.” This seems to be a direct reference to what, according to
McCallum, disorienting dilemmas can do. There is also a presence o f projection in her
description of her fallback and her realization and recovery from it. In Allie’s story,
recognition occurred, perhaps an accessing o f something that was lost -  an ability to take
perspective, to reframe -  that she said came about as a result o f time and distance. The
other practices Allie noted that facilitated her learning from this fallback were her
spiritually-oriented touchstones -  meditation and spiritual retreats.
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Time and distance as factors that facilitated her learning from fallback stand in 
marked contrast to another possibility- if being forced to stay in the same space, engaged 
with the same people would facilitate learning from fallback. If sometimes distance is 
really needed.
Palus offered another interpretation o f Allie’s story o f fallback, referencing
Jungian archetypes, and harkening to his claim that fallback is the norm in the scope of
the full human experience. He suggested that not just Allie, but all o f humanity has the
potential for a victim-orientation. In the case of Allie and from a developmental
perspective, Palus offered that her relationship to the victim-consciousness might change,
her construction o f it might change, her ability to go into alternative constructions might
change, but she will never be able to completely transcend it. He explained,
[Her] subtle shift is just kind of acceptance, and some greater degree o f awareness, 
and possibly some greater degree o f being able to kind of navigate it successfully. 
But, it wouldn't go away, because it's just, we're talking about something that's 
part of the human experience. So, I'm trying to point to those things that are just 
human. And, until humans aren't victims any more, I think individuals will still 
always be put in a victim place. You know, society can put us in a victim place. 
You know, our relationships can put us there. It's bigger than us. So, I guess 
what I'm saying is, a higher action logic would sort o f be at peace with that, but 
wouldn't any longer expect to be relieved of being the victim... What feels like 
fallback, sometimes, is just you get another dose of humanity, and that's the norm.
I recounted Allie’s story of being at the Shamanistic ceremony, and being in a
stuck space where deep-rooted patterns were called forth and healed. Allie said,
I  was at a healing ceremony with a couple of...native, indigenous shamans.
And, I  had, it was something I  was very anxious to do. I  had done this a year ago.
You know it was an amazing experience. But, I  actually got down there after, it
took a great deal o f  effort. I t ’s not an easy thing to get to. This one was in
central Mexico. You have to drive through the worst states right now with the
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killings. I wasn’t afraid o f  that. You know the travel’s hard, i t ’s out in the middle 
o f nowhere, then you put on a backpack and hike into these places. But, it was 
very clear to me, especially after the experience o f  last year that this was 
something I  wanted to do. But, when I  got there, I  mean, another stage surfaced 
where I  was just in this place of, “Why did I  do this? I  don’t want to be here. ” 
Like I  couldn’t get myself really motivated to be present. I t ’s like I  could see that, 
but I  just was.... And, then realized, but see, I  mean this isn’t quite voluntary, but 
all o f  that was being called to the surface by the sha[mans] ...for healing. And, so 
it was like a whole layer o f  unconsciousness or unawareness that where I ’ve said  
like was a fallback thing. Where I'll fin d  m yself into the daydreaming and not 
caring. That I  feel like it was somehow just pulled to the surface and then healed.
But, that was a really amazing experience, but I  didn ’t have much control 
over it. You know it wasn’t a choice in the familiar way, the way that’s more 
familiar. I  think it was pretty unintentional. I  could see it happening, but i t ’s like 
I  didn’t care. I  mean normally i f  I  saw something like that starting, I  could, I  
could generate the frequency saying, “I  don’t want to go there, ” but I  d idn’t care. 
I  think they were, I  mean I  think energetically they were going after and pulling to 
the surface patterns that were really ripe to be healed. I  mean i t ’s one o f  those 
things that I  can say I  know, and I  know what happened, but there's no rational 
explanation.
But, that kind o f  work has been extremely helpful to me in the 
developmental process, because it, they, are able to recognize patterns that we 
don 7 even know we have. You know, there are the patterns that we know we have
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that we want to get rid of, but then you get to layers o f  things you d o n ’t even know 
i t ’s there. And, it helped me understand... that whole notion o f  regression, which 
is what you 're talking about...fallback. But, where, you know certainly, I  mean 
it's well-documented in children. You 're looking at it in adults, but the children, 
when they’re ready to make the leap to the next stage often have this regressive 
periodfirst, and it feels like they 're getting worse and then it, they adapt. And, 
that was my experience ...there at that ceremony.
Cook-Greuter classified Allie’s experience at the Shamanistic ceremony as a state
of disassociation, not fallback. When I asked, as Allie suggested in her story, if  it could
be interpreted as the acting out that happens before developmental transition, that it was
the last hurrah in one action logic before transitioning to the next, Cook-Greuter
maintained that it sounded like a state o f disassociation, not developmental transition.
She went on to describe the varied experiences o f developmental transition, saying,
I would think, certainly some o f the time that’s a possibility, the same way that, 
what they call “the dark night o f the soul” happens. That’s a sort o f a dis­
integration before you re-integrate. But the other is also possible, that there’s 
actually a fairly smooth transition. There’s nothing major happening. It’s just the 
nature o f growing and maturing... through experience, through thinking, through 
all kinds of ways.
Cook-Greuter wondered if turmoil is a fallback, and said that fallback leads to growth 
sometimes, and leads to stuckness at others.
Palus echoed Cook-Greuter’s conclusion that what Allie described at this 
Shamanistic ceremony did not seem to be fallback, but his assessment was based on a 
much different argument -  that Allie opted in. He claimed that over a slightly extended 
period of time, Allie deliberately chose to engage in an experience, in a setting, that she 
knew would “challenge the psyche at a very deep level.” He offered,
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In some ways, you can say that she was at an even higher level o f consciousness, 
maybe, than what she had been at before, by kind o f  embracing, entering and 
embracing, a profound experience like that, knowing full well it was going to hurt.
Palus likened Allie’s experience at the healing ceremony to that o f McCallum’s
research participants at the group relations conference, noting that both settings were
designed to be disorienting. Another parallel between the two settings is the voluntary
nature, the explicit intent of those who do participate to grow. Further, this explicit intent
and opting in tends to be a tendency of those at more complex levels o f development.
The various possible interpretations o f the same scenario brought to light the
complexity of the fallback phenomenon and the importance o f our dedicated attempts to
understand it. Several other conclusions and implications emerged, and these are
discussed in the next section.
Conclusions and implications. Berger concluded that development took place in
the stories the pilot study participants told about their fallback experiences. She said,
“ .. .1 could see some o f what you talk about in your paper. That way that people can use
- 1 think it is post-conventional people -  can use their experiences o f smallness to help
them be bigger, be more whole.”
Yet, while the examples from the pilot study participants offered Cook-Greuter an
opportunity to think directly about what is and what is not fallback, her interpretation
differed from Berger’s. More often than not, Cook-Greuter claimed that fallback did not
exist in these stories. In fact, following the presentations o f these pilot study stories of
fallback, Cook-Greuter cautioned me to be specific about what I’m defining as fallback:
behavior or inner dialogue on past experience. I began to have some clarity that what I
220
am defining as fallback may be both, and the determinant is what’s most useful to those
attempting to navigate their way through the developmental spectrum, through life.
During one of my interviews with Torbert, and unrelated to my recounting of
stories of fallback by the pilot study participants, he spoke about the importance of
having an understanding of fallback to both stage development theory and the exercise of
leadership. Torbert explained,
I think [fallback] sort o f highlights that the work of developmental movement is 
really ongoing and continual. And indeed, the later the action logic to which one 
has developed, the more one is called to continue to work. The work gains in 
intensity, it doesn’t get easier. Or say, “Oh, I passed that test, and now I’m fine 
for the rest of my life, and I can glide through this.” It highlights the fact that it’s 
not going to be done in a three-day workshop or a five-day workshop or an off- 
site. All these ways o f intervening in people’s lives to help leadership 
development are helpful, but you can’t begin to imagine that they are going to do 
the job. It highlights why it’s useful to have ongoing first-person and second- 
person practices in one’s life, and seeking out support from people to work on 
difficult situations when one is probably more likely to be falling back. One 
realizes increasingly, I think, at least this is what the conclusion that I ’ve come to 
is, that one wants to work hard at creating an ongoing practicing environment 
with little communities of inquiry or whatever, and so forth. So, I think what it 
does is it highlights building the developmental process into your everyday 
activity rather than thinking it will go on somewhere else.
During the pilot study, Mitch, the Strategist likened fallback to relapse in
addiction treatment. He said,
In addiction, it’s not unlike talking to people about their relapses. In the fantasy 
world people go off to 30-day rehab and they come out and think they will never 
drink again, or use. The reality is that most people slip after addiction rehab. 
However much money they spend and however long they go, the most likely 
outcome after addiction treatment is relapse, and the addiction treatment industry 
does not publicize this. What they publicize is that you come here, and you’re 
good for life, which is complete nonsense. But if you work with the clients and 
say, “Look we’re not telling you to relapse, but let’s talk about what happens if  it 
does and how we’re going to deal with that. And, then you’re going to learn from 
one or several of these, and you’re finally going to get yourself where you come 
out over here, and you’re at this false, or let’s say, insecure level o f recovery.
And, we go back and forth a few times, and you’re finally going to catapult 
yourself to a secure level of recovery where the relapse becomes much less likely.
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You’ve been down the relapse road a few times and you think, unless I do this, I 
know where this is going. I know myself by now. So I can head this off now.
I’ve made this mistake three times. So let me be honest with myself. Do I really 
want to make this change or not?” It’s trial and error work and a lot o f that trial 
and error learning has to happen out in the real world. You can’t learn it.
The parallel between the two statements was striking, with both quotes pointing
to: the fact that development isn’t going to happen in an instant, the opportunity for
growth to occur from fallback, and the importance o f  people in the real world
understanding that development is not all onward and upward, sweetness and light. To
think that you have this problem once, and you do a little bit o f work to address it, and
then you’re just going to move along past it, is not realistic. Developmental growth is
lifelong work. If those occasions when we fall back can be used as tools in that work, it’s
crucial that we craft an understanding o f how that may be.
Palus voiced frustration at the lack o f meaningful and different research on human
development, suggesting that the limitations of our methods and instruments creates a
limitation in what we study. He explained that we go for the “low hanging fruit,” asking
the questions we think we can answer rather than the ones that we really want and need
answers to. In fact, Palus argued that what future research should focus on is better
methodologies and fresh ways to approach questions; the development of instruments
that can more directly assess and reveal the fine grain of one’s underlying developmental
structure and one’s use of an action logic at any given time. For instance, he noted that
the question, if  we could objectively diagnose fallback in others, is quickly squashed
given the shortcomings of our current tools for developmental measurement.
One important implication for future research on the fallback phenomenon that
emerged in my recounting of the pilot study participants’ stories of fallback is the
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possibility or impossibility of assessing someone’s experience of fallback from the 
outside in. This points to the importance o f conducting empirical research with 
participants that allows the researcher to probe the participants’ experiences. In the next 
section, I explore with the key thinkers the work that still lies ahead in mapping the 
boundaries o f fallback in human development through future research.
Part IV. Research Question Five: How Might the Fallback Phenomenon be 
Researched with Participants in the Future?
It seems clear that empirical research is needed to test the boundaries o f the 
phenomenon of fallback that I theoretically explored with the six key thinkers. Yet, how 
might we best go about this?
Design.
Instruments. Given the financial and time limitations of current developmental 
assessment instruments, Palus suggested the development o f a self-report test for use by 
practitioners; one that is easy to understand, easy to administer (quickly and in groups), 
and easy to assess. He identified the developmental autobiography through which an 
individual writes their developmental life story, and self-identifies key developmental 
moments (and may also self-assess the corresponding stage o f development for that 
moment), as one existing tool that could be adapted. The developmental autobiography 
uses a general prompt asking an individual to explore in narrative form their 
transformation across action logics during their lifetime. Palus suggested that this tool be 
adapted to include a specific probe about the individual’s experience o f transitions.
In fact, several key thinkers recommended adapting current tools to more 
effectively study the fallback phenomenon. Cook-Greuter posited that an interview
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would be most conducive to uncovering data about a new area of research, such as 
fallback. She recommended adapting Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview (SOI) and using 
either the researcher’s own questions or a combination of the researcher’s questions and 
SOI questions to focus on specific issues and situations related to fallback (e.g., going 
home, going to another country, class-reunions, serious illness). Cook-Greuter suggested 
that using an interview will provide structure -  which would be useful for comparability 
-  and flexibility to probe participants’ thinking.
Berger also suggested the SOI would be a useful tool in conducting research, 
precisely because it is heavily facilitated by the interviewer. Like Cook-Greuter, Berger 
recommended employing a domain-specific SOI to identify pockets of an individual’s 
sense-making that could be fallback.
Similarly, McCallum thought that adapting the developmental inventory to 
include a prompt (in the case o f the sentence completion tests) or a question (if using the 
SOI) about fallback could potentially reveal not only one’s go-to fallback position, but 
also one’s developmental ceiling. An example would be asking a person to identify a 
situation where there was a gap between the ideal way they’d like to show up, and the 
way they actually did. A person’s recounting of a story in which one expressed regret- 
only would likely indicate a lower developmental ceiling than one that expressed regret 
and hope or equanimity.
In addition to adapting existing instruments to research the fallback phenomenon, 
several key thinkers recommended examining the data from existing instruments through 
a different lens. Berger noted that previously conducted SOI’s that assessed an 
individual’s highest sustained demonstrated score could be re-evaluated to reveal the
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individual’s full range or band. This assessment of one’s developmental bandwidth in 
combination with the initial SOI score, would allow the researcher to identify one’s go-to 
fallback action logics.
While Berger thought that future research for the most part would need to be 
qualitative in nature, she suggested that from a quantitative perspective one could analyze 
the parent-oriented sentence stem scores on Cook-Greuter’s SCTi-MAP to determine if 
they are statistically lower than other sentence stems. This suggestion to use the SCTi- 
MAP to undertake a statistical analysis of emotional sentence stem responses to 
determine if these are lower than the rest of scores on the instrument was shared by 
Cook-Greuter. However, outside of this possibility, Cook-Greuter thought using her own 
SCTi-MAP in a study of fallback would be challenging. She noted that when people are 
completing the SCTi-MAP assessment, they are of one mind, at one time. Therefore, 
they are not subject to the different environments and circumstances that might cause 
them to fallback.
Cook-Greuter and Torbert identified additional development tools and exercises 
that could be utilized to research fallback in participants in the future. Cook-Greuter 
believed that document analysis o f a participant’s developmental assessments might be 
useful, but only if the assessment is relatively fresh. Further, she thought that conducting 
analysis on developmental autobiographies written by participants could offer a larger 
view of their development, but only if  the autobiography is extensive.
Torbert suggested that the difficult conversation method could be utilized with 
participants to prompt reflection upon earlier fallback, and thought this would be 
particularly effective in helping individuals at earlier action logics identify their own
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experiences o f fallback. He noted that Kegan’s immunity to change exercise (previously 
referred to as the big assumption exercise) would be useful in discovering the hidden 
assumptions that both lead one to make a commitment and also to resist it.
McCallum argued that accessing more than just participant self-report would be 
vital to any research design. He suggested focus groups might be a viable option for use 
in debriefing. He offered that utilizing developmental inventories would be beneficial, 
but advised having an outside party score and select the sample pool, as he did in his own 
dissertation research, so-as to avoid the researcher having that potentially influential 
knowledge going in.
Setting and participants. Berger recommended seeking participants who had a 
common experience o f a developmentally-rich circumstance with a high likelihood of 
fallback; one that caused the participants to be “developmentally smaller” for an extended 
term, which she identified as three months or longer. Examples of these circumstances 
include becoming a new parent, newly unemployed, newly married, or newly laid off. 
Cook-Greuter, too, rather liked the idea o f focusing on one kind of experience within a 
study; either one experience that all participants shared (e.g., group relations conference), 
or an individual experience of the same kind (e.g., going home for the holidays, attending 
a high school reunion, etc.).
McCallum thought it would be important to access participants in the immediacy 
of the experience and again through long-term reflection following the experience.
Berger, too, thought this would be useful, and suggested conducting pre- and post- (six 
months to one-year apart) SOIs or SCTi-MAPs with the participants. The pre-assessment
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would focus on one’s description of one’s experience in the moment, while the post­
assessment would attempt to access the smaller self once the bigger Self emerges.
Berger noted the difficulty in studying those at conventional stages through recall, 
versus in the moment, given that their capacity to reflect, to make object, is limited if it 
exists at all. She recollected that according to Kegan, the third order is the earliest that 
one is able to have a sense of one’s own psychology and identity over time, and Jennifer 
noted that this sense would be necessary for the recall of fallback. The benefit of 
identifying post-conventional stage individuals as participants is that they would have 
language around fallback and the capacity to see it.
Nonetheless, McCallum indicated he would like future research to include several 
representatives at each stage of development and cross sections within (e.g., of 
personality type, experience, family history, etc.). Cook-Greuter’s ideal research sample 
would also include participants at a range o f developmental levels, and she suggested one 
could target the participant pool by gender, age, or experience. She noted that, as always 
in research, the challenge is securing the participants with the specific characteristics 
around which you have designed your study.
Cook-Greuter suggested that the more participants we can study, the merrier, but 
advised that the more similarities o f participants, the narrower the focus (e.g. the same 
developmental level), the more comparability and generalizability is possible. McCallum 
argued for a large sample size -larger than his study’s N o f 18. Yet, Berger claimed that 
good data could be generated from a participant pool of eight to twelve, suggesting that a 
study with any N would move us further along in our understanding than we are 
currently.
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McCallum thought a cross-disciplinary exploration o f fallback through different 
lenses (e.g., biological, behavioral) would be a fascinating area of future research. He 
noted that other disciplines would have a different explanation and different definition of 
what it means “to learn.” He also proposed research that explores the connection 
between the brain and mind, and the resulting impact on the way in which humans make 
meaning. Specifically, McCallum suggested that adding the scientific experience o f the 
brain to one’s qualitative experience o f human development laid upon Ken Wilber’s all­
quadrants, all-levels, all lines, AQAL model, would be fascinating. He also identified the 
potential use of magnetic resoncance images (MRIs) to explore cognitive capability and 
the brain’s structure.
Palus identified the importance of extending our research beyond the usual 
suspects who are studied in general (i.e., undergraduate students) and those who are 
studied in our field (i.e., those with the resources to pursue a developmental path). He 
criticized the field of adult development for often ignoring cross-cultural differences and 
imposing our developmental perspective on others, calling it a blind spot. Palus 
suggested that developmental theory may well be a Western fancy, “a certain kind of 
story that rich people tell each other.”
Palus would like to see fallback explored in non-Western countries, where the 
issues o f living are different. He suggested that poverty, imposed religion, imposed 
traditions, are all a very different reality for populations outside of the West, and that 
these are real conditions which limit developmental growth. Palus imagines growth from 
fallback is very different in different socioeconomic settings in which there are no 
supporting conditions, where the environment does not promote a growthful narrative.
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Instead o f assuming and imposing, Palus championed future cross-cultural research that 
would explore how Western ways o f thinking about development and fallback might be 
useful to participants who are immersed in tradition, experiencing developmental 
disequilibrium, and who wish to exercise leadership.
Questions. Given that researching the phenomenon o f fallback is wide-open 
territory, the line o f research that could be pursued and the questions that could be asked 
are countless. The key thinkers surfaced five overarching categories in which future 
research could be focused: boundaries, fallback across the lifespan, the fallback 
experience, the role of fallback in developmental growth, and the implications o f fallback 
to human and leadership development.
Boundaries. Both Palus and Cook-Greuter indicated that research needed to be 
conducted to establish the boundaries and to determine the criteria for diagnosing 
fallback. What is the scope o f fallback? Palus wondered if 30 days marks what could be 
viewed as beyond normal human perturbations.
Cook-Greuter wondered how we shall define fallback and asked questions about 
how we could measure it: When is it fallback from the perspective o f somebody who 
watches? And, when is it fallback from the perspective of somebody who is actually 
living in it? Is the framing of it as such action logic-dependent? Is it dependent upon the 
action logic of the interviewer? What is the unit of analysis? A moment-to-moment 
experience of fallback or a retrospective look at overall development over time?
Fallback across the lifespan. Several of the key thinkers wondered what fallback 
looks like through the lens of each developmental level, noting that the identification o f 
fallback in self would differ by each individual and their action logic. They also asked,
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what is the experience of fallback across the lifespan? Cook-Greuter was curious about 
the effects o f fallback at old age when one may already be experiencing the loss o f mind 
and capacities.
The fallback experience. Berger asked, “What got you there? What got you out? 
And how does your experience of being there and now out, change who you are and what 
you do?” McCallum was curious to explore the specific fallback phenomenon, one’s 
sense-making of the experience in the present and its implications for the future, and 
what one’s self-scaffolds are in terms o f framing and behavior. He also would like to 
determine if his own research finding that individuals at later action logics have greater 
resiliency in catching themselves in fallback and/or the capacity to avoid fallback 
altogether, actually holds up under future research. Cook-Greuter, similarly, was 
interested in the influence of developmental level on one’s experience o f and recovery 
from fallback. She asked, is it as developmental theory would have us think, that the 
later the stage, the quicker the recovery?
Cook-Greuter also wanted to know what are the experiences, behaviors, feelings, 
catalysts, methods and times o f recovery of fallback? Are there differences in the 
experience of fallback depending on the range between developmental levels -  the most 
complex one is capable, and the level to which one has fallen? How is fallback enacted 
by different people in different situations? What are the fallback patterns by gender? By 
age?
The role o f  fallback in developmental growth. Torbert inquired: why do we 
sometimes grow developmentally as a result o f fallback, and at other times not? Why are
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some individuals consistently successful at practicing awareness in all areas o f their lives, 
and others not? Why is trauma at times regressive, and at others progressive?
The questions that Palus would want to ask delve into the practical way o f helping 
people: what are the optimal conditions, factors, and variables for learning from fallback? 
What kind of supports, holding environments, and facilitation are useful to those 
experiencing fallback? What are the variables involved in those who handle fallback 
well and others who do not? Does an analysis o f fallback generate more or different 
types o f help for people (and people in organizations) who are in transition? Does it offer 
a fresh analysis of transitional phenomena? Can understanding fallback help people 
move forward when in transition vs. decaying? Berger, similarly wanted to know, how 
can one best take advantage o f these times to grow?
The implications o f  fallback to human and leadership development. Specific to 
his professional focus on leadership development of individuals in organizations, Palus 
asked: what is the cause of trauma in the workplace? How can we help people when 
they’re not self-actualizing? How can the workplace be designed so that frustrations can 
be used developmentally?
“Shooting at a barn.” This is the phrase that Berger used to describe how 
research on fallback of any kind would be tremendously valuable given that the 
phenomenon has been so little studied to-date. Cook-Greuter, Palus, and Torbert often 
remarked that we just don’t know the answers to so many of the questions about fallback. 
Cook-Greuter argued that future research of fallback is valuable given that this is such an 
unexplored area with no definition currently, and no good descriptions. She also 
suggested that future empirical research on the fallback phenomenon could uncover a
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clearer understanding of what accounts for fallback and what doesn't. Torbert agreed, 
often suggesting throughout our interviews that empirical research, research extending 
beyond the theoretical framework, would be needed to answer these and many other 
questions.
The exploration of the fallback phenomenon through interviews with the key 
thinkers was rich, thought-provoking, and complex. In the next section, I attempt to 
make sense of their sense-making, and take an initial crack at mapping the boundaries o f 
the fallback phenomenon.
P art V: Synthesis, Analysis, and Claims
In the following pages, I argue that the phenomenon o f fallback can be made 
sense of and understood through the existing theory o f stage development. Next I claim 
that the most important criteria for defining fallback is the absence o f options at the more 
complex level o f development that one is capable -  be they in thought, feeling, behavior, 
or meaning-making. Further, I claim that fallback, under the right conditions has the 
potential to facilitate developmental growth, and that these conditions for growth to occur 
are most likely to be met by those in the post-conventional stages of development. I 
assert that fallback is one part o f a mutually-defining term and phenomenon, the other 
component o f which is spring forward. In my fifth claim, I identify and describe five 
overarching causes o f fallback. Finally, I argue the importance of having a theory for 
understanding fallback to both human and leadership development.
Claim one. So much exists in the current developmental theory that accounts for 
the fallback phenomenon, yet, the aspects of stage development theory that focus on the
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bi-directional nature o f human development, movement both forward and back, have
largely been ignored.
The theoretical field overestimates the stability of one’s center-of-gravity action
logic, and this overestimation is perpetuated by the final outcome assessment o f one’s
developmental capacity as a point on a scale. The developmental assessment instruments,
in their probing of one’s sense-making, yield a range o f stages, not one primary stage,
and not even the stage that is most often scored. Yet, the score that is presented, that is
emphasized, is one point, one stage on the developmental continuum.
In Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview, this point is one’s highest sustained
demonstrated score, the developmental place from which one is capable o f making
meaning under the best circumstances. In Torbert’s and Cook-Greuter’s sentence
completion tests, this is one’s center-of-gravity action logic. Palus explained,
It’s looking at a normalized curve, and I guess that’s an operationalized version of 
the center-of-gravity idea. You draw the distribution o f the scoring o f these 
sentences, then you naturally come out with a center. So, that’s where we place 
people. We say that, that’s where you seem to live the most.
Palus explored the center-of-gravity metaphor, noting our capacity to be in our
center-of-gravity, or an arm ahead, or a foot that’s a few steps back, at any time. We
have a range of stages that we may tap into, consciously or unconsciously, in any
moment. He claimed that the center-of-gravity is not a fundamental truth. Instead, it is a
metaphor, a rule o f thumb, a description of facts. It is the place you live most o f the time,
and it indicates that you are all there, with a multitude of options for developmental
expression, at once.
As Berger made sense of fallback within stage development theory, she likened 
one’s development to layers o f an onion or rings on a tree. She explained that we contain
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all of ourselves, including the smallest aspect. Each level is transcended and included, 
not destroyed. Given that all levels are contained within us, we must have the ability to 
slip into or access earlier stages. Berger posited that fallback is a key piece o f what 
makes you whole.
Torbert posited that the center-of-gravity action logic is an illusion. He explained, 
“Our attention fluctuates wildly all the time, even when we’re relatively late action 
logic...The distinction is that in the movement from Strategist to Alchemist, you begin to 
distinguish between the attention and the pattern of thought.” This ever-increasing 
awareness leads to a more frequent noticing o f the incongruities in one’s life and actions.
It seems that the reality of the developmental spectrum may be that fallback is the 
norm, and making meaning from one’s center-of-gravity is the exception. Palus claimed 
that we, at all stages of development, are subject to the full catastrophe o f life. Even 
those in the post-conventional stages experience fallback given the full complexity and 
messiness that characterizes every stage, no matter its position on the developmental 
continuum. Cook-Greuter pointed to the existence o f darkness and evil at all levels of 
development, claiming that the earlier stages idealize the darkness away while the later 
stages notice and accept the darkness.
Yet, Cook-Greuter suggested that the reason fallback has not been studied so far, 
the reason she herself has not studied it, is because o f its negative connotations in the 
midst o f the positive focus of those in the constructivist field in which constructive- 
development theory resides. Berger criticized the field’s and the theory’s neglect of 
fallback, claiming that it denies the real lived experience o f fallback in self and others. 
Palus explained why this may be, noting that the theoretical field is weak on pursuing
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empirical truth, and more specifically, pursuing empirical truth that is discontinuing: that 
looks for the outliers, that seeks to discover where the theory breaks down, where the 
edges become ragged. He suggested that fallback may reside at “the ragged edges” of 
stage development theory.
I challenge the assumption that exists in the context o f a field that emphasizes the 
onward-and-upward nature of developmental growth -  that fallback is negative. None of 
the key thinkers denied the phenomenon o f fallback. In fact, Palus’s persistent 
challenges were to the creation of a theory around fallback that perpetuated the sense o f 
the phenomenon as something separate from one’s self. Palus’s initial interpretation of 
fallback was just that: a rejection of, a cutting-off from the earlier me. To him, defining 
and establishing a definition for fallback seemed to be in service of the claim, “I ’ve fallen 
back, I ’ve regressed to something that I am no longer.” He noted that the term fallback 
assumes movement, rather than acceptance o f the whole system. “I do not accept it as me. 
It’s something that I need to fix.”
It is clear that no matter the claims by the theorists that later is not better, that 
there is value even in the simpler stages of sense-making, a judgment still exists. Perhaps 
the judgment is not that earlier stages are less than, rather that later stages are greater. In 
Kegan’s description of the twenty-something-year-old student who behaved like a child 
when she went to her parents’ home, he described her experience as, “This is not me: this 
is not me today,” which would point to a rejection o f that earlier self that Palus would 
assert really is still her.
Instead, Palus stands by an interpretation of those earlier stages o f development 
residing right alongside the later ones in each individual. The full range o f opportunities
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is there. The shadow is there. He claimed, “It’s an ‘and’ place when you fallback, it’s 
not an ‘or’ place. It’s not flipping between poles.” In Palus’s view, calling it fallback, 
making it “a thing,” a theory, seems to pose it as anomaly o f who we really are, and if it’s 
taken as a proven theory, there’s danger in that.
Cook-Greuter’s understanding of fallback differed from Palus’s. She claimed that 
fallback is separate or different from who we are. Fallback is not fantasizing, because 
fantasizing is normal in humans at all levels o f development. Fallback is not thoughts, or 
internal processes, which are all part o f who we are as humans. In Cook-Greuter’s 
definition of fallback, action or behavior, something outside o f the normal internal 
processes of being a human, is a condition.
When asked why we embrace constructive-development theory, Palus responded, 
“We love these big theories that seem to account for everything.” Yet, the constructive- 
development and stage development theories do not account for everything. The 
phenomenon of fallback, while identifiable within the construct of the existing theory, 
has largely been neglected in the field, because it challenges the positive leanings, the 
forward emphasis that has been a hallmark o f the theory to date. In the section that 
follows, I begin to stake out the territory of fallback, in hopes of crafting an 
understanding of fallback that may make the existing stage development theory more 
complete.
Claim two. What is most important in defining the boundaries of fallback is not 
whether one expresses a less complex developmental capacity through thoughts, feelings, 
or behaviors, but that this expression is in the absence of all other options to think, feel, 
or behave differently.
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I spent several months considering the different possibilities offered by the key 
thinkers for what criteria constituted fallback. McCallum suggested that the experience 
of fallback is a cognitive constricting o f capacity, in which no options exist. Cook- 
Greuter in her own definition o f long-term or permanent fallback, noted it as a total loss 
of capacity to reason, to see, to feel, what you saw, felt, and reasoned before. She called 
it a complete loss of access to the later level where one is helplessly subjected to the 
experience. She claimed, “The whole thing goes down.”
Palus claimed that what fallback is not, is acting from a lower action logic than 
that which you are capable. Rather, it is only fallback if the highest action logic o f which 
you are capable isn’t working, and you seek access to that action logic, but you just can’t 
get it. In Palus’s stories o f transformational experiences by participants in his own 
dissertation research, he noted that the participants felt incapacitated, rendered stupid, 
helpless, unable to cope, existing in a primitive survival state during which the “machine 
is having trouble working” and is experiencing “breakdown.” Palus wondered what the 
relationship is between incapacitation and fallback. Incapacitation, a loss o f capacity, to 
disable, is precisely how Berger described the experience o f fallback. She said there is a 
lack o f other options, and a disabling o f complexity.
While the key thinkers variously used “make meaning,” “making sense,” 
“operating,” “behaving,” and “loss of access,” in their definitions o f fallback, Cook- 
Greuter was the first to state explicitly that fallback requires action. She noted that 
fallback is not fantasizing, thoughts, or internal process, because these are all part o f who 
we are as humans. Fallback, in her definition requires behavior, though she conceded 
that behavior can be broadly defined.
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The various interpretations o f the criteria for fallback may have connection to the 
originators’ of stage development theory’s different conceptions of what characterizes 
development. Kegan’s constmctive-developmental framing o f developmental stages as 
orders o f development or orders o f consciousness focused on meaning-making, differs 
from the ego-developmental framing of stages by Torbert and Cook-Greuter as action 
logics.
Cook-Greuter noted that Kegan’s Subject-Object Interview measures cognition, 
how one thinks, how the mind works. Alternatively, her own and Torbert’s sentence 
completion tests measure ego development; how one makes sense including behavior, 
emotions, affect, moral development, and lines of development (e.g., cognitive, 
relational).
I posed Cook-Greuter’s criteria o f action to the other key thinkers. McCallum 
thought there was merit in being cautious in my definition o f fallback, not accounting for 
everything within it. However, he also acknowledged that there are many possible 
interpretations for behavior. Torbert who had originally been on the side o f meaning- 
making, came out in favor of a necessity for behavior in fallback. However, he 
eventually saw the potential for both possibilities. Torbert conceded that fallback could 
be experienced in one’s inward thoughts alone, if  recognition and correction take place. 
However, he could see the possibility o f fallback marked by thought only, not action, 
with the conditions noted above, only occurring in those who hold advanced action logics.
Palus, embracing his definition that privileged the emic point-of-view o f the 
individual experiencing fallback, thought that the answer resided in the subjective
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experience of that individual. Berger believed that the criteria for fallback is the loss o f 
other options to think, act, feel, perceive where before other options existed.
Toward the end of the interview season, I started to get clarity on my own views 
around the criteria for fallback. I began to see where some o f the key thinkers agreed 
with each other and the places where their convergence broke down. As I made sense of 
this, I wanted to share my newfound hypothesis of the criteria for phenomenon with the 
key thinkers, and Cook-Greuter, given that her understanding had been the furthest from 
mine, was at the top of my list. During my final interview with Cook-Greuter I suggested 
the following:
It could be fallback, even in the absence o f action, if  it’s just your thoughts about 
something, if  it’s the only option that you have. So, it’s not, “I could be angry, or 
I could take on this other person’s perspective, or I could slander this person.”
But, if  it’s just, “I’m angry,” and that’s the only option I have, [that’s fallback]... 
That we have access to a full distribution o f stages at any time, and we are all o f 
those. And, we pull on those when we need to. And, sometimes, we’re pulled 
into those, without choice. And, so the pulling into, even if it’s part o f our normal 
range, if  we’re pulled into that, and we don’t have a choice, and we don't have 
other options, then that’s what I think fallback might be.
Cook-Greuter was willing to concede that this definition made sense to her based on the
data we have.
I believe that fallback in all o f its expressions, not the least o f which is thought 
and feeling, but also including behavior whether observable or not, is a true lived 
experience in human beings. Further, the classification o f the phenomenon as fallback 
should not be dependent upon an analysis o f how it is expressed (through thought, 
behavior, feelings), but rather on if no other options exist in that moment. Palus regularly 
noted that the value of a theory is in its usefulness. Berger challenged me to consider 
both what is most useful and what is most theoretically robust in my creation of a theory
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for understanding fallback. I think the criteria for fallback that I outline above addresses 
the lived experience of the phenomenon, and as such meets the standards of usefulness 
and robustness o f theory that Berger and Palus championed.
The possibility of growth as a result o f fallback is the topic o f my next claim. 
Claim three. Fallback, under the right conditions has significant potential to 
facilitate developmental growth, and given the increased likelihood for these conditions 
to be met in post-conventional stages, growth from fallback is more likely to occur at the 
post-conventional stages o f development.
All of the key thinkers believed that fallback had the potential to play a 
paradoxically positive role in developmental growth. Yet, most of the key thinkers also 
noted that fallback does not always lead to growth. They identified three developmental 
possibilities resulting from fallback: one can go up, one can go down, or one can stay the 
same.
The characteristics of stages along the developmental spectrum clearly point to a
connection between one’s developmental capacity, one’s ability to notice and recover
from fallback, and the potential for fallback to be developmental. These characteristics
reveal that those who both experience fallback to an earlier stage of development, and
who have a center-of-gravity developmental stage that is earlier, take longer to notice
fallback. Whereas, later stage individuals exhibit an increased capacity to notice and
acknowledge the gap between their espoused way o f making sense o f the world and the
way they actually do make sense of the world. Torbert explained,
As one moves towards later action logics, one would expect that the person would 
become more cognizant of those differences between large parts of one’s life, 
because one’s increasingly looking at one’s life across context and over long 
periods of time, not just moment-to-moment.
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According to Torbert, when one’s center-of-gravity developmental action logic is 
in the conventional range, one has less capacity to even recognize that one is falling back 
to an earlier stage of development, because the awareness o f one’s behaviors and 
thoughts in the moment is not present. Berger, Kegan, and Torbert noted that the 
Diplomat is the earliest stage of development that would have the capacity to notice 
fallback. Additionally, Torbert contended, “The Strategist action logic is the first one 
that really begins to try to trace whether we are doing what we think we ought to be doing 
in a given moment.”
In fact, one of McCallum’s findings from his 2008 study was that the later one’s 
center-of-gravity action logic, the more one notices the falling back, therefore the shorter 
the fallback periods (McCallum, 2008). He acknowledged the irony o f this in that it may 
appear that those at post-conventional action logics fall back more frequently. When in 
fact, those at later action logics have access to an “encompassing consciousness” that 
more frequently not only notices fallback, but recovers from it-  access that those at the 
conventional action logics do not possess.
Moreover, Berger suggested that post-conventional-measured individuals have the 
ability to notice experiences o f fallback to various places along their developmental band 
either in the moment or shortly thereafter. Torbert similarly believed that fallback could 
be recognized close to or in the moment of its occurrence, and posited that the closer to 
the state of fallback one is able to reflect on it, the faster one’s recovery from it. He 
mused,
It’s interesting, the more we talk, the more the rapidity with which one can 
transform subject into object, and treat it as object, emerges as really a significant 
element in terms o f how fallback works and how one recovers from it.
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McCallum championed the importance of awareness which extends beyond the 
mind in recognizing fallback -  getting to the balcony about our mental processes, 
checking in with the heart, paying attention to one’s desires -  resulting in an expansion of 
freedom to choose to make sense and act differently. McCallum acknowledged that this 
noticing o f incongruence is something that is more a goal and a reality in the later stages.
Cook-Greuter also claimed that those at later action logics have access to more 
tools to recover from fallback than earlier developmental action logics. She identified a 
willingness to seek support and an inclination toward self-reflection as two o f these tools. 
Given the likelihood of those at later action logics to seek feedback and support for an 
experience that reveals one’s weakness and vulnerability, post-conventional individuals 
would be more likely to experience growth from fallback than would their conventional 
counterparts.
Contexts supportive o f development would be those in which skills are developed
and feedback is given related to the next level of development. Torbert pointed out that
late stage individuals (Strategists and beyond) tend to recognize environmental effects on
their developmental capacities and attempt to structure the environment to support their
development. Torbert explained,
I think what is true is that only people going into post-conventional stages begin 
to have a deep interest in [fallback]. It tends to be, in general, too threatening for 
people whose identity is completely enmeshed with their actual behavior. Where 
they don’t have any distance between the two. And, it ultimately requires looking 
back and forth between behavior and intent, to do anything with it.
It seems clear that developmental growth as a result o f fallback is possible, and
where one sits along the developmental spectrum would influence one’s ability to not
only recognize and reflect on one’s fallback experiences, but also to grow as a result of
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them. This is important, because it highlights how the description of stage characteristics
in the current stage development theory informs an understanding of fallback.
Specifically, this understanding suggests that growth from fallback, given the later stages’
propensity to not only notice it, but also to access their more abundant tools to recover
and develop as a result of it, is more likely to occur in post-conventional-measured
individuals. In the next claim, more nuance is added to the understanding of fallback.
Claim four. Fallback is part o f a mutually-defining term, the other component o f
which is spring forward.
The key thinkers often contemplated the experience o f fallback and growth across
the developmental lifespan. Berger noted that in the earlier action logics, growth occurs
in opposition to one’s earlier self. The unsuitability o f prior sense-making systems is a
catalyst for growth. She claimed that later in the developmental spectrum, there may be
no choice but to “fall forward” in response to fallback. She explained,
Something made you leave in the first place -  some sense of the unsuitability of 
that sense-making system. And, that thing is going to happen again, right? I 
think we don’t stay back there, because we can’t put the toothpaste back in the 
tube. Like you can’t actually, you can’t un-know a more complex world. You 
can deny it for a time, but I don't think you can un-know it. So, I guess you have 
to fall forward, too.
McCallum acknowledged that in fallback there is a loss, there is suffering, there is 
something that we must experience as absent that can snap us back to attention, make us 
notice, make us question. He argued that this noticing of loss, suffering, what is absent, 
this noticing o f fallback might bring us closer to the divine. He explained, “If  that’s our 
fundamental, existential orientation, then regression itself is something that is precious, at 
some level.”
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All o f the key thinkers, as they worked their way into definitions o f fallback, did 
so by distinguishing it from regression or permanent fallback. Kegan claimed that 
genuine regression would actually be devolution, which he described as the complete loss 
o f complex functions. On the contrary, he described fallback as a temporary inability to 
use one’s most complex functions. Serious regression is the term Cook-Greuter coined 
for acting from an earlier stage of development from which there is no return, or no hope 
of return. Torbert noted that permanent fallback would entail a real loss o f capacity, and 
could be caused by old age, physical trauma, or brain trauma. McCallum claimed that 
permanent fallback could occur when the actual self meets so many instances o f not 
living up to the idealized self over an extended period that it gives up. Additionally,
Palus identified permanent fallback as a deterioration of an action logic that may not 
come back.
Berger noted that fallback by its nature must be temporary. It could not be 
permanent, because permanent would then be a new normal o f developmental sense- 
making in which individuals are unable to see the fallback, because they are it. She also 
suggested that in temporary fallback, you know that you will recover what is lost. 
However, this is not the case in permanent fallback.
Berger first suggested the possibility o f the mutually-defining terms of “fallback” 
and “spring forward.” She noted that just as there is no big Self without small self, 
perhaps fallback is not regression, but regression with perspective and growth. Upon 
reflection, I discovered a preponderance of mutually-defining terms in developmental 
theory. There can be no post-conventional stages without conventional stages. There’s 
no consciousness without unconscious, no good without evil. It then follows, that there
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can be no fallback without spring forward. Berger suggested that the dual nature of the 
concept helps make it “identifiable, nameable, study-able, possible.” As already noted, 
the value o f a theory is in its usefulness and theoretical robustness.
Therefore, recovery must be implicit in our definition o f fallback. I propose that 
the term fallback, the phenomenon of fallback does assume movement, but not 
developmental incapacitation in isolation. I posit that to be fallback, it must be 
accompanied by progressive movement or springing forward.
Claim five. There are five overarching causes o f fallback. These include: 
ordinary triggers, physiological brain responses, contextual “gravitational pulls,” 
challenges to identity, and unresolved trauma.
Ordinary triggers. Ordinary triggers are our regular companions in the complex 
and fast-paced world in which we live, therefore it’s important to be aware o f their 
tendency to pull us into our smaller self. Torbert explained that ordinary triggers prompt 
a passive digression into more habitual, less strategic, less complex developmental 
capacities. These include laziness, exhaustion, depression, group norms, stress, fear, 
tension, crisis, rage, shame, loss, overwork, failure, hunger, and jet lag. McCallum also 
identified circumstances of uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity, and illness, as ordinary 
triggers o f fallback. These additional ordinary triggers noted by McCallum seem to also 
be those that trigger fallback through the physiological incapacitation o f the cognitive 
mind by the brain, which is the second overarching cause o f fallback.
Physiological brain responses. Kegan referenced brain scientist David Rock, and 
his SCARF model, each letter indicating a specific threat area: S = status, C = certainty, 
A= autonomy/freedom, R = relationships, F= fairness. The amgydala, where emotion
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and primitive flight-fight responses are housed, when triggered by a threat to one of these 
SCARF areas, can override the neocortex where cognition resides. Kegan suggested that 
these triggers can lead to the experience of being taken over by a less complex way of 
making meaning, of feeling destabilized and at psychological risk. Effectively, there is a 
biochemical response to certain stimuli that may temporarily not allow one to access the 
cognitive developmental tools that may constitute one’s best Self, one’s developmental 
center-of-gravity. Perhaps this is the physiological explanation for why certain 
circumstances, particularly those tied to one’s primitive self (e.g., those involving family) 
or involving risk (e.g., illness, injury, threat, fear, even if it is the 21st century version of 
these) nearly inevitably catalyze fallback.
McCallum also noted that the ability to quell the brain’s response to these stimuli 
are the same awareness and mindfulness practices that are also so seemingly important to 
avoiding fallback, recovering from fallback, and growing from fallback -  and the same 
practices that those at later developmental action logics are drawn to.
Kegan, Cook-Greuter, and Berger all noted that parent/child relationships may 
prompt a primitive response from the brain. Berger explained, . .The relationships we 
have with our most primal companions are our parents and our kids, I think. Those are 
ancient relationships...ancient in our lifespan, and also ancient in our mammalian 
progression. They bring up drives to protect at all costs.”
Cook-Greuter also pointed to the ancient triggers inherent in these relationships. 
She said,
I’m just guessing, but from what we read about neurobiology; that there must be 
pathways in the brain that are so strong, because they have been there for so long, 
and reactivated again, and again, and again, that they’re just very strong. So, 
when they get triggered, you know, it happens.
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Parent and child relationships and the home environments in which they 
originated were identified within another overarching cause o f  fallback, contextual 
“gravitational pulls.”
Contextual agravitational pulls. ” Palus identified family relationships, 
organizations, and societies as contexts that may pull individuals back to a lower 
developmental level. He noted that the majority o f individuals reside at this less complex 
space, given the rarity o f individuals in the post-conventional stages in our environments. 
He suggested that these are all settings in which individuals tend to operate at the 
“lowest common denominator.” Palus said, “I’m really entertaining the idea that the 
when [of fallback] is most of the time, and the why [of fallback] is, because we can’t help 
it.” He continued, “I think it’s a little bit o f a fancy we have to think that there’s 
significant numbers of people spending significant amounts o f  time at this advanced level, 
and that it’s kind of rare that they fall back.”
Several of the key thinkers noted that organizational cultures in the West are often 
Achiever in orientation. This is not surprising given that this is the developmental level 
supported in broader Western society. Cook-Greuter found in her own research and 
practice that the developmental norms of organizations can be particularly challenging 
for post-conventional individuals, because these environments don’t appreciate what 
those at later stages have to offer. She suggested that these environments often cause 
individuals to revert to what’s familiar rather than what’s most complex. She noted, if  an 
individual is unable to find respite from the developmental oppression in other areas o f 
life, this could possibly lead one to further regression.
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McCallum suggested that there’s something about the present home holding 
environment (where one physically resides), perhaps the one that has known us for some 
time, that pulls us back to who we were earlier. Cook-Greuter also pointed to the 
developmental pull backwards of the home environment. She classified this kind of 
fallback as temporary, suggesting that when one leaves the trigger environment, one is 
able to recover to one’s “average” developmental capacity and see the situation 
differently.
She also identified communication in a foreign language and a change to one’s 
culture as other environments in which one’s developmental capacity is limited. She 
noted that one feels “clumsy,” “dumb,” “like a child” when unable to express oneself and 
not be perceived as one is accustomed. Cook-Greuter pointed to the challenges to one’s 
identity that these cultural contexts elicit. In fact, she suggested that contextual norms in 
any of these settings may result in a change in the way one presents one’s self given that 
the context won’t recognize one’s more complex self.
It is clear that contextual gravitational pulls may cause us to shift from an 
espoused way of making meaning and acting to a lower developmental expression in a 
different circumstance. The inevitability o f the gravitational pull on one’s center-of- 
gravity, particularly when the center-of-gravity is in the post-conventional range, is 
powerfully influenced by the preponderance of conventional range sense-making, 
discourse, and action in the contexts which surround us.
Challenges to identity. Berger, Torbert, and McCallum identified challenges to 
one’s identity that may take the form of major life events, new experiences, and 
“disorienting dilemmas” as an overarching cause of fallback. Berger noted that major life
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events which may include unemployment, bad marriages, the death o f a loved one, illness
or injury often catalyze fallback. She also identified new experiences that fall under the
category o f major life events (e.g., new parenthood, taking a new job, moving to a new
country). She remarked on the paradox of these “rich learning zones,” in that these
seemingly positive circumstances, those that are often cited by the theorists as catalyzing
developmental growth, allow us to be in touch with our full capacities, both big and small.
It’s easy to see how these events, whether positive or negative in nature, could
significantly challenge one’s identity, and trigger feelings o f loss of control.
Torbert described the experience of fallback prompted by new experiences as,
“You’ve gone down a fairly deep, but familiar tunnel. It’s not a scary tunnel, or it seems
less scary than what’s above ground.” McCallum noted,
When we are taken out of our familiar circumstances, and the kinds of 
conventions and supports that prop up our best behaviors, our best capacities, are 
taken away -  yeah, that’s going to be a condition that’s probably going to 
instigate a little bit of regression.
McCallum pointed to Jack Mezirow’s “disorienting dilemmas” as another catalyst 
for fallback in the category of challenges to one’s identity. McCallum described 
disorienting dilemmas as experiences that transform or challenge one’s perspectives, 
unsettle one’s meaning-making, add complexity, and cause cognitive dissonance. He 
noted that the realization that one’s biases are no longer adequate for describing reality 
has a real emotional impact.
When McCallum described this catalyst for fallback, I thought o f the group 
relations conference that was the setting for McCallum’s dissertation research in which 
he found the existence of fallback. Cook-Greuter also pointed to group relations 
conferences when identifying challenges to identity as a catalyst for fallback. She noted
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that group relations conferences reveal the gap between one’s ideal self and one’s actual,
and noted that these settings precipitate an extreme challenge to one’s identity, revealing
how little in control individuals at all levels are.
Unresolved trauma. Unresolved trauma was variously referred to by the key
thinkers as “unintegrated aspects o f self,” “encapsulation,” primary signifiers, and “big
assumptions.” This trauma, by whatever name, was described as creating a “magnetic
pull,” “onion holes,” “tethers,” or “potholes” to earlier stages in one’s development.
Unintegrated aspects of self were regularly connected to the habitual fallback stage that
individuals experience.
Kegan suggested that when trauma happens at a time in one’s life when one is
constructing the world in a simpler way, there is a literal or psychological feeling o f one’s
life being at risk. He explained,
People may have a kind of experience, which we could call dissociation. And, the 
way that you survived that situation was to kind of remove yourself in some way 
from it ... And, it has a big cost, which is usually that some piece o f your 
experience gets bracketed off, or encapsulated.
Kegan suggested that while the rest o f the self develops and becomes more 
complex, the bracketed self is left at that historical and developmental time, and that way 
o f meaning is preserved until one is psychologically strong enough to reintegrate parts 
that were left behind. The unintegrated aspect and its hopeful eventual reintegration is 
not itself a fallback, rather the encountering o f some person or some thing that resembles 
that unresolved aspect of development may cause the fallback.
Trauma as a trigger for fallback has links to various other theorists, as well. 
Torbert said,
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I sort of take an Erik Erikson perspective on this, in that he talks about the fact 
that people don’t complete a certain action logic or stage of life -  he didn’t use the 
words “action logic,” obviously -  that they experienced trauma during that 
particular stage, and they don’t resolve it fully.. .They become capable o f later 
stages, but they’re susceptible if  situations resemble the trauma situation... to 
falling back to the earlier stage, I think...
Berger referencing Kegan and Lahey’s big assumption exercise, noted that these
developmental potholes are often tied to assumptions bom in a younger self that later
become tethers for fallback to one’s smaller self.
While the various key thinkers gave these five overarching causes of fallback
different names and assigned them to assorted categories, there was significant evidence
across key thinkers that these are the primary catalysts for fallback. However,
developmental transition as a catalyst for fallback, a cause that I offered to the key
thinkers for consideration, was nearly universally rejected.
Not developmental transition. Torbert originated the idea o f developmental
transition as an overarching cause of fallback. He explained that the very nature of
transition involves a falling back to what’s known in the process of developing to the
newly aspiring (and still largely unknown and not-yet-mastered) meaning-making
structure. He noted,
[In] any movement from one action logic to the next in the leap forward, there’s a 
period when one is ambivalent between the two meaning-making systems, and 
one is simply returning to one’s settled center-of-gravity, and then moving 
forward to the newly aspiring center-of-gravity. So, certainly in the move 
between action logics, one can see it’s inevitable there.
However, Kegan, McCallum, and Berger agreed that developmental transition,
while marked by experiences of fallback should not be included as an overarching cause
of fallback. They argued that fallback in developmental transition is just a natural
element of development that is already accounted for in the theory. Berger noted that the
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see-saw motion during developmental transition is a normal piece of growing. One has
not yet fully transcended the next stage of development. Therefore, she offered, perhaps
it’s only fallback when one is all the way forward, secure or embedded in a
developmental stage.
Yet, both McCallum and Palus pointed out that if  being more explicit about the
likelihood o f fallback during developmental transition might help people understand what
is happening, accept it, lean into it, and have hope, therefore yielding a better outcome,
perhaps there is merit. Palus explained,
Maybe if you equip people better to accept these transitional periods as legitimate, 
and kind of lean into them a little bit, as it were, or expect them, or plan for them, 
or take two aspirins and go to bed early, that sort o f thing, then maybe people 
would do better.
This list of catalysts for fallback is in no way exhaustive, and as Berger pointed 
out, the causes of fallback are as varied as the individuals experiencing them. Yet, there 
is value in naming them. Further, there is great value in being reminded of them, whether 
for the first time or the ninety-first.
The catalysts for and the experience o f fallback were regularly addressed 
throughout my data collection. Yet, every time I heard these catalysts described or read 
about them, I knew that this was important, even for me, someone who is immersed in 
this work, in this data, in this environment through my academic institution, and the 
communities that remind me o f the importance o f balance in my non-academic, non­
professional life. Naming the catalysts, remembering the catalysts, provides a powerful 
reminder that complacency is at the door. The value of understanding fallback is in its 
capacity to remind us that we need to be diligent to our own development, to minding the 
way we show up in the world, and measuring it (without shame or judgment but with a
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commitment to reflection) against the way we like to tell ourselves and others that we do. 
And, a critical component o f recognizing fallback is recognizing the circumstances which 
prompt it in us, which identifying the overarching causes o f fallback helps us to do. In 
my final claim, I address the importance of understanding fallback in developmental 
theory.
Claim six. Having a theory for understanding fallback acknowledges the full
lived experience of what it is to be human, exposes the myth o f consistency and onward-
and-upward development both in self and in developmental theory, and provides the basis
for reconceptualizing fallback as a paradoxically positive aspect of human development,
which has broader implications for the exercise of leadership.
In our final interview, Cook-Greuter and I spoke about the challenge to creating
absolute theory in social sciences, particularly that which involves the complexity of
human life. She said,
That’s exactly the idea o f a MAP [Maturity Assessment Profile], is an abstraction, 
and the useful guiding thing. But, it’s always a generalization. It never can do 
justice to the actual complexity of human life. It just can’t. The periodic table -  
that works. Some of the natural sciences, some of the things work. Nobody has 
yet challenged the periodic table. But, in human affairs, there’s only 
approximations -  better ones or lesser ones.
The factual basis of our existing theories of human development was regularly a 
topic in my interviews with Palus. He often cautioned against proclamations and 
judgments about fallback, claiming that we just don’t know, we don’t have enough data, 
that the facts aren’t all available. Yet, he later noted that the truth, the facts, can lead us 
down a destructive path, when he recounted the story of the woman who studied 
evolution, and later claimed this factual knowledge destroyed her faith. He identified 
wisdom communities and aligning oneself with the growth aspect o f their narratives as
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supporting growth from fallback. He cautioned that society is in danger o f killing these 
narratives.
Palus suggested that perhaps the stories we live into lead to more constructive 
development when they are not necessarily completely factual, but they are positive. 
Through this alternative approach, the truth, the validity of a theory, came up in a 
different way, a way that privileged not having all the facts, because the facts can 
sometimes be destructive.
Still -  five years following the publishing of McCallum’s evidence that all 
eighteen of his participants whose developmental scores fell all along the developmental 
spectrum experienced fallback; two years after my own exploration of the lived 
experience of fallback in three post-conventional-measured individuals; and four months 
after my theoretical exploration of fallback with six key thinkers in the fields o f human 
and leadership development -  we do not have all the facts to fully understand fallback.
Yet an understanding of fallback continues to be, and is perhaps becoming exponentially 
more important in both the contexts of human development and leadership.
Understanding fallback is important, because it exposes the myth o f forward 
movement in developmental theory, and makes the theory more whole. Berger explained, 
“You’re making developmental theory more textured, more nuanced, more whole, by 
describing this piece of the theory that people have mostly ignored. Because, 
developmental theory is so forward-looking, and it’s necessary to also be looking back.” 
McCallum noted that understanding fallback reveals the “blind spots” in the field and 
paints a more realistic picture of development that acknowledges our shadows. Palus
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suggested that understanding fallback challenges us in the fields of human and leadership
development to think beyond the Expert norm we currently fall prey to.
It is important to understand fallback, because naming it acknowledges the
phenomenon, allows individuals to recognize and recover from it, and reveals the lessons
that may be learned from fallback, thereby making it less painful in the long run. Palus
suggested that a theory is useful if people can understand it. Even if not perfect, it helps
to frame, to have assumptions and a common language.
Torbert noted the importance of having both a theory o f development and a theory
for understanding fallback, because the theory helps one relearn how to pay attention and
recognize fallback, use this recognition to reframe one’s experience, and recover, given
that fallback puts the possibility of recovery right in front o f you. McCallum also pointed
to an understanding of fallback offering the opportunity to reflect without shame or
judgment, recover, and grow.
It is important to understand fallback, because it fosters compassion for one’s self
and others, and offers a long-term perspective on the whole process o f development.
Palus claimed that understanding the process o f development and fallback as a real
component of it, allows one to have empathy and hope. The value o f understanding
fallback in the process of human development is significant. Berger offered, “That idea
that when you lose yourself, you are going to find yourself, again. When you’re in your
small self, big Self is not gone. It's just not with you right at that moment.” She
recounted what she tells her son in his moments o f fallback,
I want you to know, everybody feels this way. This way that you are feeling, it's 
a momentary feeling. I don't know whether it's going to last a little while or a 
long time. But, there is this now, and then there is something else that comes 
after now. This is a moment.
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An understanding of fallback is important to the exercise of leadership for many
of the same reasons it’s important in the context o f human development. Fallback reveals
the myth o f consistency that both individuals and organizations operate under, helping
leaders and organizations identify and acknowledge the gap between their espoused
theory and their theory-in-use. Torbert explained,
It allows you to see discrepancy between what you or your group or your 
organization claims it means to be doing and what it’s actually doing.. .in order to 
become more response-able at more moments of time. To actually see what’s 
going on and work from that insight rather than operating based on a myth about 
what’s happening.
Palus suggested that developmental theory and fallback as an aspect o f it 
encourages a view o f the whole person over time, rather than a moment-to-moment 
judgment. Similarly, Berger pointed out that understanding fallback allows leaders to see 
people as growing and changing, not still. She noted that it allows leaders to explore and 
create contexts and conditions that encourage the presence o f the big Self. Yet, 
understanding fallback, acknowledging it as a reality in human life, also allows space for 
the small self to show up in organizations.
Understanding fallback and its capacity for developmental spring forward is 
important, because it reframes fallback in a positive light, and in organizational contexts, 
reframes failure as opportunities to grow. McCallum identified acceptance o f failure as 
ground for growth, and Palus noted that at the Center for Creative Leadership, optimism 
and resiliency are identified as traits o f leadership. Berger referred to research that has 
shown that organizational cultures with a mindset that growth occurs from failure 
experience greater innovation, creativity, healthy treatment o f conflict, and team success. 
Insomuch as fallback may both be viewed as failure, and failure may serve as a catalyst
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for fallback, framing fallback in a positive light and treating it as an opportunity for 
growth may lead to organizational success.
It is important to understand fallback, because it reveals and provides an 
understanding of the fact that we do not always show up our best, most complex Selves. 
This revelation has significant implications beyond the theory and into practice, on one’s 
self and in our interactions with others. Understanding fallback allows us not to judge 
others based on how they show up in any one moment. It increases empathy not just for 
others, but for self, because it acknowledges that we are not consistent in our meaning- 
making. An understanding of fallback challenges us to be mindful o f making those 
experiences of fallback, learning experiences. It encourages both a long-term view of 
development and a moment-to-moment awareness. The former for forgiveness and hope. 
The latter to remind us that development is a process, is work that must be undertaken 
throughout one’s life. This understanding of fallback allows us to have hope in the work.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REFLECTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of fallback through 
interviews with six key thinkers in the field o f human development and leadership 
development. This research was intended to: construct an understanding of how the 
fallback phenomenon fits in the existing theory o f human development, elucidate the 
phenomenon of fallback and its potential for transforming the developmental growth of 
individuals, develop a clear and universal definition of fallback, and identify the best 
design and focus for future empirical research on the fallback phenomenon.
I employed a qualitative research design using grounded theory methodology to 
explore five research questions:
1. How do we more deeply understand the fallback phenomenon as situated within 
current developmental theory?
2. How do key thinkers in the field of adult development and leader development 
understand the fallback phenomenon within their own theoretical frame?
3. What role may fallback play in developmental growth?
4. How does each key thinker make sense of the stories that post-conventional- 
measured individuals tell about their fallback experiences?
5. How might the fallback phenomenon be researched with participants in the 
future?
Through the evidence generated from an exploration of these research questions 
with the key thinkers, I asserted the following six claims:
1. So much exists in the current developmental theory that accounts for the fallback
258
phenomenon, yet, the aspects o f stage development theory that focus on the bi­
directional nature of human development, movement both forward and back, have 
largely been ignored.
2. What is most important in defining the boundaries o f fallback is not whether one 
expresses a less complex developmental capacity through thoughts, feelings, or 
behaviors, but that this expression is in the absence of all other options to think, 
feel, or behave differently.
3. Fallback, under the right conditions has significant potential for facilitating 
developmental growth, and given the increased likelihood for these conditions to 
be met in post-conventional stages according to the characteristics that distinguish 
them, growth from fallback is more likely to occur at the post-conventional stages 
of development.
4. Fallback is part o f a mutually-defining term, the other component o f which is 
spring forward.
5. There are five overarching causes of fallback. These include: ordinary triggers, 
physiological brain responses, contextual “gravitational pulls,” challenges to 
identity, and unresolved trauma.
6. Having a theory for understanding fallback acknowledges the full lived 
experience of what it is to be human, exposes the myth of consistency and onward 
and upward development both in self and in developmental theory, and provides 
the basis for reconceptualizing fallback as a paradoxically positive aspect o f 




The utility o f this research can be demonstrated through two primary arguments. 
First, this research addresses aspects o f the theory o f  human development— specifically, 
the assumption that development is always forward-moving. Even one discontinuing 
case is sufficient to demonstrate that this theory, as it currently exists, is inadequate. In 
the pilot study, I found three. In McCallum’s research, he found eighteen. And, in this 
theoretical study on fallback in human development, all six o f the key thinkers confirmed 
that development is more fluid and bi-directional than the theory suggests. Therefore, 
developing an understanding of exactly how the phenomenon of fallback fits within 
developmental theory is important.
Second, since the phenomenon of fallback in stage development theory has not 
been studied extensively, the findings from the pilot study combined with the findings 
from this theoretical exploration with six key thinkers provides a detailed and invaluable 
launching point to inform future studies.
The purpose of this research at its conceptualization was to develop a theory o f 
fallback. As the research season draws to a close, I realize how far away I’ve gotten from 
my original bold intent to come away from this dissertation with a theory of fallback. In 
fact, as has marked so much o f my prior research in this area, I have many more 
questions than answers.
For four-and-a-half years, I dedicated the majority o f my academic explorations 
and intellectual musings to stage development theory. It has only been in the last seven 
months that I’ve begun to see how the theory as it exists, could already account for a full 
range of possibilities in any moment, and include the phenomenon of fallback.
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Specifically, in Palus’s exploration of the metaphors around development and center-of- 
gravity, but also in hearing Berger’s, then Cook-Greuter’s, then when revisiting Tobert’s 
interpretation o f the range of development, I see the theory in a whole different way. Yet, 
the theory hasn’t changed.
Even if the phenomenon of unconsciously employing a less complex meaning- 
making system than that which one is capable -  what I refer to as fallback -  is already 
implied in the existing theory, it absolutely was not clear to me. Therefore, my 
contribution may not be a theory o f fallback, may not even be a theory for understanding 
fallback. However, what I hope it will provide is a different way of looking at stage 
development theory, a different lens that brings the perhaps-already-accounted-for 
concept o f fallback out o f the shadows, so that it can be seen as real, as present.
Further, my goal in illuminating fallback is not to see it so it can be rejected, but 
to see it, so it can be embraced. This, too, is me. And, giving attention to this, naming 
this, may help me and others expand our range of options not only for how we make 
meaning, or show up, or exist in relationship with others, but for how we enter into 
relationship with self.. .more authentically.. .more whole.
In the following pages, I reveal my own process o f loss and discovery as I poked 
at the edges of a theory in hopes o f making it more perfect, and ended up with something 
more messy and perhaps more imprecise, yet all the more hopeful and beautiful than 
when I started. I explore the key thinkers’ and my own evolution of understanding about 
fallback in human development; examining from whence we came, where the theory 
stands at present, and what lies ahead for theory, research, and practice. I discuss not 
only the limits o f the theory, but also the limits o f this research. Finally, I conclude this
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chapter by reflecting on the parallels between my exploration of fallback and my own 
process of discovery.
Background
In 2008 I was introduced to the field o f human development and within that, 
constructive-development and stage development theories. These theories made sense to 
me as I reflected on the journey through my life. I could see my evolution along the 
developmental path, and it was tremendously helpful to have language and a theory as I 
reflected on my own life, assessed where I was at present, and created a vision for myself 
in the future.
Yet, where the theory broke down, in my eyes, was in its claims that development 
is unidirectional, always forward, greater, more evolved. In my own life, I knew that this 
had not been the case. I could identify many times in the course of a day during which I 
felt, hard as I may try, that I could not access the highest level of sense-making that I was 
capable. And, there were extended periods in my own history when I felt my 
developmental capacity was utterly wiped out, and I truly feared it would never come 
back.
Nearly five years ago, I began my exploration to figure out if  I was an anomaly in 
a proven theory of stage development, or if  my experience was one that was shared by 
others. It became clear very quickly that I was not a statistical outlier in this theory. In 
fact, my experience of developmental peaks and valleys seemed to be the norm. So, why 
did the theories o f stage development and constructive-development, theories of 
increasing complexity, not represent the reality of the complexity of human life? This is 
the question I set out to answer.
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Evolution of Understanding Fallback in Constructive-Development Theory
Challenges to understanding fallback within constructive-development 
theory. The phenomenon of fallback in constructive-development and stage 
development theories is noticeably absent. During the course o f this research, it became 
clear that the theoretical omission of the phenomenological reality o f fallback might be 
attributed to challenges which include: the negative framing o f fallback in the midst o f a 
predominantly positivist field, the difficulty in crafting a definition given the myriad 
ways in which the phenomenon can be made sense of, and the challenges to assigning 
criteria to a phenomenon that has been very little studied.
Negative framing offallback in the positivist fie ld  o f  constructive-development. 
Aside from McCallum, who has done extensive thinking about the fallback phenomenon 
through his own research, the key thinkers noted that they had never thought about the 
various aspects of the theory or the experience of fallback, at least not in the way I was 
asking them to think about it. How could this be?
All o f the key thinkers except Kegan explicitly noted that the constructive- 
development field is overly focused on onward-and-upward and the positive aspects of 
development. And, fallback, has heretofore largely been framed as negative. Cook- 
Greuter hesitated to name the phenomenon fallback, variously referring to examples of 
individuals operating from an earlier stage than one is capable as “drag back,” “trigger 
back,” and the “hurdles of development.” Palus’s hesitation to name fallback as such and 
to make it a theory originated from his concern that doing so would imply a rejection of 
an earlier part of self that exists no matter what one’s measured developmental stage.
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The negative connotations of fallback in the positively-oriented constructivist
field have limited discussion, theorizing, and research on this phenomenon of fallback
which is so obviously a component of human development. Therefore, the exploration
that I undertook with the key thinkers was one of largely uncharted territory. I
challenged the key thinkers to ponder this critical area of study that they had not thought
extensively about before. I told Tobert during an interview,
I do know that I’m -  that’s kind o f what’s wonderful for me -  that I’m not asking 
you questions that you just, you’ve thought about it, you’ve written about it, 
you've studied it. It is nice to have you thinking through this, often for the first 
time. And, I know it’s not easy.
Indeed, it was not easy, yet it was incredibly valuable having the opportunity to plumb
the existing theory and the phenomenon of fallback with these individuals; the originators
of the theory and those who explore human development both in research and practice.
Divergence o f  understanding and lack o f  data. This exploration provided space
to probe the metaphors of developmental theory and fallback (e.g., center-of-gravity,
onions and onion holes, gravitational pull, orders of consciousness), thereby making them
real. Examining the fallback phenomenon through each key thinker’s theoretical frame
revealed both areas of convergence and differences o f thought around both the existing
theory and the phenomenon of fallback. For example, Cook-Greuter’s, Palus’s, and
Torbert’s definition of fallback required action. Yet, meaning-making from a less
complex stage o f development than one is capable was the determinant in Berger’s and
Kegan’s definitions. McCallum’s definition fell somewhere in the middle. Interestingly,
loss -  o f capacity, of other options, o f complexity -  was a thread that ran through each
key thinker’s exploration of fallback. Cook-Greuter and Kegan considered the role o f the
distance between one’s most complex level of development and the level to which one
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has fallen. Palus, Berger, and Cook-Greuter contemplated the amount o f time in fallback 
as a potential criteria for it being assessed as such.
Frequently throughout the season o f data collection, the key thinkers would ask 
themselves, would ask me, would ask the cosmos questions about the boundaries of 
fallback. Berger asked: What’s the time boundary around losing capacities and 
recovering them? Or is there one? Is it only fallback if you use this loss as a vantage 
point for growth? Is it permanent regression if you never regain capacities? Cook- 
Greuter and Palus also pointed to the amount of time in fallback as an important criteria. 
Cook-Greuter further emphasized the importance o f understanding how the distance 
between one’s center-of-gravity developmental level and that to which one falls may 
dictate the scope of fallback.
So often, these questions and ponderings begged the ultimate categorization 
question which came up time and again in this study: is fallback in the eye o f the 
experiencer or the observer? Palus wondered: Is it enough that an individual subjectively 
self-identifies their phenomenological experience as fallback? Because, one’s 
phenomenological experience may feel like fallback, but it may be temporary 
disequilibrium. So, does it need to be externally diagnosed? The examination of the 
fallback phenomenon through the eyes o f each key thinker revealed the importance of 
understanding how fallback is experienced across the developmental lifespan, and if the 
classification of fallback is based on one’s subjective experience or a diagnosis by others.
Even though my personal theory o f development mandated that fallback must be a 
component, I, too, came to this research not understanding exactly how and where it fit.
In reflection, mine was such a rigid, Expert approach to developmental theory coming in:
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we have this center-of-gravity action logic, and this is who we are most o f the time. And, 
when it’s not us, we’re falling back. Even though I had been studying stage development 
theory for years, I hadn’t allowed myself to think beyond, “We are this stage. This is 
how things work. And, these are the steps that you take.”
Over time through this research process, I began to see where that’s not the case, 
that we’re not one thing most o f the time. It’s what w e’d like to be. Especially from an 
ego perspective, “Yes, I want to be that best Self.” But, it’s realistically probably not 
who we are. Berger talked about the layers o f the onion to describe the full range of 
development to which individuals have access. Palus really dug into the center-of- 
gravity metaphor and claimed that it’s much more messy than this idealized version of 
development that has heretofore been perpetuated by those theorizing, researching, and 
practicing in the field. Getting my head around the shortcomings of the theory, letting go 
of some of the perfection of what I thought stage development theory is, was challenging 
for me. Yet, that’s not life. Life is complicated, and so is development.
This exploration o f what we know about constructive-development and fallback 
revealed the many things we do not know. Even within their own theoretical descriptions, 
there were some contradictions and some evolutions o f understanding by the key thinkers. 
Clearly, this is true of mine, as well. However, this research revealed that an 
understanding o f fallback existed in the current stage development, all along. We just 
needed to find our way to it.
Our current sense-making of fallback in constructive-development theory. 
What this exploration revealed is that so much exists in current developmental theory that 
accounts for the fallback phenomenon: in the full range of development one has access to
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(versus one point on a line of development), in the characteristics of each stage, the 
capacity one has to notice and their response to this noticing, one’s desire to continue to 
grow, and the increasing tools one has to create an environment that fosters growth. 
However, these are not the aspects o f development that are highlighted.
Eventually over the course o f data collection, if  not from the outset, fallback as a 
paradoxically positive aspect of development became clear to all of the key thinkers. 
Exploring the fallback phenomenon through a positive frame allowed the key thinkers to 
poke holes in the assumptions of constructive-development. This research brought to 
light the complexity of both the ways in which humans develop and the phenomenon of 
fallback.
The discourse among the key thinkers may have been slightly different in the way 
in which they framed the fallback phenomenon or the specific recommendations for its 
scope. Yet, the key thinkers’ underlying conceptual framing revealed that: fallback does 
exist, and it can be accounted for in the existing developmental theory; it has the potential 
to play a significant role in development, particularly with those at the post-conventional 
stages; and while it may seem to be developmental decline in the moment, fallback 
involves developmentally springing forward.
To be sure, there was not consensus by the key thinkers on either the criteria or 
the scope o f a definition of fallback, yet it seemed as the interview season progressed, 
they were ever more hopeful that I would come up with one. That had been my hope, as 
well. However, the key thinkers and I individually and collectively underwent an 
evolution in our conceptualization of fallback, an evolution that is still taking place. 
Ultimately, the exploration of the phenomenon with each key thinker demonstrated the
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challenges in naming and exploring fallback heretofore, and the challenges we need to 
address in order to name and explore fallback in the future.
What we need in order to move beyond our current understanding.
According to the evidence in this study, fallback is a phenomenon that involves 
temporary developmental decline, which ultimately leads to recovery, and in some cases 
developmental growth. Understood as such, fallback encourages looking at the whole 
person over time, rather than in the moment-to-moment possibilities o f developmental 
inconsistency. It can now be embraced in the field, discussed, explored, played with.
Assumptions made by those in the field of constructive-development have 
encouraged the negative framing of fallback, thereby making it a neglected area of 
research and discussion. Through this exploration o f the fallback phenomenon in current 
stage development theory, the value of understanding fallback is clear. Even in the 
absence of a concrete definition of fallback in which all criteria are solidified, we now 
have a way of understanding the phenomenon that has not existed in the past.
Why is there not the theory and definition o f fallback that I promised at the outset 
o f this study? The answer is that we just don’t know enough. The phenomenon of 
fallback needs to be further studied, and a definition and a theory of fallback should come 
from this future empirical research, once we have it.
Implications and recommendations fo r  theory. The exploration o f fallback with 
the key thinkers played at what Palus described as “the ragged edges” o f the theory, 
adding complexity and generating even more questions. While I believe that the positive, 
humanist approach to stage development is valuable, I argue it’s equally vital that the 
theory acknowledges the lived experience o f development even when it’s not forward-
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moving. I offer several recommendations for key thinkers, scholars, and researchers as 
we continue to shepherd the evolution o f stage development and constructive- 
development theories. These include: play at the edges of what is known and studied in 
the fields o f stage and constructive-development; paint the full picture in descriptions o f 
developmental capacity, not just the ideal; and explicitly acknowledge the lived 
experience o f fallback in human development.
I challenge the key thinkers in this study, and all o f us interested in developmental 
theory to engage in discussions about what exists at “the ragged edges” o f stage 
development theory, and to move beyond “the Expert-level discourse,” which Palus 
claimed marked the field and the theory. I encourage us in the field o f human 
development to engage in discussions about what is not known, not just with those with 
whom we agree, but with those who challenge us to think differently. My 
recommendation here is that we treat development o f the theory as we would 
development of self, which is to surround ourselves with those who would both challenge 
and support us. And, be open to being transformed.
I recommend that future descriptions o f stage development theory emphasize that 
development is not about one’s measured center-of-gravity. As is clear from this study, 
one’s center-of-gravity score paints just one aspect o f one’s developmental picture. 
Theoretical descriptions should make clear that there is a full range of developmental 
options, and acknowledge that one’s center-of-gravity, while an important piece of 
information, does not begin to describe the full complexity o f one’s development.
Those in the field of human development need to acknowledge the lived 
experience o f fallback in constructive-development theory by explicitly addressing the
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phenomenon in future publications and presentations and encouraging the next generation 
o f theorists to do so, as well. I encourage the open exploration of the role that fallback 
may play in one’s constructive development, and the conditions that encourage this to 
happen. While these findings indicate that fallback has the capacity to play a 
paradoxically positive role in developmental growth, I encourage the field to embrace all 
aspects o f development, even those that look scary or like decline in the moment, 
realizing that the role they play in the long term is one that is integral to growth.
Implications and recommendations fo r  research. Empirical research on 
constructive-development and stage development theories has been limited and largely 
theoretical in nature. The same ground has been traversed over and over again, as we 
study the participants that are available, and ask the questions we know we can answer, 
rather than pursue the “truths” that lay beyond our grasp. Adult development theory has 
explored the data that pervades its surroundings: the conventional stages of development 
at which 95% of the population resides; Western society and culture, and more 
specifically those who are privileged, educated, resource-rich, and homogenous within it; 
and the aspects o f the theory that we know how to measure. Yet, this leaves a whole 
swath of developmental levels, populations, questions, and phenomena unaddressed in 
the research. Fallback in human development is one of these.
One of the primary reasons I did not conduct an empirical exploration of the lived 
experience of fallback with participants rather than a theoretical study for my own 
dissertation rather than a theoretical study is that I wasn’t sure how to do so. Having the 
opportunity to explore what future research may look like with both researchers and 
practitioners was invaluable. While the key thinkers identified challenges to researching
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fallback in the future, explicitly probing the possibilities removed some o f the roadblocks 
to studying the phenomenon.
Challenges do exist, yet the opportunities are numerous. Particularly now that 
fallback can be understood and framed as a phenomenon that has the potential to play a 
role in developmental growth, perhaps researchers in the field will be more inclined to 
study it. Researching the phenomenon with each key thinker also allowed the possibility 
for other explanations for fallback to emerge and to be researched in the future. The key 
thinkers drew multiple roadmaps that will allow us to more fully, precisely, and with 
greater data “fence the field” (as Berger would say) o f fallback in human development 
and redraw the boundaries of the existing theories where needed.
As Berger noted, our understanding o f fallback is so limited, research o f any kind 
would be valuable. Determining what would be research-worthy on this topic is like 
“shooting at a bam.” No matter what your specific target, you really can’t miss. 
Nevertheless, having some specific targets to aim for may help.
The boundaries o f our knowledge have been dictated by the limits of our 
instruments. The existing developmental measures, while providing an important piece 
of information, offer only one piece. Future research should focus on the development of 
additional and the refinement o f existing instruments that will allow us to identify 
fallback and examine an individual’s sense-making at a given time. Given the resource- 
heavy (i.e., time, money, expertise in administering and scoring) nature o f existing 
instruments, the development o f instruments that are easier and less expensive to both 
administer and assess would be tremendously valuable, particularly in extending the 
scope of the theory beyond research, into practice.
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What we have now is a theoretical supposition that fallback requires spring 
forward, and that the propensity for the noticing, recovery, and the possibility o f growth 
that is necessary for fallback is most likely to be possible at the post-conventional stages, 
thereby making fallback more o f a post-conventional phenomenon. However, we next 
need to test out this hypothesis and explore the experience o f fallback across both the 
developmental (conventional to post-conventional) and temporal (young to old) lifespan. 
In so doing, our assumptions based on what we know about the characteristics o f each 
stage and about the scope and boundaries o f fallback can also be tested, leading to a more 
precise definition and theory of fallback.
The stories told by the pilot study participants about their own experiences of 
fallback uncovered the many ways that fallback shows up in our lives, and exposed the 
numerous possible theoretical interpretations o f the phenomenon. This has implications 
for the way we research fallback in the future, the questions we ask, and the importance 
of our ability to further probe the experience o f participants over time. We need to 
explore the phenomenon of fallback not only through post-event reflection (which 
thereby limits the population with which we study fallback, to those further along the 
developmental spectrum), but in the midst o f  developmentally rich and fallback-inducing 
conditions. Given the importance o f one’s in-the-moment and after-the-fact sense- 
making about fallback, conducting research that examines participants’ experiences over 
time and possibly with the administration o f pre- and post- assessments o f developmental 
capacity would be valuable to understanding the experience o f fallback and its capacity to 
lead to developmental growth. Uncovering a data-based understanding of what causes 
fallback in individuals, and the conditions under which one may recover and ultimately
272
grow is integral to our ongoing discovery of what prompts developmental movement to 
and through the post-conventional stages.
Extending our burgeoning understanding o f fallback beyond individuals, to 
groups, organizations, societies and cultures is pivotal to understanding the implications 
of human development to leadership development; specifically the relationship between 
developmental capacity, fallback, and the exercise o f leadership in self and the 
development o f the capacity for the exercise of leadership in others. This may include an 
explicit exploration o f the significance and validity o f  constructive-development theory 
and an understanding of fallback in cultures and populations that have not heretofore 
been studied. It seems apparent that constructive-development theory, stage development 
theory, and an understanding o f fallback are valuable frameworks in the population in 
which they have been studied. Yet, the limits o f the theory are largely unknown, because 
the field itself has been hesitant to push against them.
As future research explores the hypotheses about fallback related to our own 
constructive-development and stage development theories, it will also be important to 
examine the phenomenon of fallback through other lenses and alternative hypotheses. 
These include the physiological influence o f the brain on the structure and function o f the 
mind; the influence of context or domains on the capacity one has in given environments; 
the effect of unresolved trauma or unintegrated aspects of self on one’s development; the 
limits o f consciousness in one’s experience of life; and the role of archetypes in providing 
the narratives that both lead to fallback and one’s recovery from it. Perhaps an 
exploration of these may reveal the physiological, psychological, and behavioral 
explanations for why certain circumstances -  particularly those involving family, illness,
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injury, threat, and fear, (even if it is the 21st century version of these) -  nearly inevitably 
catalyze fallback. Cross-disciplinary inquiry into the phenomenon o f fallback would be a 
fascinating area of future research.
As with any good theory, the scope of fallback will likely never be fixed and 
precise. As Cook-Greuter reminded me, no theory can ever account for the full 
complexity of human life. This research was merely an initial expedition to begin to 
chart the territory. It is my great hope that there will be many more explorations that 
follow.
Implications and recommendations fo r  practice. Where the rubber meets the 
road for me has always been at the intersection o f theory, research, and practice. What is 
the lived experience o f individuals struggling to face the realities of daily life, both 
challenges and opportunities? If  the world in which we live is pleading for a higher level 
of consciousness, of sense-making, o f ability to successfully navigate its increasing 
complexity, how do we get there? Theory and research are only as valuable as the tools 
they provide to those who attempt to put their truths into practice in real life, day after 
day. So, how does our understanding o f human development and the movement in both 
directions along the continuum, influence how we show up in the world and in the 
environment we foster for others to do so, as well? If mutual, connected, enlightened 
leadership is desired, how do we get there? Specifically, what is the role that a more 
nuanced, complex, mutual, and connected understanding o f human development, 
constructive-development and stage development theories within it, and the phenomenon 
of fallback may play in our quest to understand, to test, and to practice?
274
Heretofore, stage development theory has not accounted for the inevitability of 
fallback in spite o f the lived experience o f many that would seem to prove its existence. 
Berger noted that the number one question she is asked when she presents to groups of 
people on the topic o f human development is related to what happens when development 
is not forward-moving; when one is unable for a time to show up with the full capacities 
that one would otherwise have. No matter how we construct it—as theory or not—it’s 
imperative that we acknowledge that we do go to this less complex place in our meaning- 
making. Instead of rejecting it, we need to accept it as reality, and explore how to make 
it useful and productive. Given that the value of a theory is its usefulness, the 
understanding of fallback that resulted from this research greatly enhances the practical 
utility o f stage development theory.
The implications o f this research for practice are many. The understanding of 
fallback generated through this research provides a narrative that frames fallback as a 
potentially positive experience, rather than condemning it as a negative one; an 
understanding that approaches the phenomenon with curiosity rather than shame; that 
offers an opportunity to grow rather than decline. Naming it, making sense o f it, showing 
that it does involve a temporary decline in one’s developmental complexity that has 
potential to lead to something better, makes fallback something that can be utilized more 
effectively and makes it less frightening. Positively framing fallback allows one to 
embrace the small self thereby increasing the likelihood of recognizing it, recovering, and 
growing.
Contexts and their gravitational pull were shown to be potent catalysts for 
fallback in individuals. Interestingly, context was also identified as a significant factor in
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one’s recovery and growth from fallback. This knowledge is powerful not only in the 
shepherding o f one’s own development, but the fostering of development in others, in 
groups, and in organizations, in that it emphasizes the importance of context to 
developmental capacity. The narratives that pervade our environment have significant 
implications for how we understand our capacity to show up in the world in the best 
conditions, and how we deal with our inevitable encounters with the worst. The role o f 
narrative also informs the attention we need to give to the stories we tell ourselves and 
those we tell others. An understanding o f the importance o f narrative in our experience 
of fallback is a pivotal aspect o f its outcome, positive or negative.
The understandings generated through this research may inform the design of 
environments: 1) that provide tools and feedback to individuals that may result in quicker 
awareness o f fallback, thereby leading to recovery and development; and 2) that both 
value the whole person thereby allowing space for the small self to show up, and also 
create the circumstances for the biggest Self to come forth. Creating contexts that 
understand the full complexity of humans and create the conditions under which the 
highest level of development may be fostered is pivotal to the development o f humans, 
the exercise of leadership, and the cultivation o f a more civilized and generative society.
Berger encouraged talking about fallback in teams, identifying the circumstances 
that bring forth the small self, and explicitly creating an environment that encourages the 
presence o f the big Self. Safe environments need to be created in which individuals do 
not fear exposing their vulnerabilities, and have a mutually-oriented motivation to remain 
present in the face o f adversity and through developmental missteps knowing that there is 
great value in doing so.
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The positive framing o f fallback in individuals has interesting parallels to the 
positive framing of failure in organizations. Individuals who view fallback as an 
opportunity to notice, learn, and grow seem to navigate the travails o f development more 
successfully. Similarly, Berger noted that research has shown that organizations that 
view failure as an opportunity for assessment, learning, and growth are more successful. 
In fact, Palus made an explicit connection, noting that optimism is a characteristic of 
leadership. It’s clear that development is work, but the understanding o f fallback 
generated through this research offers one the opportunity to find hope in the work.
“You don’t blame the little seed that doesn't grow for being one that didn’t,” said 
Cook-Greuter. I think this is a profound statement o f not only the responsibility 
individuals and leaders o f families, organizations, societies, and cultures have to provide 
the conditions for one to bring their best Self, but also the reality that one will not, in fact, 
can not always do so. An understanding of the inevitability o f  fallback encourages 
looking at a person over time, rather than judging them for how they show up from 
moment-to-moment.
This study revealed not only the inevitability of fallback in human development, 
but also the potential role it plays in developmental growth adding both nuance and 
complexity to the theory o f stage development. I argue that human development cannot 
be divorced from leadership development, therefore an understanding of fallback and its 
role in development is crucial to creating an environment in which both the development 
of the person and o f the person’s capacity to exercise leadership can flourish, and is 
integral to preparing leaders who are able to address the increasing complexities of 
present and future communities of practice.
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In the course of the interviews, and particularly in my conversations with Palus, I 
came to see that any theory, even when not completely grounded in empirical fact is 
valuable if it is useful. Yet, while my own assumption all along included a positive, 
growth-oriented outcome from fallback, I was confronted in this study by another 
possibility, and another limitation to the theory of constructive-development; the theory 
that I had to this point so enthusiastically embraced.
A caveat: Limitations to constructive-development theory in practice. In this 
section, I relate my own disorienting dilemma around the usefulness o f not only stage 
development theory, but also an understanding of fallback. This experience is recounted 
in the following excerpts from my post-interview analytic memos, the first o f which was 
written following an interview with Palus:
It was in this interview that /  became very aware o f  the privileged approach to 
this theory. People who grow from  fallback have the resources to support growth from  
fallback. Going back to the idea, is it true? Has it been proven? I  think the answer may 
be yes, in the population that w e’ve studied...an educated, well-bred set with the 
resources to opt into subsidized experiments such as group relations conferences or 
Shamanistic ceremonies, experiments that support growth. We have a theory that is true 
based on the experiences o f  a privileged population. Can fallback lead to developmental 
growth? Yes, in those who have the resources to support it. But, what the fie ld  has 
perhaps not studied is the population that does not have access to these resources, and 
fo r  whom fallback may ju s t lead to more fallback.
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The weight of this discovery, that perhaps the theory I had so fully embraced was 
only valuable for a privileged few, burdened my mind and my heart. I posed this 
possibility to McCallum. The below excerpt was written following our conversation:
Our fina l moments were devoted to a discussion about the way that human 
development and fallback play out in other cultures, in impoverished environments, in 
settings where and with participants who, frankly, development has not been studied, to 
date. So, is this theory, are these instruments, useful to the Jesuits that McCallum is 
consulting to in Madagascar and Africa? What about the homeless that live in any city in 
the United States? This discussion took me back to my early musings about the role 
M aslow’s Hierarchy o f Needs may play in understanding development and when it is not 
forward-moving -  when in fact, it plummets down to the bottom o f the pyramid.
I  think this is such a ripe area fo r  future study. Study it in our own country in 
populations who are not the white, privileged, well-educated participants o f  human 
developmental (or at least stage developmental) studies heretofore. Explore how the 
societal/cultural developmental level in other countries affects the narratives that 
individuals construct and pass along. Where might this theory be o f  most use? And, i f  
i t ’s not valuable fo r  those outside o f  the circles that we researchers travel in, what might 
be?
It’s clear from these excerpts that constructive-development and stage 
development theories, and my own burgeoning understanding of fallback slipped off the 
pedestal more than once in this process. These theories that had been so influential in my 
own life and development may potentially be nothing more than, as Palus noted, “a 
Western fancy.” Was all of this theoretical exploration for naught? Does it not even
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matter if it doesn't matter for the global population? Perhaps the reader can see a fallback 
in my own thinking here. Eventually I came back around to an appreciation for what the 
theories can offer, if not everyone, at least many. Are these understandings useful for the 
population that has been studied? Yes. And, now we just need to explore this question 
beyond the usual research suspects.
Limitations of the Study
As noted, this research explored how six key thinkers in the field o f adult 
development and leadership theory and practice conceptualize the phenomenon of 
fallback in human development. There are several researchers and practitioners doing 
work in the field o f adult and leadership development, each with nuanced approaches to 
the research and their understanding of it. While the research I conducted does not 
include a full representation o f all thought in the field, I attempted to include a 
representative sample of the primary thought leaders in constructive-development and 
stage development theories and their respective theoretical lenses in this study in an effort 
to clarify, expose, and reconcile the various explanations and interpretations o f the 
fallback phenomenon. Further, while the number o f key thinkers included in this 
research was small, it was also significant in the context o f the field, which is still quite 
young and rather intimate in its scope.
Another limitation of this research is its lack of generalizability in the traditional 
scientific sense. However, the goal of this study was not to provide generalizability, nor 
was it intended to reach consensus. Rather the goal of the research was to generate a 
well-informed theory of fallback that exposes the complexity of human development. 
While the end result is not a theory or even a definition o f fallback, it is a theory for
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understanding fallback in both the context o f the theoretical framework o f human 
development and the lived experience of it.
The final potential limitation o f this research is my own subjectivity. I have an 
inherent bias based on my personal experience of and interest in the fallback 
phenomenon. Without a doubt, this bias affected the key thinkers I selected, the 
questions I asked, and the sense I made of the data. Yet, my attentiveness to my role in 
the research, and my adherence to making the inevitability o f my own subjectivity 
explicit, not only made me more aware, but yielded even richer and more revealing data. 
Conclusion
As I neared the end of this research and writing, I reviewed the analytic memos 
that in many ways served not only as a researcher’s journal but also as a diary of my own 
personal journey, my own self in process throughout the course of this research. I close 
with an excerpt o f these reflections.
At the end o f  our fina l interview, Berger pointed to the irony o f  my impetus fo r  
conducting research on this topic, and the reality o f  the resulting outcome. She remarked 
that I  set out to add neatness and perfection to developmental theory through my 
research, but I  ended up unraveling the edges and making it more messy, more imperfect.
She was right. I  wanted the theory to be perfect. I  was attracted to stage 
development theory, because I  thought, ‘‘I t ’s clean, and i t ’s neat. ” But, at the same time, 
in my research on fallback, I  pushed where the theory is not clean and neat.
That is who I  am in life. I  strive fo r  perfection. I ’ll admit it. Expert is absolutely 
my fallback, my go-to place. And, at the same time, I  push into the shadows and darkness 
o f  my se lf and do fin d  beauty in the imperfection. Fallback, in i t ’s unraveled edges,
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messiness, and imperfection, holds beauty, too. There is something a little disappointing 
about having o n e’s theory dismantled. It's a little sad, bittersweet. Yet, in some ways, 
i t ’s a bit o f  a relief to let go o f  that expectation. It feels like something better is being 
bom.
Torbert shared with me that earlier in his life, his closing salutation on his 
correspondence was, “In the struggle.” He said he thought “Peace” or "Cheers” or 
“Sincerely” ju s t sounded too contrite, too Pollyanna, not fu lly  embracing the struggle 
that marked his life at the time. Since he shared this with me, I ’ve been drawn to “in the 
struggle ’’fo r  the way it does capture the messiness, the complexity o f  life -  and since 
embarking on this research, the messiness and complexity o f  development, and the 
complexity within which this phenomenon o f  fallback is situated.
In this chapter, I guided the reader through my own journey of development as I 
sought to develop an understanding of fallback, and ended up developing an 
understanding o f myself in the process. I now continue along my hopefully never-ending 
path of development.. .in the struggle.
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Brief Overview o f Each of Torbert’s Eight Main Action Logics
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Brief overview o f  each o f  Torbert’s eight main action logics
Action logic (the primary stage 
or level from which one makes 
meaning o f their world)
Main focus (of an individual’s 





1 - Opportunist -  needs rule 
impulses
Own immediate needs, 
opportunities, self-protection
4.3
2 - Diplomat -  norms rule 
needs
Socially expected behavior, 
approval
11.3
3 - Expert -  craft logic rules 
norms
Expertise, procedure and 
efficiency
36.5
4 - Achiever -  system 
effectiveness rules craft logic
Delivery of results, effectiveness, 
goals, success within system
29.7
5 - Individualist -  relativism 
rules single system logic
Self in relationship to system; 
interaction with system
11.3
6 - Strategist - most valuable 
principles rule relativism
Linking theory and principles 
with practice, dynamic systems 
interactions
4.9
7 - Alchemist 
(Magician/Clown)- deep 
processes and intersystemic 
evolution rule principles
Interplay o f awareness, thought, 
action, and effects; transforming 
self and others
2.0
8 -  Ironist -  intersystemic 
development rules process 
(Torbert, 1994)
Generating ambiguity (Torbert & 
Herdman-Barker, 2008); 
transforming others through own 
role transformation (Torbert, 
1994)
?
Note. Adapted from Cook-Greuter, S. R. (2004). Making the case for a developmental 
perspective. [Technical paper]. Industrial and Commercial Training, 36(7), p. 279; 
and Cook-Greuter, S. R., & Soulen, J. (2007). The Developmental Perspective in 





I  will send the summary offindings from  the pilot study to provide a launching point fo r  
the interview. This interview protocol assumes that the key thinkers have read the 
summary.
1. How would you define fallback from your developmental theoretical perspective? 
(Developmental Action Inquiry, Subject-Object, Integral Approach)
2. Who influenced your perspective on human development (and fallback)?
3. Does your understanding o f fallback differ, or is it the same as others who have used 
fallback to understand development?
4. In your opinion, does fallback exist?
5. What is the relationship between fallback and meaning making?
6. Can you explain the fallback phenomenon?
a. When or why do individuals fallback?
b. How do you know you’re in it?
c. How would you know it if  you saw it?
d. Can fallback be temporary? Long-term? Permanent?
e. Is fallback inevitable?
7. How do we account for fallback? What are the causes?
a. What is it about going home/relationships that prompt fallback?
b. What is it about injury/illness that may prompt it?
c. What is projection, and what is its relationship with fallback?
i. Is projection a constant in fallback?
d. What is the role of intellect versus intuition in falling back and progressively 
developing as a result o f it?
e. How might Maslow’s hierarchy of needs influence when, where, how, and 
why we fall back?
f. Are there other possible causes?
g. Is one prompt/catalyst/cause easier to grow developmentally from than 
another?
8. How would you critique my hypothesis that fallback does exist and that it may, in fact, 
play a role in developmental growth?
Offer specific examples from the pilot study before asking each o f  the following  
questions:
a. Is there another explanation for what participants o f the pilot study that I 
conducted during the spring describe as unconsciously acting from an earlier 
meaning-making structure than their measured center-of-gravity action logic?
b. Is it their “last hurrah” in a current action logic before progressing to the next?
290
c. Is it a states/stages distinction, meaning that we may well have multiple 
developmental centers o f gravity (stages) associated with each o f our various 
states?
9. Could fallback lead to developmental growth?
a. If so, how or in what ways?
b. If not, why not?
c. What structures, supports, environments would need to be present to allow 
growth to happen?
i. Would this vary based on the primary meaning-making stage o f the 
individual?
d. What role would intellect vs. intuition play in recovering from fallback? 
Growing from fallback?
e. What can we do to foster this growth and learning in ourselves?
f. What can we do to foster this growth and learning in others?
g. Is there a difference between temporary and extended fallback in its 
ability/capability/capacity to prompt development?
h. How can we account for variation in developmental growth after fallback?
10. Why is it important to understand fallback? What can we really learn from an 
investigation into fallback?
a. Why has fallback not been explored further?
11. How might fallback impact leadership development?
12. How might I best design research on this topic in the future?
a. What would you want to know about fallback?
b. How would you recommend I structure my research design?
i. interviews, observations, document analysis, etc.
ii. how many individuals?
1. O f different post-conventional stages? All the same?
c. How would your instrument be best used to understand the phenomenon of 
fallback? (Subject/Object Interview, SCTi MAP, Leadership Development 
Profile)
i. Or is there another instrument you think would help better elucidate 
fallback in research participants?
d. What questions should I be asking?
i. Circumstances prompting fallback?
ii. What fallback looks like/behaviors associated with fallback?
iii. Circumstances/exercises supporting development from fallback?
e. Why would you design the research this way?
13. Can you see yourself in this data (from the summary o f  my pilot study findings) in 
terms o f development?
a. As you look back on your own development, are there any events that stand 
out in your mind?
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i. Could you describe each one?
ii. How did you respond to the event?
b. Have you ever experienced fallback?
c. What kind of fallback do you think you experience (ordinary/extreme; 
temporary, pro-longed, permanent)?
d. In your experience, is unintentional fallback always negative?
e. What exactly do you feel you are losing in those moments (periods) of 
fallback? Or are you losing?
f. Could you describe the most important lessons you learned through 
experiencing fallback?
g. After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who 
has just discovered that he or she has fallen back?
h. How do you think these episodes during which you didn’t operate from your 
primary action logic have affected your developmental progress?
14. How, if at all, have your thoughts and feelings about fallback changed since our first 
interview?
15. Is there anything that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you 
during these interviews?
16. Is there anything else you think I should know to understand fallback better?
17. Is there anything you would like to ask me?
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APPENDIX C 
Pilot Study Summary o f Findings
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“In addiction, it’s not unlike talking to people about their relapses. In the fantasy 
world, people go off to 30-day rehab, and they come out and think they will never 
drink again, or use. The reality is that most people slip after addiction rehab, 
however much money they spend and however long they go. The most likely 
outcome after addiction treatment is relapse, and the addiction treatment industry 
does not publicize this. What they publicize is that you come here and you’re 
good for life, which is complete nonsense. But if  you work with the clients and 
say, Took, we’re not telling you to relapse, but let’s talk about what happens if it 
does, and how we’re going to deal with that. And, then, you’re going to learn 
from one or several o f these, and you’re finally going to get yourself where you 
come out of here and you’re at this false, or let’s say insecure level of recovery. 
And, we go back and forth a few times, and you’re finally going to catapult 
yourself to a secure level o f recovery where the relapse becomes much less likely.’ 
You’ve been down the relapse road a few times, and you think, unless I do this, I 
know where this is going. I know myself by now. So, I can head this off now. I’ve 
made this mistake three times. So, let me be honest with myself. Do I really want 
to make this change or not? It’s trial and error work and a lot o f that trial and error 
learning has to happen out in the real world.. .you can’t learn it.”
— Mitch, Strategist, likening fallback to relapse 
Do we in fact fall back, unintentionally, to earlier action logics.. .not only 
temporarily, but for extended periods of time? Might this unintentional falling back play 
a role in our developmental growth? And, if  the answer to all o f this is “yes, o f course”, 
why is the phenomenon known, but so rarely named?
Using Torbert’s Developmental Action Logics as the conceptual framework, and 
focusing specifically on the post-conventional action logics, I conducted a pilot study to 
elucidate the phenomenon o f fallback and its potential for transforming the 
developmental growth o f individuals. Interviews, both individual and group, were 
conducted with three participants representing the Individualist, Strategist, and Alchemist 
action logics as measured by Suzanne Cook-Greuter’s SCTi-MAP. I sought to shed light 
on this often present but seldom explicitly named phenomenon of fallback in human 
development in three ways: 1) through exploration of the scenarios that participants 
described as fallback; 2) through analysis o f how participants measured at different 
primary action logics described their response to fallback; and (3) by delving into the 
actions, scaffolding, environments, and circumstances that appeared to have supported 
learning from fallback.
Stage development theory posits that each stage o f meaning-making is more 
complex than and also inclusive o f the earlier stages through which the individual has 
already passed. Therefore, it would follow that one could choose to act from an earlier 
action logic to meet other individuals where they are at developmentally, to accomplish 
specific tasks, or to optimally function in given environments. All participants described 
their conscious use of this capacity in given circumstances.
However, the idea that one does also unconsciously act from an earlier action 
logic at times has not been accounted for in stage development theory. Yet, the three 
participants in this study did not hesitate when asked to describe situations o f involuntary 
fallback.
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“When something comes up and I get pissed off, and I think you don’t know, I 
know better. Well, that’s kind of falling back into that, ‘I’m better than you, I ’m 
smarter’ thing. Now, if that isn’t falling back into an Achiever, I don’t know what 
is. You know the competition. Your ego triggers something. ‘Fine, do it your way.’ 
You know, instead o f just being open even though the other person annoys you. 
Not being annoyed. Being able to see there’s another perspective that’s important 
instead o f competing with the perspective. And, I get caught in that a lot.. .at 
home.”
Liz - Individualist
When asked both individually and as a group how the participants thought these 
episodes during which they didn’t operate from their primary action logic has affected 
their developmental progress, all participants claimed that the fallback episodes played a 
somehow positive role.
“I think ultimately they were really necessary for growth. You know it’s that 
bringing something to the surface that needs to be healed or released somehow in 
order to move on. It just had to be in order to grow.”
A Hie - Alchemist
This exploration into the phenomenon o f fallback in human development 
provided an initial glimpse into how three post-conventional action logic-measured 
individuals experience acting from an earlier developmental stage than their primary 
meaning-making center-of-gravity. However, delving into this little-researched topic also 
uncovered several additional concepts that are ripe for further inquiry.
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When entering into the data collection, I had conceptually defined temporary 
fallback as something that occurred over the span o f minutes, days, perhaps weeks. In 
addition, however, fallback scenarios spanning the course o f several months were 
described by all participants, the occurrence o f which took place before a seemingly 
substantial progressive shift in meaning-making capacity. This prompted me to wonder if 
these episodes were in fact fallback, or a “last hurrah” of sorts within their primary action 
logic before transforming to the next, or perhaps both.
“I mean I probably had months and years when I was in fallback.. .There were 
times when I was just caught in something for a long time. I remember there was 
a .. .one thing.. .where I was really caught in this kind of victim stance. Like, what 
had been done to me that was so unjust and so unfair. It went on for a really long 
time. And, I was just so convinced that I was totally blameless, and it had nothing 
to do with me. It was just this terrible person that had seized upon an innocent 
victim. And, I don’t know if it.. .I’m just not even aware enough to know what 
level of consciousness I might have been at and how it was a fallback. I mean it 
was certainly a fallback. I can remember having fantasies about what I would like 
to do to this person.. .1 never did it. It was probably a fallback. So, yeah, I think 
you can be in that for really long periods of time, you know when there are these, 
these strong patterns and beliefs that are really rooted pretty deeply in us. It’s . .. 
you can get pretty hooked by them for a long time.”
Allie - Alchemist
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Both the Individualist and Alchemist offered multiple mentions o f fallback with a 
focus on intuition and alternate forms of seeking consciousness versus connecting to 
intellect in their efforts to recover, learn, and grow from fallback episodes.
“Getting more into body awareness, so when the anxieties come up, trying to 
locate them as physical sensations versus thinking. It takes it out o f the, it takes it 
away from thinking. Because it’s thinking that gives you the anxiety. You have a 
thought about being hurt, or you have a thought about being mad, or you have a 
thought about being anxious. That’s what causes you to have these bodily 
sensations. So you focus more on the physical sensations o f the thought, not the 
thought. It helps it dissipate, because you can locate it in your body, you can look 
at it, you can see it, you can feel it. And, if you do that it sort o f goes away. It 
works.”
Liz - Individualist
Interestingly, the Strategist described his response to fallback with a particularly 
intellect-focused flavor, using analysis of systems, problem-solving, and logic as tools to 
make sense o f and learn from the episodes. What role might intellect play in falling back 
unintentionally and in one’s recovery from it? What o f intuition?
To some extent all participants, but the Alchemist in particular, referenced the 
presence of projection in her unintentional fallback episodes. She described powerful 
shifts in learning and growth from these experiences.
“I mean one of the really important things for me is finally really getting that 
what’s going on externally in my world is an out-picturing o f m y.. .it really is this 
sense o f creating my own reality. If suddenly there’s this string o f people that I ’m
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encountering that are annoying or that.. .1 know now not to go, like it’s totally 
pointless to get into ‘You know what they did and what they said?’ It’s like okay, 
what in me is magnetizing this at this point? And, it’s just amazing how it can 
shift what world we start to encounter out there. So, that’s the, I would say, that’s 
the biggest shift. “
Allie -  Alchemist
Projection and shadow emerged as themes in the participants’ stories about 
fallback, which led me to wonder how an exploration and acceptance of one’s own 
shadow might facilitate recognizing and learning from fallback, and ultimately assist us 
in creating our own reality. It is to the importance o f understanding fallback that I turn 
next.
Why does understanding fallback matter?
The literature notes that certain conditions exist that may cause individuals to 
exhibit behavior indicative of earlier stages (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter &
Soulen, 2007; Kegan, 1982; McCallum, 2008; McCauley, et al., 2006; Torbert, 2004). 
However, while the phenomenon of temporary fallback and its role in human 
development have been addressed in the stage theory literature only cursorily, the 
implications of this connection are far-reaching. While each individual’s meaning- 
making structure and experience of fallback is unique within the broader framework of 
his/her center-of-gravity action logic, the phenomenon of fallback appears to exist all 
along the developmental spectrum (McCallum, 2008). Cultivating a greater 
understanding of fallback, and understanding that fallback is an inevitable aspect of 
human development, no matter one’s developmental action logic, can help make the
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process— often marked by risk and ambiguity (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Cook-Greuter & 
Soulen, 2007; McCallum, 2008)— less frightening.
Identifying one’s primary fallback action logics and the circumstances which 
prompt the occurrence o f fallback allows greater presence and awareness in the moment, 
enabling an individual to respond more effectively, and for fallback to be experienced as 
an opportunity for learning (Torbert, 2004). This learning may be a primary agent in 
developing the aptitude for more complex ways o f making meaning o f the world and may 
actually prompt human beings to transform to later developmental action logics.
Structured interventions have shown promising results in the developmental 
movement of an individual through post-conventional developmental stages (McCauley, 
et al., 2006). The findings from this study on fallback may inform the design o f programs 
that can provide scaffolding and/or interventions that lead to quicker in-the-moment 
awareness of fallback, and therefore its recovery and analysis.
